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Chapter 1   
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest poverty rate and lowest human development indicators 
in the world. Around 45 percent of the population in the region live on less than 1.25$ per 
day, and this makes up 30 percent of the world’s poor. Life expectancy at birth is around 54 
years while it is 70 years in North America, and on average 1 in 8 children under the age of 
five die on a yearly basis (World Bank, 2013). These unfavourable statistics briefly 
illustrate why poverty reduction is an important goal for local and international policy 
makers.  
 The strategy to reach that goal should be to analyse wide ranging economic and 
political problems of different African
1
 communities. To begin with, the role of various 
factors in economic development and how they interact with each other should be explored.  
As Rodrik and Rosenzweig (2010) stress development policy is instinctively related to 
different economic disciplines:  
“The policies that impact development are wide-ranging, all the way from broad 
macroeconomic policies such as monetary and exchange-rate policies to 
interventions in microfinance… Poverty reduction, economic growth, and 
development most broadly are the outcomes of a complex set of interactions across 
the entire range of economic policies and institutions. From this perspective, 
“development policies” must have a very broad meaning indeed.” (pp. xv-xxvii) 
                                                          
1
 I refer to Sub-Saharan Africa when Africa term is used.  




 Furthermore it should be checked how broad development policies proposed for the whole 
region apply to separate countries and communities as neither the problems concerning 
economic development nor the structure of the economies are the same across Africa.  For 
instance 
 per capita income is lowest in Niger (180 international $) and highest in 
Equatorial Guinea (13720$); 
 share of agriculture accounts 2.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 
Botswana, it accounts 48 percent for Ethiopian economy; 
  around 81 percent of Bruindese lives under poverty line (1.25 $ per day); 13 
percent of South African lives under poverty line; 
  the ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary school is lowest in Niger (78 
percent) and highest in Cape Verde (104 percent); 
  162 per 1000 infants under five years old die in Sierra Leone, 48 per 1000 infants 
die in Botswana;  
 ratio of private sector credit to GDP is 62.1 percent for Cape Verde economy and 
145 percent for South African economy (World Bank, 2013). 
In short, concerning economic development, the problems are diverse and the intervention 
process is complex due to the interaction of the policies. 
Different characteristics of market institutions in Africa make intervention process 
even more complex (see Fafchamps (2004) for a detailed overview of market institutions at 
the region).  African markets are mainly characterized by subsistence production, self-
employed entrepreneurs, many small volume transactions, flea markets, relationship based 
trade contracts, and gift exchange for social insurance. In these markets, judicial systems to 
regulate the transactions are weak; social institutions and norms such as social networks, 
customs, personal trust, and reciprocity replace them to sustain cooperation between agents 
and secure the contract compliance in the exchanges.  On contrary, mainly facilitated by 
strong formal institutions (i.e. judicial system and courts), Western markets possess 
different characteristics: high specialization in production, high volume per transaction, 
large enterprises and organizations, developed public and private social insurance schemes, 




trade through contractual agreements.  If the interventions disregard these differences and 
directly transfer technology and institutions from developed economies to African markets, 
they may not produce desired outcomes; the transferred innovations may clash with the 
substitutes in the African markets - which are functional and efficient given the existing 
market institutions in the region.  Moreover, they may also not be as beneficial as they were 
in their source economies while strong formal institutions are absent but strong social 
norms and institutions are present.  So development interventions must not only focus on 
interaction between diverse problems of African economies but also consider the unique 
features of market institutions in Africa.  
1.2 Objective and research questions 
Studies concerning how broad development interventions affect each African community’s 
economic development and how they interact with each other and market institutions in 
Africa are steps towards understanding this complex relationship; they therefore have the 
potential to guide the policy makers in the right direction.  The purpose of this dissertation 
is to add to such studies by analysing the interaction between economic development in 
Africa and three economic concepts:  decentralized agricultural innovation systems, trust 
and saving practices - all of which are closely related to market institutions in Africa.  The 
aim is not to provide a complete picture of the interactions between those concepts though.  
Instead each chapter has a stand-alone contribution as a result of separate and independent 
academic studies. 
Specifically this study answers three research questions.  The first question concerns 
the interaction between economic development and agricultural decentralized innovation 
systems.  Several programs and organizations have recently introduced the innovation 
systems approach to rural Africa via so called innovation platforms in order to stimulate 
agricultural development in Africa.  Innovation system approach does not involve direct 
transfer of agricultural technologies from developed world to promote rural economic 
development as conventional approaches do through extension agents. Instead, bringing 
local stakeholders such as R&D organizations, advisory services, input suppliers, financial 
organizations, downstream processing and marketing firms all together, innovation 




platforms design and apply technological and institutional innovations by utilizing local 
knowledge, opportunities and institutional environment. This thesis explores how 
decentralized innovation systems affect local agricultural development in Africa in 
Chapters 2-4. 
The second question is related to the interaction between economic development and 
trust.  Theory suggests that trust, which is an important outcome of market institutions in 
Africa, fosters economic development thanks to reduced transaction costs and increased 
specialisation.  A virtuous cycle may also materialize if increased specialisation, through 
increased market integration and economic development, also fosters trust.  To shed light 
on the latter argument, Chapter 5 investigates the effect of market integration on trust at an 
early level of economic development.  
The third question is about the interaction between economic development and 
saving practices.  Access to finance is limited in developing countries; therefore 
entrepreneurs have to save in order to invest back to their businesses.  At the same time, 
entrepreneurs in Africa save through multiple ways.  They keep their savings not only in an 
official account (i.e. in banks or MFI) – like in Western economies - but they also save by 
entrusting funds to a moneylender for safekeeping, by hiding them in a secret place, or by 
giving it other household members, etc.  Each of those practices may potentially have 
different efficiency levels, and therefore may have varying effects on business investments.  
Chapter 6 studies how those different saving practices affect the likelihood of reinvestment 
of business profits and compare their reinvestment efficiency. 
To answer the above summarized research questions, the dissertation utilizes two 
main data sources and various identification strategies.  The first question is investigated by 
using experimental data from the Sub-Saharan Africa Challenge Program (SSA-CP) which 
introduced local decentralized innovation systems to rural agricultural communities in 8 
African countries.
2
 Identification mainly relies on differences in differences and panel data 
methodologies.  The thesis examines the second question by using a sub-section of SSA-CP 
dataset, and benefits from detailed survey questions to control for confounding factors and 
instrumental variable strategies to identify the casual relationship.  Finally, the study 
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answers the third question with the help of a national survey in Tanzania which focuses on 
micro and small enterprises and collects information on entrepreneurs’ saving and 
reinvestment practices. It makes use of detailed survey questions, and employs instrumental 
variables strategy to overcome concerns regarding endogeneity. 
1.3 Related literature 
The thesis mainly relates to three distinct areas within the economic development literature.  
Studies presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 fit into the broad literature that investigates the 
highly debated role of agriculture in economic development.  The early popular economic 
development models have considered agriculture as an unproductive sector from where 
resources should be de-allocated away to more productive industries to boost economic 
growth.  In contrast, a parallel literature has argued that, having strong linkages with non-
farm sectors, agriculture may be the key for economic development particularly at the early 
stages of development by enhancing growth in rural non-farm economy and leading to 
faster overall growth (see Christiansen et al. (2010) for a more detailed literature review).  
Recent studies support the latter argument by showing that the growth in agriculture is 
better at reducing extreme poverty than non-agriculture sectors (World Bank, 2007; 
Christiansen et al., 2010; Janvry and Sadoulet, 2010). These findings imply that agriculture 
may play an important role in tackling poverty in Africa since it is the main source of 
income for the poor in rural Africa (World Bank, 2007), and there is a large room for 
increasing production in Africa by improving productivity and land use (Janvry & 
Sadoulet, 2010).  Hence, there is an opportunity to reduce poverty and boost economic 
development in Africa by enhancing agricultural productivity, land use, and production. 
Therefore, many studies have explored the bottleneck points for low productivity 
and land use in African agriculture (see Binswanger and Kalla (2010) for an overview), and 
assessed whether wide ranging related policies might solve those bottlenecks.
3
  
Nevertheless, the literature still lacks quantitative studies evaluating how, within the 
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 Some of the important policy evaluation studies are conducted on access to markets by Barrett (2008); 
fertilizer use by Duflo et al. (2008); land rights by Goldstein and Udry (2008); new technology usage by 
Conley and Udry (2010).     




institutional frameworks of value chain and agricultural innovation systems, multi-
stakeholder development partnerships between various stakeholders affect the adoption of 
agricultural innovations and development in Africa (Byerlee & Bernstein, 2013; Campell, 
2013).  Chapters 1, 2 and 3 add to this literature by providing evidence regarding the impact 
of such a partnership within the framework of decentralized innovation systems on poverty 
and agricultural innovation. 
Chapter 5 contributes to the literature by investigating the interaction between 
economic development and social capital.  Putnam et al. (1994) define social capital as “… 
features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (p. 167). How do those features of 
social organizations affect economic development?  In his seminal work, Putnam et al. 
(1994) shows that denser social networks and higher social capital explain the differences 
in industrialization level across Italian regions.  Subsequent studies support this finding by 
showing that social capital of the societies determines the range of economic concepts 
concerning development (see Guiso et al. 2010 for an overview).  Hence, we have enough 
evidence to argue that social capital is a determinant of the economic development.  
On the contrary, much less is known regarding how social capital evolves during the 
process of economic developments.  In one of the rare studies, Miguel et al. (2006) 
document that during the industrialization process of Indonesia, participation to social 
groups and interaction with others have increased in the districts of Indonesia.  Tabellini 
(2008) theoretically shows that the increase in those social interactions between socially 
distant individuals may lead to evolution of generalized moralities which can sustain 
cooperation between anonymous agents and facilitate trade between them.   Inspiring work 
of Henrich et al. (2004, 2010) confirm the robustness of these theoretical propositions by 
showing that market friendly social norms may evolve as a result of market integration 
communities. By using data from behavioral experiments conducted in 14 rural societies, 
Henrich et al. (2004, 2010) document that there is a positive correlation between the level 
of market integration of the societies and the prevalence of market friendly behavior such 
as generalized trust, fairness and cooperation in those societies.  This finding may suggest 
that economic development process lead to the emergence of favourable social norms 




through market integration of societies, as transformation from personalized exchange to 
impersonal market exchange is a necessary stage for economic development (Fafchamps 
2011).  Empirical evidence concerning market integration and evolution of generalized 
social norms is still limited though; communities subject to former analysis are very 
heterogeneous or related studies do not estimate a causal relationship from market 
integration to social norms.  Chapter 5 adds to this literature by reporting estimates for the 
causal effect of market integration on trust from a rural homogeneous society in Western 
Africa. 
Finally, the results presented in Chapter 6 are mainly related to the literature 
exploring the role of finance in economic development. There is a rich literature showing 
that development of financial markets matter for economic growth.  Those studies have 
documented that access to financial services such as credit, insurance, payments/money 
transfer, bank and saving accounts) may alter consumption, investment and saving 
behavior, and as a result yield to long-term economic growth (see Levine (2005) for a 
detailed overview).  So, can access to similar services in developing countries - where 
financial markets are usually missing - boost economic development and alleviate poverty 
as well?  To probe this question, recent country level empirical studies have evaluated the 
impact of financial services such as micro credit, micro insurance and savings products, 
which are generally designed for the poor households, entrepreneurs and farmers, on 
several outcomes.  For instance, a large literature has studied the impact of micro credit on 
business performances of entrepreneurs, household income, and consumption in developing 
countries (see Armendáriz and Morduch (2005) for detailed overview).  Cai et al. (2012) 
and Cole et al. (2013) provide evidence concerning the impact of micro insurance on 
production choices of farmers in south western China and India respectively.  Finally a 
growing body of literature has assessed the effect of access to formal saving services such 
as deposit or MFI accounts and informal saving practices such as saving through groups, in 
a coin container, rotating savings and credit associations, etc. on entrepreneurial decisions, 
household expenditures and income (see Karlan et al. (2013) for an overview).  Chapter 6 
mainly contributes to this final literature by comparing the efficiency of those formal and 
informal saving practices in directing profits back to business investments. 




1.4 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 focus on the impact of decentralized 
innovation systems approach on resource poor farmers. Specifically, Chapter 2 evaluates 
the impact of the innovation systems on poverty and investigates whether it outperforms 
conventional extension approaches by using experimental data from Central Africa.  
Chapter 3 investigates whether innovation systems can promote the adoption of agricultural 
innovations by using experimental data collected in 8 African countries. These two chapters 
and other related studies in the literature find considerable heterogeneity in the impact of 
innovation systems; therefore Chapter 4 investigates whether this heterogeneity results 
from the heterogeneity in implementation of innovation system approach by quantifying the 
defining principles of the approach into an index.   
 Chapter 5 examines the impact of increased market integration on various measures 
of trust.  Using a comprehensive survey of households in West Africa which are still in the 
early stages of market integration, the study identifies a negative and causal relationship 
between market integration and trust. 
 Finally Chapter 6 investigates the relationship between entrepreneurial saving 
practices and reinvestment. This study develops a model of entrepreneurial reinvestment 
and saving practices and shows that an entrepreneur's reinvestment decision depends on the 
efficiency of her saving practice, in addition to the productivity and the borrowing capacity 
of the entrepreneur. Then, utilizing a novel micro and small enterprise survey from 
Tanzania, the study tests the empirical implications of this theory. 
 






2. Decentralized innovation systems and poverty 





Agricultural development in Africa has resurfaced as a priority issue on the international 
development agenda.  In addition to obvious concerns about food security and prices, three 
factors are responsible for the recent re-appraisal of African farming: targeting, 
comparative advantage, and inter-sectoral linkages.  Some 75% of the poor in developing 
countries live in rural areas, and the majority of them depend on agriculture for their 
livelihoods. Given agriculture’s dominant role in the lives of the rural poor, it makes sense 
to center strategies for cutting poverty on growth in this sector (World Bank, 2007).  
Moreover, most African countries are agriculture-based, and tend to have a comparative 
advantage in the production of primary commodities.  Finally, agricultural growth has large 
multiplier effects in early stages of development (Haggblade et al. 2007).  The growth in 
GDP originating in agriculture raises incomes of the poor much more than growth 
originating elsewhere in the economy (Ligon & Sadoulet, 2007), especially for the poorest 
and especially in early stages of development (Christiaensen et al., 2010).   
African rural society is characterised by high transaction costs and risk, hampered 
information flows, and a weak institutional environment.  As a result, both market 
                                                          
 This Chapter is based on following research paper: Pamuk, H., Bulte, E., Adekunle, A., & Diagne, 
A. (2014). Decentralised innovation systems and poverty reduction: experimental evidence from 
Central Africa. European Review of Agricultural Economics, jbu007. 
Chapter 2: Decentralized innovations systems and poverty reduction 
10 
 
development and access to existing markets are inhibited.  Creating an enabling 
institutional and policy environment is a necessary condition for African farming to take-
off (IFPRI, 2010).  Therefore, the new development agenda emphasizes (i) linking farmers 
to input and output markets, (ii) identifying governance arrangements to strengthen 
property rights and asset control, and (iii) promoting technical innovation and diffusion of 
knowledge to increase land and labour productivity (Djurfeld et al. 2006, World Bank, 
2007 Dorward et al. 2009, and IFPRI 2010).  Increasingly it is recognized that these 
elements hang together, and that innovation in the domains of governance and technology 
could go hand-in-hand.   
Agricultural innovation among African smallholders has progressed slowly, and 
efforts to promote the adoption of new technologies, even if occasionally successful locally, 
have largely proven unsuccessful.  A challenging perspective of conventional, top-down 
approaches to extension argues that agricultural research should be embedded in a larger 
“innovation system,” integrating knowledge from various actors and stakeholders.  This 
amounts to a participatory approach to innovation and diffusion, which implies a shift from 
viewing innovation as a “product to a process” (Knickel et al. 2009).  In such an innovation 
system, agents such as firms, research institutes, intermediaries, customers, authorities, and 
financial organizations are interacting partners resulting in non-linear, iterative processes 
(Geels 2004, van Mierlo et al. 2010).  
The main objective of this study is to compare the performance of traditional “top-
down” approaches to innovation and extension to the performance of a decentralized 
innovation system approach, and to compare both approaches to the default case of doing 
nothing.  Specifically, we focus on the impact of so-called innovation platforms (IPs) on the 
alleviation of rural poverty and on food consumption.  We also probe potential channels 
explaining impact, focusing on the adoption of specific technological and institutional 
innovations.   
The question whether decentralized, local approaches to extension outperform 
centralised, top-down ones links to a broader debate that goes back to at least Scott (1989).  
Scott argues that centrally managed and highly schematic development visions do violence 
Chapter 2: Decentralized innovations systems and poverty reduction 
11 
 
to complex local interdependencies, and systematically fail to achieve their objectives.  As 
an alternative to such “high-modernist” ideologies, based on epistemic knowledge, he 
proposes greater emphasis on local, practical knowledge (which he labels “metis”).  From a 
theoretical perspective it is not obvious which approach to innovation is more efficient and 
effective—the traditional, centralized model or the local and participatory model.  
Economies of scale in innovation and transfer may imply greater benefits for the 
centralized approach.  In contrast, the decentralized approach is presumably better able to 
capitalize on local knowledge about constraints and possibilities, and local understanding of 
needs and priorities.  
Local institutions, such as the ones that facilitate capitalizing on local knowledge, 
tend to co-evolve with communities, and respond to local regulatory or cultural issues.  In 
models explaining economic performance based on observational data, local institutions are 
likely to be endogenous.  Careful econometric analysis, based on propensity score matching 
or instrumental variable strategies,
4
 may enable the analyst to attenuate these endogeneity 
concerns (even if some concerns will remain due to unobserved heterogeneity).  An 
alternative approach to probe the causal impact of institutional innovations is to introduce 
variation in these institutions—as part of an experiment.  This is the approach taken in this 
paper.  Our identification strategy is based on quasi-experimental data obtained in the Sub 
Sahara African Challenge Program (SSA CP).  In a sample of villages in selected countries, 
IPs were introduced—forums where local stakeholders come together and search for 
practical ways to advance their livelihoods.  We analyse how poverty in these IP villages 
compares to outcomes in communities served by the traditional innovation approach, and to 
outcomes in a sample of control villages. 
Three remarks are in order.  First, our data do not derive from a full-fledged 
randomized control trial (RCT).  The intervention villages were not randomly drawn from 
the same sample as the control villages (but an effort was made to ensure that the treated 
and control villages were “similar”).  This has implications for the data analysis.  Second, 
                                                          
4
 For example, Mapila et al. (2011) uses propensity score matching to investigate the impact of agricultural 
innovation systems on rural livelihoods in Malawi.  They conclude innovation systems increased the rural 
income, upland crop production and fertilizer use. 
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IPs were introduced in 2008 and 2009, and follow-up data was collected in 2010.  Hence, 
we can only pick up short-term effects.  Future work, based on additional data to be 
collected in the future (in 2014), should explore whether the results we obtain are 
sustainable, or are overtaken by other events, and explore whether the channels via which 
IPs have impact on poverty evolve over time.  Third, although the program involves a cost, 
we do not have any data regarding the amount of the cost.  Only if we find that the 
intervention does not reduce poverty, we can reach to a conclusion about its cost efficiency 
and conclude that it is inefficient. 
  We obtain a nuanced set of results.  On average, the decentralized innovation 
systems approach is better able to alleviate poverty than the traditional approach (and both 
approaches are better than doing nothing).  However, we also document considerable 
heterogeneity across IPs.  There are successful IPs as well as unsuccessful ones in terms of 
poverty alleviation, and it appears as if some of the platforms have failed to engage the 
relevant stakeholders, or have otherwise been unable to mobilize stocks of local knowledge.  
Unearthing the determinants of IP performance is left as an urgent priority for future 
research.   
 The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2.2 we briefly summarize key lessons 
from the literature on agricultural innovations in Africa.  In section 2.3 we describe the Sub 
Sahara African Challenge Program, and the nature of its main intervention—the creation of 
innovation platforms in selected villages.  In section 2.4 and 2.5 we summarize our data and 
outline our identification strategy, respectively.   Section 2.6 presents the results, focusing 
on average poverty impacts of the innovation system approach and on heterogeneous 
treatment effects (across innovation platforms and across individuals treated by the same 
platform).  In section 2.7 we probe the channels linking IPs to reduced poverty, and section 
2.8 concludes. 
2.2 Agricultural innovations in Africa 
Agricultural yields in many African countries have been declining in recent decades.  One 
reason for this disappointing outcome is imperfect adoption of innovations.  Agricultural 
Chapter 2: Decentralized innovations systems and poverty reduction 
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innovations may be a significant growth factor for the economy as a whole, via effects on 
demands for inputs and prices of food (see the recent paper on mechanisation in US 
farming by Steckel and White 2012).  While various yield-increasing technologies are 
available for African farmers, their uptake among smallholders remains far below 100%.  
Key factors identified in the literature include factors directly linked to the technology 
(availability or untimely delivery of innovations, high costs, demands on complementary 
inputs, “riskiness”), factors at the level of individual farmers (e.g., education, access to 
credit, but also risk preferences and loss aversion—see Liu 2013), and contextual factors 
such as poor extension, transaction costs (e.g., bad infrastructure), access to value chains 
(Barrett et al. 2012), and geophysical conditions (for discussions, refer to Feder et al. 
(1985), Rogers (1995), Sunding and Zilberman (2001), and Suri (2011)).  Recent academic 
work emphasizes the role of social learning and networks in innovation and diffusion 
processes (e.g., Bandiera & Rasul (2006) and Conley & Udry (2009)). 
Some analysts argue that an important cause of the limited impact of traditional 
research and extension activities in Africa is the simplistic yet dominant view on innovation 
processes (Leeuwis & van de Ban 2004).  According to the traditional adoption and 
diffusion model (or pipe-line model, sometimes referred to as technology-transfer model, 
delivery model, or technology-push model) innovation is conceptualized as a linear 
process.  It starts with conception by scientists and extends to adoption by farmers, via 
extension workers (Knickel et al. 2009).  Research, transfer, and adoption are independent 
activities, and there is little attention for the context within which these processes are 
embedded.   
Consequently, traditional extension –– for which various modalities exist, including 
the well-known training and visit (T&V) and village agent model –– often amounted to 
“blanket recommendations.”  Such recommendations might not fit with local conditions.  
For example, heterogeneity in returns to new technology has recently been documented by 
Duflo et al. (2008) for the case of fertilizer, and by Suri (2011) for the case of hybrid maize.  
The lack of a fit between recommended technologies and local needs may be especially 
pronounced when research and extension are biased towards big farmers.  Not surprisingly, 
then, demand for extension may be weak among food producing smallholders in peripheral 
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locations (Holmen 2005).  There are additional reasons for pessimism about the 
effectiveness of traditional extension.  “Public services have dominated extension. …  But 
public financing and provision face profound problems of incentives of civil servants for 
accountability to their clients, weak political commitments to extension, extension workers 
not being abreast of relevant emerging technological and other developments, a severe lack 
of fiscal sustainability in many countries, and weak evidence of impact” (World Bank, 
2007, p.173). 
In fairness, the traditional approach to extension is gradually changing, shifting 
from the prescription of technological practices to focusing on capacity building among 
rural people – empowering them (World Bank, 2007).  Accordingly, extension efforts now 
sometimes include a broader range of approaches, including public-private partnerships 
(collaboration between state, firms and NGOs) and farmer-to-farmer training.  However, 
conventional extension in our study region is still characterized by a single line of 
command, based on “expert knowledge” flowing to farmers through a network of public 
extension agents.  We seek to explore whether participatory approaches to innovation and 
diffusion, and specifically agricultural innovation systems, - are more or less successful in 
reducing rural poverty in our study region. 
The theory defines agricultural innovation systems as informal organizational 
structures including various stakeholders (e.g. farmers, research institutes, NGOs, etc.) and 
aiming to increase agricultural production by facilitating the communication between 
stakeholders and design of local agricultural innovations (see Geels 2004 for a detailed 
discussion on innovation systems theory.).  The theory hypothesize that innovation systems 
may increase the success chance of agricultural innovations by making the participation of 
the farmers to the innovation research process easier and serving as a feedback mechanism.  
Though their participation, local farmers may share their tacit knowledge of local farming 
characteristics in the agricultural research process; this enhances the likelihood of the match 
between local needs and outcome of the research - the innovations that will be promoted in 
the field.  Participation may also boost their understanding of promoted innovations, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of adoption in the field.  Finally, innovation systems serve 
as a feedback mechanism through which producers can report the problems concerning the 
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innovations.  Hence policy makers can re-design and re-introduce innovation according to 
the received feedback and make sure that innovations have been proved useful for the 
producers and adapted by them. .   
2.3  Program description: Introducing innovation systems in 
African farming 
We test the hypothesis above by utilizing the SSA CP started in 2004.  To remedy 
perceived problems with the traditional approach to extension, a new approach was 
proposed named Integrated Agricultural Research for Development (IAR4D).  It aims to 
bring stakeholders together and integrate their knowledge so as to generate network effects 
and stimulate innovation relevant for the local context.  The ultimate objective is to 
alleviate rural poverty.  
The IAR4D approach aims to promote innovations via decentralized innovation 
systems, so called IPs.  IPs are introduced in selected locations (serving various villages), 
and serve as vehicles to bring together representatives of farmers’ associations, private 
firms and traders, researchers, extension workers, NGOs, and government policy makers.  
Ideally, an IP should decide on membership of stakeholder groups through a participatory 
and bottom up process.  Selected stakeholders should come together, diagnose common 
challenges and bottlenecks, and decide on strategies to overcome key problems.  This 
includes raising awareness among local communities for adopting the innovations 
prioritized in the action plan––assigned IP members go to the field and facilitate adoption 
(FARA, 2008).
5
 To facilitate the adoption, IPs may implement the education programs for 
the communities, give information to farmers regarding agricultural techniques, and 
provide extension services.  How these have been implemented, and which institutional and 
technological innovations an IP have focused on may vary between IPs.   Because IPs 
operate at the local level, responding to local challenges, they are independent of each 
other, and each IP follows its own agenda under the general framework of IAR4D 
approach.  For this reason, across IPs the diagnosis and strategy setting stages may produce 
                                                          
5
 However, there is always a risk that IPs might not function ideally. For instance, some stakeholders might 
promote the adoption of specific innovations before other stakeholders have decided on the bottlenecks.     
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different outcomes. Importantly for the purposes of this evaluation the intervention did not 
include subsidized access to certain inputs, loans (which would otherwise have confounded 
the poverty impact of the institutional innovation).  
The Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) coordinated the 
implementation of the SSA CP through local partner agencies (NGOs and universities)
6
, 
and aimed to investigate IAR4D’s effectiveness relative to doing nothing and conventional 
research and extension approaches.  For the latter purpose, the implementation plan was 
designed as an experiment.  The objective was to obtain results informative about 
agricultural development across the African continent, hence the program was rolled out in 
three major sub-regions (so-called project learning sites: PLS): (i) “Lake Kivu” in Eastern 
and Central Africa, (ii) “Kano‐Katsina‐Maradi” in West Africa, and (iii) Zimbabwe‐
Malawi‐Mozambique in Southern Africa. In total, 36 IPs were created––12 per PLS.  An IP 
serves multiple intervention villages (typically between 5 and 10 villages, so the number of 
treated villages was expected to be between 60 and 120 villages per PLS).  Per village, 10 
households were randomly sampled and surveyed, so the total number of households 
surveyed per PLS is in the range of 600-1,200.  To evaluate the performance of IAR4D 
villages, data were also collected in two types of comparison villages (conventional 
extension villages and control villages without any intervention – see below).  The total 
number of respondents per PLS is therefore in the range of 1,800-3,600. 
How were intervention and control villages selected? The selection has been done 
by the local project implementation teams consists of local stakeholders at each PLS. The 
details of the sampling procedure vary slightly across PLSs.  As poverty data for midline 
period (see below for details) are collected at Lake Kivu PLS only, we use data from the 
Lake Kivu region, capturing parts of Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) for the analysis.  In each country, a sample of sites or wards was selected 
(named sub-counties in Uganda, secteurs in Rwanda, and groupements in the DRC).  These 
wards represent administrative groupings of multiple villages, and were selected to provide 
                                                          
6
 The funds FARA received from international donors have been allocated to local agencies and local 
agencies used these funds to implement the project. 
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a representative sample in terms of market access and agro-ecological conditions.  In total, 
24 wards are included in the Lake Kivu PLS, evenly split across the three countries.   
When designing the study, a trade-off had to be struck between the management of 
spill-over effects (e.g., counterfactual villages benefitting from activities or ideas generated 
at nearby platforms) and the balance of the sample.  If treatment status would be randomly 
assigned at the village level, then treatment and counterfactual villages are expected to be 
similar at the baseline, both in terms of observables and unobservables.  But random 
assignment at the village level also implies that treated villages may be located next to 
counterfactual villages.  To attenuate potential spill-over bias, assignment into treatment 
was done at the level of the ward.  This implies treated and counterfactual villages are 
clustered in space, minimizing spill-over effects—a benefit that comes at the cost of 
reduced balance between treated and counterfactual villages (as will be evident below). 
12 wards were assigned to receive the treatment, and consequently a random 
subsample of (clean) villages from these wards received an IP.  We define “clean villages” 
as villages that did not receive any (conventional) projects in the 5 years preceding the 
intervention (i.e. no extension or NGO activities during the period 2003-2008).  The other 
twelve wards were assigned to control status, and a random sample of villages from these 
wards comprises our samples of counterfactual villages.  Specifically, villages from these 
“control wards” were assessed and classified into one of 2 types of villages: (i) clean 
villages that had neither received IAR4D nor conventional projects in the previous 2-5 
years; and (ii) conventional extension villages, which had received projects identifying, 
promoting and disseminating technologies in the same period.  Hence, based on their 
individual history of exposure to extension, some villages drawn from the control wards 
were labelled as “control (clean) villages,” and others as “conventional (extension) control 
villages.” 
It is important to note that the historical allocation of extension workers across the 
African landscape is possibly non-random.  Hence, we need to delve into selection issues 
and potential endogeneities, when assessing the impact of innovation platforms.  Details of 
our identification strategy are discussed in section 2.5. 
Chapter 2: Decentralized innovations systems and poverty reduction 
18 
 
2.4  Data 
We use data from the Lake Kivu PLS containing villages in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda.  For this site, 76 villages were randomly selected to be 
“treated” by IAR4D (i.e., received an IP).  There was no non-compliance – all villages 
accepted the IP (but there is variation in the nature of the intervention across sites; see 
below).  A village census was carried out in adjacent wards to construct a sample frame and 
stratify villages into the sets of “(clean) control” and “(conventional) extension” villages.  
Next, 85 villages were drawn from the set of control villages, and another 85 villages were 
drawn from the set of traditional extension villages.  Note that control and conventional 
extension villages were drawn from the same 12 wards, and that these wards are not the 
same as the ones from which the IAR4D villages were selected.   
Baseline data were collected in the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda in 2008/09, and the 
next wave of data was collected in 2010.  Since some of the baseline data are collected in 
late 2008 and others in early 2009, we control for the timing of data collection via a dummy 
variable.  Over both surveys we observe some 2,230 households, residing in 244 villages 
(indicating some attrition as the number of respondents in the baseline wave was 2,402).  
The average number of respondents per village was 9.5 (standard deviation 1.6).  A 
summary of the sampling frame is provided in Table 2.1.
7
  
Table 2.1: Sample design  
Survey Control Conventional IAR4D (intervention) Total 
Households 
baseline 806 816 780 2,402 
midline 769 776 685 2,230 
Villages 
baseline 85 85 76 246 
midline 84 85 75 244 
 
                                                          
7
 One reason for attrition was oversampling at the baseline.  At the baseline, we slightly oversampled villages 
and households in Rwanda.  Subsequently, one village (Remera) was randomly dropped from the analysis.  
Moreover, 44 households were randomly dropped from other oversampled villages as well.  One other village 
in the DRC could not be visited because of security concerns.  A reason for remaining attrition is “relocation” 
of the respondent.  The analysis below is based on less than 2230 households because of missing values in 
either the base- or midline controls.  However, we have also estimated the key models based on parsimonious 
specifications (fewer controls, more observations) and the results are very similar.  
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Table 2.2 summarizes our outcome variables.  These include innovation proxies (as 
intermediate outputs) and two poverty indicators.  As poverty indicators, we use the 
commonly used headcount ratio (measured at the village level) as our primary measure, and 
a less-standard household-level Food Consumption Score (FCS).  Our poverty rate estimate 
is not based on census income data, but represents an estimate provided by the village 
leader and several other local “leaders” (including school teachers, etc.).  During a focus 
group discussion
8
, these leaders tried to reach a consensus regarding the number of 
households below the poverty line.
9
   Poverty was defined as per capita income below USD 
1.25.  We discuss potential shortcomings of this variable in the final section.  
The FCS index is based on daily food consumption of respondents during a short 
interval of time, corrected for the nutritional value of food items consumed.
10
  It is well 
known that such measures may fluctuate over the seasons.  However, since our data were 
collected in treatment and comparison villages simultaneously, we are able to control for 
such seasonal influences in our empirical analysis.
11
   
 
                                                          
8
The village leader, some selected farmers from the village and local project stakeholders from government, 
universities, research institutes, etc. attended to the focus group meeting at each village.  In the meetings, the 
project officers asked pre-determined questions concerning village characteristics (landscape, institutions, 
organizations etc.), whether there have been any previous extension efforts in the village, and whether 
villagers are willing to participate to the project. 
9
 While we appreciate the potential concern that focus-group estimates of local poverty may be less than 
perfect, we believe it is fair to say that household poverty data are typically also imperfect – obtaining reliable 
income data is notoriously difficult, which is why the Challenge Program opted for the focus group 
methodology.  Note, that the focus group data are available in panel format (for both treated and control 
groups) so systematic errors in measurement should not concern us.   
10
 To construct this index we used information about household consumption of certain groups of food during 
the last 30 days and converting it to weekly by calucating the corresponding level for 7 days.  Food groups 
are: Cereals, vitamin rich vegetables and tubers, white tubers and roots, dark green leafy vegetables, other 
vegetables, vitamin a rich fruits and other fruits, meat, eggs, fish, legumes, nuts and seeds, milk and milk 
products, oils and fats, sweets, spices, caffeine or alcoholic beverages.  We score each food group based on 
the World Food Program Technical Guidance Sheet for Food Consumption Score (UN 2008).  Scores 
increase with the nutrition level of the food group, and the index score for each household is calculated by 
summing group scores. 
11
 Specifically, our estimates of the impact of the intervention relative to the control and conventional 
extension villages will be unaffected if all types of villages respond the same way to seasonal fluctuations. 
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Table 2.2: Outcome (dependent) variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Poverty indicators  
Headcount ratio percentage of the people living under poverty line 
FCS Food consumption score, calorie weighted average of weekly consumption of a respondent 
Technology indicators  
Mulching equals 1 if a household uses mulching , 0 otherwise 
Trenches/terraces equals 1 if a household uses trenches/terraces, 0 otherwise 
Water harvesting equals 1 if a household uses water harvesting, 0 otherwise 
Irrigation equals 1 if a household uses irrigation techniques, 0 otherwise 
Conservation farming equals 1 if a household uses conservation farming, 0 otherwise 
Animal manure equals 1 if a household uses animal manure 0 otherwise 
Cover crops equals 1 if a household uses cover crops, 0 otherwise 
Crop rotation equals 1 if a household uses crop rotation, 0 otherwise 
Inter cropping equals 1 if a household uses inter cropping, 0 otherwise 
Rhizobiainoculation equals 1 if a household uses Rhizobiainoculation , 0 otherwise 
Chemical fertilizer equals 1 if a household uses chemical fertilizer , 0 otherwise 
Row planting equals 1 if a household uses row planting , 0 otherwise 
Plant spacing equals 1 if a household uses plant spacing, 0 otherwise 
Organic pesticide equals 1 if a household uses organic pesticide, 0 otherwise 
Inorganic pesticide equals 1 if a household uses inorganic pesticide, 0 otherwise 
Drying equals 1 if a household uses drying, 0 otherwise 
Threshing/shelling  equals 1 if a household uses threshing shelling equipment, 0 otherwise 
Improved storage facil. equals 1 if a household uses improved storage facilities, 0 otherwise 
Pest control equals 1 if a household uses pest control, 0 otherwise 
Grading equals 1 if a household uses grading, 0 otherwise 
Land regulation  
Nrmbylaws equals 1 if the local council in the village enacted any bylaws related with natural 
 
resource management, 0 otherwise 
Landbylaws equals 1 if there any bylaws affecting land management in the village, 0 otherwise 
Marketing strategies  
Notsold equals 1 if household did not sell at least one type of product it produced, 0 otherwise 
Consumers equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product on farm to consumers, 0 otherwise 
Middleman equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product on farm to middleman, 0 otherwise 
On the roadside equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product on the road side, 0 otherwise 
local market equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product at the local/village market, 0 otherwise 
district town equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product at the district town market, 0 otherwise 
distant market equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product at a distant market, 0 otherwise 
Sold equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product it produced, 0 otherwise 
Village Resources  
Wells equals 1 if the village have boreholes/wells, 0 otherwise 
Veterinary equals 1 if the village have cattle dips/veterinary, 0 otherwise 
Woodlots equals 1 if the village have village woodlots, 0 otherwise 
Water body equals 1 if the village have water bodies, 0 otherwise 
Watering points equals 1 if the village have livestock watering points 
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Table 2.3: Variable definitions for control variables 
Variable                 Definition 
Household characteristics 
edu_primary equals 1 if household member having highest education level at  most have  
completed primary school, 0 otherwise 
edu_ 
secondary 
equals 1 if household member having highest education level at least  have some  
vocational training and at most have completed  secondary education,  0 otherwise 
edu_univer equals 1 if household member having highest education level at least have attended to  
a college and at most have completed a university, 0 otherwise 
Gender equals 1 if household head is male 
Hhsize number of persons living in the household 
duration number of years of experience in farming of household head 
age 15-24 equals1 if age of the household head between 15 and 24, 0 otherwise 
age 25-34 equals1 if age of the household head between 25 and 34, 0 otherwise 
age 35-44 equals1 if age of the household head between 35 and 44, 0 otherwise 
age 45-54 equals1 if age of the household head between 45 and 54, 0 otherwise 
age 55-64 equals1 if age of the household head between 55 and 64, 0 otherwise 
age 65+ equals1 if age of the household head is above 65, 0 otherwise 
dependency ratio of the number of household members aged below 16 and above 64  to the number of 
members aged between 16 and 64.  
borrowed_ 
formal 
equals 1 if household borrowed from bank or micro or government credit schemes credit 
institutions, 0 otherwise 
borrowed_inf
ormal 
equals 1 if household borrowed from informal savings, money lender, 
 NGO/Church, relatives , 0 otherwise 
rooms1 equals 1 if household lives in a house having no rooms or 1 room, 0 otherwise 
rooms2 equals 1 if household lives in a house having 2 rooms, 0 otherwise 
rooms3 equals 1 if household lives in a house having 3 rooms, 0 otherwise 
rooms4 equals 1 if household lives in a house having 4 rooms, 0 otherwise 
rooms5 equals 1 if household lives in a house having 5 or more rooms, 0 otherwise 
survey time equals 1 if baseline of survey is applied in 2009, 0 if it is applied in 2008 
Village Characteristics 
School equals 1 if the village have schools, 0 otherwise 
Hospital equals 1 if the village have hospitals/clinic/health, 0 otherwise 
Telephone equals 1 if the village have telephones, 0 otherwise 
Roads equals 1 if the village have all weather roads passing, 0 otherwise 
Country1 equals 1 if the village is in Democratic Republic of Congo, 0 otherwise 
Country2 equals 1 if the village is in Rwanda, 0 otherwise 
Country3 equals 1 if the village is in Uganda, 0 otherwise 
 
We distinguish between 4 different categories of innovation variables: technology 
indicators, marketing strategies, access to village resources, and land regulations.  Hence, 
following van der Ploeg et al. (2004) and Pamuk et al. (2014b) we interpret “innovation” 
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quite broadly, encompassing technologies as well as governance arrangements, the 
adoption of new regulations, changes in market participation practices, or access to new 
infrastructure.  Unlike the adoption of techniques, we treat institutional or access 
innovations as community variables—common to all households in the village.  
Finally, our control variables are summarized in Table 2.3.We distinguish between 
household and village characteristics.  While we focus on village variables, the household 
variables allow us to analyse heterogeneous impact across various dimensions, and test for 
potential selection bias (e.g., education, gender, household structure and wealth, farming 
practice, access to credit, community development).  As mentioned, we also created a 
survey time dummy, capturing whether the household was first surveyed in 2008 or 2009.   
2.4.1 Testing for balance  
Since the IAR4D and counterfactual villages were not randomly selected from the (same) 
population of villages it is imperative to check how the three groups of villages compare at 
the baseline.  Table 2.4 compares control, conventional and IAR4D villages in terms of 
dependent variables and (household and village) controls.  The first three columns provide 
sub-group averages for the various variables, and the other three columns test whether 
observed differences are significant, or not.  
While there are neither significant differences in poverty variables between 
conventional extension and control villages, nor between the IAR4D and conventional 
extension villages, we do observe that on average the number of poor people in IAR4D 
villages is higher than in control villages.  Failing to account for such pre-existing 
differences will bias impact assessments.  In terms of food consumption, we do not measure 
significant differences across the three types of villages. 
In terms of our household controls, there are hardly any differences between the 
three types of villages.  It appears as if the number of respondents with secondary education 
is somewhat smaller in IAR4D villages than in control villages and households living in 
IAR4D villages have more access to formal credit.  But the differences are very small and 
some random differences are not unexpected given the size of our sample.  It is interesting 
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to observe, however, that in terms of household variables there are hardly any differences 
between the conventional and control villages. We observe that, in conventional villages, 
average house size is slightly larger, and the number of respondents who completed 
secondary education is slightly higher than in control villages.  
Table 2.4: Mean values for baseline variables 





IAR4D – Conv. 
Poverty indicators  
Headcount ratio 43.09 51.82 56.45 8.73 13.36** 4.63 
FCS 39.43 40.51 39.74 1.08 0.31 -0.77 
Household characteristics  
Gender 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.03 0.02 -0.01 
age 15-24 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 
age 25-34 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.02 
age 35-44 0.25 0.24 0.24 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
age 45-54 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.02 0.01 -0.02 
age 55-64 0.15 0.13 0.15 -0.02 0.00 0.01 
Hhsize 6.55 6.74 6.37 0.19 -0.17  -0.36* 
edu_secondary 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.00    -0.07**   -0.07** 
edu_univer 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.02 
Dependency 1.34 1.31 1.30 -0.03** -0.04 -0.01 
rooms1 0.06 0.04 0.04 -0.02  -0.02* 0.00 
rooms2 0.16 0.13 0.13 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 
rooms3 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.00 0.02 0.02 
rooms4 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.00 0.01 0.02 
rooms5 0.21 0.26 0.22 0.05* 0.01 -0.04 
borrowed_formal 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.01  0.03* 0.02 
borrowed_infor. 0.64 0.68 0.68 0.03 0.03 0.00 
Duration 22.43 22.06 21.40 -0.37 -1.03 -0.65 
Village characteristics  
School 0.48 0.44 0.47 -0.04  0.00   0.03 
Hospital 0.13 0.20 0.12 0.07 -0.02  -0.08 
Telephone 0.52 0.49 0.53 -0.03  0.00   0.04 
Roads 0.45 0.51 0.59 0.07    0.14*   0.08 
survtime 0.29 0.29 0.20 0.00  0.09 -0.09 
country1 0.35 0.35 0.26 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 
country2 0.29 0.29 0.34 0.00  0.05  0.05 
country3 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.00  0.04  0.04 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 Standard errors for the differences in household characteristics are calculated 
by using robust standard errors clustered at village level. 
 
The situation is also similar for village characteristics.  When comparing IAR4D 
villages to control ones, there does not seem to be a systematic bias. The only finding is 
that IAR4D villages are more likely to be connected via an all-weather road than control 
villages (so we control for this in the empirical analysis below).  We again do not observe 
any difference between conventional and control villages in terms of observed 
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characteristics.  So, if extension workers purposefully selected some villages and not 
others, it appears as if they are not basing their selection on village characteristics. 
2.5 Identification: Average treatment effects and heterogeneous 
impact  
We now outline our identification strategy.  We are evaluating the impact of innovation 
platforms on poverty rates and innovation proxies as intermediate outcome variables.  Note 
that this is not necessarily the same as evaluating the impact of IAR4D on poverty rates.  
The reason is that there may be non-compliance in the sense that not all IPs function as 
intended by the IAR4D philosophy.  While all treatment villages received their treatment 
(i.e., they received an IP), the level of stakeholder engagement and bottom-up priority 
setting may vary from one IP to the next.  As an extension of the current analysis, one 
might develop an index measuring the “degree of IAR4Dness” across the platforms.  This 
would enable the analyst to estimate an IV model using assignment status as an 
instrumental variable for index scores, and regress poverty and adoption rates on predicted 
IAR4Dness.  Such a strategy would yield a local average treatment effect (LATE) of 
IAR4D on poverty rates.  The current analysis based on a comparison of poverty rates and 
food security across IP villages and counterfactual villages yields an intent-to-treat (ITT) 
estimator of the average treatment effect of receiving an IP.  In what follows, and slightly 
abusing terminology, we also refer to this as the ITT of receiving IAR4D treatment. 
We seek to gauge impact by comparing IAR4D villages (i.e. villages benefitting from 
an IP) and either conventional or control villages in terms of reduced poverty.  If extension 
workers selected the set of conventional villages non-randomly, then failing to account for 
this may introduce selection bias.  The literature suggests several ways to accommodate this 
concern (e.g., Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009).  We use (i) a 
difference-in-difference (DD) methodology that combines aggregate baseline and midline 
data, and (ii) a first difference (panel) methodology, where we base impact assessment on 
intra-unit comparisons over time.  So our analysis depends on the assumption that if there 
was not IAR4D intervention, the trend in outcome variables would be same for the 
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treatment and control villages.  Thus there is heterogeneity in the time varying unobserved 
factors (to econometrician) between control and IAR4D villages. Since we have only two 
waves of data, we cannot test whether this assumption holds.  
Lack of control over conventional extension activities introduces another problem.  
By definition, conventional extension activities started before the SSA CP started.  Hence, 
conventional villages started receiving their intervention before the IAR4D concept was 
implemented, and cumulative effort in conventional villages could easily exceed effort in 
IAR4D villages.  This cumulative effect could confound simple comparisons of midline 
data.  However, ex ante there is no significant difference in the headcount ratio between 
conventional and control villages, according to the evidence in Table 2.4.  This might 
simply reflect that conventional approaches to innovation and diffusion have been 
ineffective.  
Another factor may be relevant.  Insofar as it takes time to gain momentum and 
genuinely achieve impact, the deck is stacked against IAR4D—the conventional villages 
made a flying start at t=0, and, hence, should be able to accomplish more during the 
interval from t=0 until t=1 (thus, perform superiorly according to the DD or panel model).  
In contrast, if there are diminishing returns to intervention effort, then perhaps the 
“greenfield” start of IAR4D implies an advantage in a panel setting.  The reverse is true in 
case of increasing returns to intervention effort.  These are caveats that should be borne in 
mind when interpreting the empirical results, but which cannot be addressed rigorously 
with the data currently at our disposal.   
2.5.1 Intention to treat effects 
Define outcome variables, which are introduced in Table 2.2,  for individual i, living at 
village v at time t by Y0ivt, Y1ivt, Y2ivt for control (subscript 0), conventional (subscript 1) and 
intervention/IAR4D treatment groups (subscript 2), respectively.  We will drop the i 
subscript for outcome variables at the village level.  Treatment groups are denoted by 
Controlv, Convv and IAR4Dv for control, conventional and IAR4D villages, respectively. 
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Treatment dummies are equal to   if the household (or village) belongs to that group and 0 
otherwise.  Since villages can only belong to one treatment group, we know:  
(2.1)   Controlv + Convv + IAR4Dv = 1 
The simplest analysis rests on a comparison of midline data.  Estimates are unbiased if a 
classical conditional independence assumption holds:  
(2.2)  E[Yiv|Xi,Zv,IAR4Dv,Convv] = E[Yiv|Xi,Zv]     
where Xi refers to a vector of observed household characteristics and Zv denotes the vector 
of village level characteristics. Condition (2.2) states that, after controlling for household 
and village characteristics, the likelihood of being in a control, conventional extension or 
IAR4D village is same for households.  If we also assume there is a linear relationship 
between outcome and treatment plus other control variables, we can formulate the 
following regression model: 
(2.3) Yiv = α + γ1 IAR4Dv + γ2 Convv + β’ Xi + θ’ Zv + εiv     
where εiv1 denotes an error term.  In (3), γ1 and γ2 capture the average treatment effect 
(ATE) of IAR4D and conventional policies on control villages.  To assess ATE of IAR4D 
approach and whether innovation platforms are more effective than conventional policies, 
we test whether γ1 0 and γ1 – γ2  0.  To ease the analysis process and test the statistical 
significance of γ1 – γ2  0 directly, we also reformulate (2.3) such that:  
(2.4) Yiv = α + 1 Controlv + 2 Convv + β’Xi + θ’ Zv + εiv     
This gives us -1 ≡ γ1 and -2 ≡ γ2-γ1.  However, estimating (2.4) likely produces biased 
estimates of impact because it is unlikely that the assumption of conditional independence 
holds.  Relaxing this assumption, we now introduce a difference-in-difference model (DD) 
that combines midline and baseline data.  With the usual constant trend assumption, we 
obtain the following model for outcome variable, Yivt:   
(2.5) Yivt = α + μ midlinet + σ1 Controlv + σ2 Convv + 1 (midlinet × Controlv)+ 
         2(midlinet × Convv) + β’ Xit + θ’ Zvt + εivt      
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where midlinet = 1 if t=1 (i.e. for the midline survey), and midlinet = 0 otherwise.  In 
equation (2.5), -1 and -2 provide the ATE of innovation platforms on control villages, and 
the difference between IAR4D and conventional approaches, respectively.  
Unobserved heterogeneity at village level may drive the selection of conventional 
villages and also be correlated with the outcome variable, and therefore may bias the 
impact estimates in (2.5).  Assuming that these unobserved characteristics are constant and 
separable, the outcome variable can be formulated as follows: 
(2.6) Yivt = αi + μ midlinet + σ1 Controlv + σ2 Convv + 1 (midlinet × Controlv) 
 + 2 (midlinet × Convv) + β’ Xit + θ’ Zvt + εivt       
To eliminate unobserved fixed effects, we use balanced sample of households and first-
difference (2.6) so that: 
(2.7) ΔYiv1 = μ + 1 Controlv + 2 Convv + β’ ΔXit + θ’ ΔZvt + Δεivt  
In what follows we will refer to this model as the first difference, or FD, model.  The DD 
and FD models are complementary approaches to dealing with potential selection effects 
caused by the non-random selection of conventional villages.  Models (2.5) and (2.7) are 
estimated using OLS
12
.  In all estimations, we include household and village characteristics 
summarized in Table 2.3, and the country dummies drops in first difference models.
13
  As 
the headcount ratio indicator, land regulations and village resources variables are available 
at the level of the village, we estimate  models for those variables at the village level, and 
take unweighted averages of relevant household variables to arrive at village-level 
variables.  Since there may be correlation among households within villages, we cluster 
                                                          
12
 This means we use linear probability models to deal with binary outcomes, allowing ready comparison 
across specifications.  Our specifications should be robust with respect to these commonly used 
methodologies as most of the covariates are dummy variables.  If we assume that treatment heterogeneity is 
limited, regression estimations are close to the average effects (indeed, fitted probabilities will be between 0 
and 1––see section 5 for evidence on heterogeneity).  However, we have also estimated non-linear models and 
our qualitative results do not change much then (even if for two of the innovation indicators different results 
emerge—estimates available on request). 
13
 The estimates are robust when we use only baseline household and village characteristics as control 
variables for the first difference models. 
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standard errors at the village level
14
, and use robust standard errors (i.e., models explaining 
food consumption scores).
15
 Finally, we note that power of the estimations may be low, as 
we have observations for a small number of villages.  The power tests
16
 show that the 
smallest program effects on poverty and FCS that can be detected with 5 percent statistical 
significance level are around 12 percentage points and 3.7 points respectively. Therefore 
when interpreting, we will be cautious regarding the type II errors: to falsely conclude that 
there is no treatment effect, even if there actually is one. 
2.5.2 Tackling heterogeneity 
While the average impact of conventional and IAR4D treatments in terms of reduced 
poverty may be assessed using the above strategy, it ignores that the returns to the treatment 
may vary across IPs, depending on local circumstances.  To probe into this issue we 
analyse heterogeneity in impact.  We take the entire sample of control villages as the 
counterfactual for each IP (but obtain similar results when using, instead, only control 
villages from the same country as the IP in question as the counterfactual), and explore how 
impact varies for the 12 IPs by using the following model:
 17
 
(2.8) ΔYivt = μ + 1 Controlv + Σip θ2ipIPip + β’ ΔXit + θ’ ΔZvt + Δεivt  
(2.9) ΔYivt = μ + 2 Convv + Σip θ1ipIPip + β’ ΔXit + θ’ ΔZvt + Δεivt   
where    denotes each IP (ip = 1, …12).  IPip = 1 if a household lives in an IAR4D village.  
If IAR4D has an impact for a specific IP, then θ1ip  0.  Moreover, if θ2ip  0, then this 
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 The poverty results are robust to clustering the standard errors at IP level.  
15
 In theory our estimates could be biased if alternative organisations implemented other interventions 
systematically targeting IAR4D villages or comparison villages.  We have kept track of other interventions in 
IAR4D villages, and found this hardly occurred.  We have no data on other projects in comparison villages.  
If another organisation specifically targeted our comparison villages and implemented a project that alleviated 
(enhanced) local poverty, then our DD and FD models will underestimate (overestimate) the true impact of 
the IAR4D intervention. 
16
 We used G*Power program to estimate the post-hoc rminimum impact sizes . In the estimation, sample 
size, alpha and power is assumed as 16, 0.05, and 0.8. To reach to minimum impact sizes we use standard 
error estimates from the regression results. The minimum impact sizes are higher for IP level estimations (see 
below) as degrees of freedom are lower for those models. 
17
 We do not aim to estimate the true impact estimate via this analysis since we cannot identify the true 
counterfactual group for each IP. 
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impact is different from the effect of the conventional approach.  Heterogeneity in terms of 
impact implies θ1ip   θ1ip’ where  ipip’. 
Heterogeneity might also materialize at the household, rather than the IP, level.  Not 
all households may be able to benefit from the proposed innovation (e.g., because it does 
not meet their capabilities, skills, assets, or desires).  Indeed, if IPs are hi-jacked to serve 
the interests of local elites, they could aggravate local inequality.  We therefore speculate 
that the impact of IAR4D might vary with certain household characteristics.  To examine 
whether this is true, we estimate the following model, which is based on (2.7) but includes 
interaction terms: 
(2.10)  ΔYivt = μ + 31 IAR4Dv + φ’ (IARD4Dv × Fit
k
) + 2 Convv + β’ ΔXit + θ’ΔZvt + Δεivt,
  
(2.11) ΔYiv = μ + 32 IAR4Dv + φ’(IARD4Dv × Fit
k
) + 2 Controlv + β’ ΔXit + θ’ΔZvt + Δεivt 
where IARD4Dv is a dummy variable equals to 1 for intervention/IAR4D villages and Fit is 
a vector of characteristics (a relevant subset of Xi1, see below).  Parameters associated with 
the relevant interaction term, φ, reveal whether impact varies with different characteristics 
(note that φ from (2.10) and (2.11) are equivalent).  Parameters 31 and 32 indicate average 
treatment effects relative to control and conventional villages, as before.  
We interact 4 groups of variables with IARD4Dv, denoted by superscript k.  Three 
groups are candidates for heterogeneous impact: (i) education (edu_secondary and 
edu_univers), (ii) agricultural experience (duration), and (iii) access to finance 
(borrowed_formal and borrowed_informal).  The fourth variable for interacting captures 
the baseline survey time (Surv_time).  This interaction term has a different interpretation, 
and allows us to tentatively explore whether the length of the intervention matters.  By 
extension, this may be informative regarding the potential bias introduced by the fact that 
conventional villages have benefitted from intervention for a longer time than the IAR4D 
villages.  If the estimate of the coefficient interaction term is jointly significant together 
with the estimated coefficient for Surv_time then the impact of intervention varies with the 
intervention length.  
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2.6 Estimation results for poverty indicators  
We now turn to the regression results.  In Table 2.5 we report average treatment effects of 
the IAR4D approach in terms of poverty.  We report regression outcomes for the DD and 
FD model.  For each model, the left column provides the estimated impact on control 
villages, and the right column reports differences between IAR4D and conventional 
extension.  When estimating the models we included a full vector of control variables (see 
Table 2.3), but do not report these coefficients to economize on space.
18
   
2.6.1 Intention to Treat Effects 
We believe Table 2.5 contains the most important result of this paper.  We reach to nuanced 
set of results. The IAR4D intervention successfully reduced poverty, and is more effective 
than conventional extension efforts in reducing poverty.  Both the DD and FD models 
indicate that, compared to the control group of “control villages,” the number of people 
below the poverty line has fallen by some 17% on average.  Comparing IAR4D and 
conventional extension approaches produces a slightly smaller impact (approximately 14% 
fewer poor people), suggesting that the conventional extension strategy hardly outperforms 
doing nothing.  These are striking results, in light of the fact that the IAR4D approach has 
been implemented for just 2 years, so that we are only picking up short-term effects. 
 However, the negative signs for the food consumption indicator in row 2 provide do 
not support the above conclusion.  Note that the FCS coefficients are not statistically 
significant from zero.  This could indicate various possibilities.  Perhaps the poor prefer to 
spend part of their extra income on other items than food.  Or, alternatively, perhaps extra 
expenditures on food do not translate into extra calories (but in better-tasting food, say, as 
argued by Banerjee & Duflo 2011).  Subsequent results also suggest considerable 
heterogeneity in terms of food consumption at the IP level. 
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 Due to missing observations for poverty indicators and control variables, the number of observations 
reported in Table 4 is lower than documented in Table 1. To test whether missing observations bias our 
results, we also estimated parsimonious models without control variables and with limited sets of control 
variables (varying sample size).  We conclude our results are robust. To economize on space we do not report 
those estimates, and they are available upon request. 
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Table 2.5: Estimated impacts of intervention on poverty and food consumption 
 
DD FD 
 IAR4D - Control IAR4D – Conventional IAR4D – Control  IAR4D – Conventional  
Headcount Ratio -18.26*** -12.96* -17.13** -14.25* 
 
(6.468) (6.948) (7.582) (8.131) 
[N=402] [N=163] 
FCS -1.568 -1.4440.328 -1.195 -2.380 
 
(1.876) (1.667) (1.656) (1.566)) 
 [N=3339] [N=1119] 
Note: In all regression models, the controls listed in Table 2.2 are included (details available on request). 
Country fixed effects are only controlled for DD models.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, * p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  The number of observations is reported in square brackets.  
 As mentioned above, these estimates may over- or underestimate the effectiveness 
of innovation platforms.  Note that, if there are diminishing (increasing) returns to 
intervention, then the estimated 14% difference between IAR4D and conventional 
extension efforts according to the DD and FD model is an overestimate (underestimate) of 
the true gap in effectiveness over the two-year study period.  Regardless, since the 
headcount ratio in the IAR4D villages was greater than in the conventional villages at the 
time of the baseline survey (see Table 2.4), it appears as if the IAR4D villages have “caught 
up.” 
2.6.2 Heterogeneity across innovation platforms 
In Table 2.6 we examine whether there are differences, in terms of impact on the incidence 
of poverty, across innovation platforms.  We provide estimates for θ1ip and θ2ip from (2.8) 
and (2.9), respectively, for each IP separately.  For any IP, the first row corresponds to the 
impact of IAR4D on the food consumption index and the number of poor people.  The 
second row shows how this estimated impact compares to the impact of conventional 
extension efforts.   
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Table 2.6: Poverty impacts at the level of individual IPs 
IP name Country Estimated Dependent Variables 
 coefficients FCS Headcount ratio 
Kayonza Uganda Θ11 -7.877*** _
19
 
  Θ21 -8.880***  
Bubare Uganda Θ12 -3.258 -6.087 
  Θ22 -2.255 -3.417 
Bufundi Uganda Θ13 -1.523 - 44.73*** 
  Θ23 -0.520 -42.06** 
Chahi Uganda Θ14 -1.929 -30.21** 
  Θ24 -0.926 -27.54* 
Gataraga Rwanda Θ15 6.165** -20.51 
  Θ25 5.162*** -17.85 
 Remera Remera Θ16 -0.433 9.299 
  Θ26 0.570 11.97 
Rwerere Rwanda Θ17 8.912*** -9.552 
  Θ27 7.909*** -6.883 
Mudende Rwanda Θ18 -6.756*** -38.35*** 
  Θ28 -7.759*** -35.68** 
Kituva DRC Θ19 -12.09*** -29.13** 
  Θ29 -13.09*** -26.46* 
Bweremana DRC Θ110 -13.20*** 8.425 
  Θ210 -14.20*** 11.09 
Rubare DRC Θ111 -7.564*** 39.21*** 
  Θ211 -8.567*** 41.88*** 
Rumangabo DRC Θ112 -6.501** 11.59 
  Θ212 -7.504*** 14.25 
Note: In all regression models, the controls listed in Table 2.2 except country dummies are included (details 
available on request).  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  The number 
of observations is reported in square brackets.  
The results suggest considerable heterogeneity across IPs.  Indeed, there are (i) 
successful IPs where poverty went down (Bufundi, Chahi, Mudende, and Kituva), (ii) IPs 
where poverty appears unaffected, but also (iii) IPs where poverty has increased after the 
implementation of IPs (Rubare).  Hence, average treatment effects mask large differences 
across platforms.  Similar heterogeneity exists for our food consumption measure.  It is 
interesting to note that the most successful IPs are the ones with high poverty rates at the 
baseline, suggesting a catching up process.  It is also interesting to note that successful 
platforms in terms of poverty reduction are scattered across the study region, and not 
confined to one or two wards or countries with specific characteristics: Bufindi and Chahi 
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 Not available, because baseline headcount ratio data from Kayonza IP are missing. 
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are located in different districts in Uganda, Mudende is in Rwanda, and Kituva is in the 
DRC.  Hence, the results are not driven by cultural and institutional factors limited to a 
specific locality. However, and supporting the view that the impact of IPs varies with local 
conditions, not all poor IPs have above-average growth.  For example, Rubare and 
Rumangabo are poor but not successful. Average poverty rates at the baseline were 57 and 
66%, respectively, and poverty rates went up after the intervention.  
Note also that the poverty and food consumption scores do not go hand-in-hand for 
several IPs.  For Bufindi, Chahi, Kituva and Mudende, our data suggest a (dramatic) 
decrease in poverty rates that is not accompanied by an increase in food security scores.  
This is a puzzling result—perhaps reminiscent of results reported for India by Deaton and 
Dreze (2009).  As mentioned above, it may reflect a near zero income elasticity for the food 
items included in the FCS measure, but in light of the low baseline score this may not be 
plausible.  Other candidate explanations exist.  The estimated poverty impacts may be 
mismeasured.  Recall our poverty data are based on focus group discussions, so they may 
be imprecise or open to manipulation.  Alternatively, perhaps the poverty impact is actually 
less dramatic than it appears – if the platform translates into a small income gain for a large 
number of people just below the poverty line, then the headcount ratio falls a lot without 
affecting consumption patterns of affected households a lot.  In other words, a dramatic 
reduction in the poverty headcount should not be confused with a dramatic increase in 
income. 
There is evidence regarding the country level correlation at the impact of IPs on 
FCS. We observe statistically negative coefficient for all IPs from DRC although there is 
heterogeneity within Rwanda and Uganda. Do different regional trends explain the decrease 
in FCS in the IPs from DRC?  To check whether regional trends explains the result we 
estimate (2.7) for only DRC and find that program did not improve FCS but there is a 
regional trend biasing the food consumption score negatively.  
Of course we are interested in exploring the determinants of IP performance.  
However, we lack the data to analyse this in any level of detail (we have only 12 
observations at the IP level), and believe this question is best addressed at the programme 
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level—pulling together data from the three sites (36 IPs in total).  A look at our data, 
however, suggests IP performance may vary with certain key baseline community 
characteristics.
20
  For example, IP performance varies with a few proxies of social capital.  
We find robust (partial) correlations between IP success and whether community members 
make voluntary financial contributions to support community activities, or to remedy 
communal problems.  Hence, pre-existing levels of social capital may be a factor 
explaining the success or failure of IPs.   
While determining the exact mechanism linking innovations to poverty reduction is 
beyond the scope of the current paper, we emphasize this is an important area for follow-up 
work.  Both the selection of innovations as well as the impact of adoption of specific 
innovations appears to be context-specific.   
2.6.3 Heterogeneity across households  
Next we examine whether the impact of IAR4D is conditional on household 
characteristics—is a subset of villagers able to reap the benefits (if any), while others 
cannot?  In Table 2.7 we provide estimation results for models (2.10-1.11).  The two top 
rows for each group   give estimated values for 31 and 32, respectively.  The other rows 
present estimates of φ.  It is clear that there is no evidence of heterogeneous impact.  The 
impact of IAR4D does not vary with household agricultural experience, access to finance, 
or education.  That is, IAR4D benefits, if any, are shared within the community. 
The only interaction term to enter significantly in Table 2.7 measures heterogeneity 
in time — this interaction term is the product of the IAR4D intervention and the survey 
time dummy (significant at the 10% level).  The interaction term suggests that IPs that have 
been in existence for two years outperform IPs that have been in existence for only 1 year.  
All successful IPs started in 2008 (but not all IPs starting in 2008 were successful).  
Specifically, the more established IPs have on average a reduction in poverty of 20% and 
the immature IPs see the poverty rate go up by 5%.   
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 To circumvent reverse causality concerns we use pre-IP intervention baseline measures of community 
characteristics in this analysis. 
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The latter result, however, should be taken with a pinch of salt, because the nature 
of our poverty data may not permit strong statements about tiny (short-term) effects.  
Nevertheless, we speculate that any negative start-up effects may capture the investment 
component of building an IP – there are significant short-term (opportunity) costs and 
medium-term benefits will only materialize after the IP is functioning.  Such non-linearities 
in the response to intervention effort may imply that we underestimate the impact of 
IAR4D relative to the conventional policy (where intervention started earlier, so that initial 
investment costs have been borne before the experiment started).  
Table 2.7:  Heterogeneous treatment effects 
                                               Dependent variables 
Dependent variables: FCS Poverty 
Estimated Impact 
  
IAR4D – Control -0.998 -28.61 
IAR4D – Conventional 0.109 -25.88 
IAR4D × Duration 0.101 0.492 
IAR4D – Control  -0.151 -27.93** 
IAR4D – Conventional 0.952 -24.45** 
IAR4D × edu_secondary 3.675** 38.98 
IAR4D × edu_univer 0.944 -14.69 
IAR4D – Control 3.115 -28.37 
IAR4D – Conventional 4.207 -25.86 
IAR4D × borrow_formal -9.165* 69.27 
IAR4D × borrow_informal -2.084 2.272 
IAR4D – Control  1.180 -20.33** 
IAR4D – Conventional 2.273 -18.02** 
IAR4D × survtime 0.199 25.70* 
Note: In all regression models, the controls listed in Table 2.2 except country dummies are included (details 
available on request).  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
2.7 Probing the mechanism: Platforms and innovation  
How does IAR4D lower poverty?  As a first stab regress the adoption of our innovation 
indicators on the IP treatment by using linear probability models (i.e., we estimate (2.6) and 
(2.7) using innovation variables as dependent variables).  We ask whether there are 
significant differences in terms of adoption between the three types of villages.  Estimation 
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results are given in Tables 2.8 and 2.9.  We only report (differences in) coefficients of 
interest, but again these models were estimated with a full vector of controls.
21
 
The innovation impact, as summarized in Tables 2.8 and 2.9, is less pronounced 
than the poverty impact summarized in Table 2.5.  On average, IAR4D does not have a 
robust and significant positive impact on the adopting of these innovations.  Instead, the 
DD and FD models suggest IAR4D is associated with the dis-adoption of certain 
technologies, such as the probability of using animal manure or the use of certain post-
harvest technologies (drying).  A similar picture emerges with respect to other innovation 
proxies, related with regulation, marketing strategies and village resources.  According to 
Table 2.9, IAR4D does not have a significant positive impact on the average probability of 
adoption.  
However, these results should not be surprising, and do not discredit the innovation 
systems hypothesis. For instance, Pamuk et al. (2014b) analyse the impact of IAR4D on 
technology adoption for all PLSs (i.e., not just the Lake Kivu PLS analysed in this paper), 
and show that priorities vary across IPs.  Indeed, the lack of significant average treatment 
effects in terms of adoption of specific innovations is the natural outcome given that 
priority setting is decentralized. Since each IP decides on its own priorities, reflecting local 
preferences, opportunities and constraints, each IP should settle on its own “innovations” 
and average treatment effects are difficult to detect.  
For this reason, we also tested for heterogeneity in terms of the types of innovations 
that are adopted.  This implies estimating (2.10) and (2.11) and using our innovation 
indicators as dependent variables.  Detailed regression results are many, and are not shown 
here to economize on space (but they are available on request).  Summarizing the main 
insights, and consistent with results by Pamuk et al. (2014b), adoption priorities vary from 
one IP to another.  This is true both for the technical as well as the governance-related 
innovations.  For example, in Bubare conservation farming has significantly increased 
while plant spacing and organic pesticide usage decreased.  In Bweremana mulching and 
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 Our analysis regarding technology adoption is limited in the sense that we do observe the impact of the 
intervention on simultaneous adoption of multiple technologies as discussed by Dorfman (1996).  
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row planting usage increased, and manure use decreased.  Similarly, in some IPs market 
integration has gone up, while in others it went down.  There does not appear to be a 
systematic pattern in terms of innovations adopted by IPs.     
Table 2.8: Estimated impact of Intervention on agricultural technologies 
 DD FD 
       
         
      
      
      
         
      
      
Dependent Variables                         
Mulching -0.0528 0.00842 -0.0310 -0.00697 
 
(0.0472) (0.0465) (0.0476) (0.0461) 
Trenches/terraces -0.0186 0.0459 0.00162 0.0740* 
 
(0.0443) (0.0446) (0.0444) (0.0431) 
Water harvesting -0.0107 -0.0280 -0.0209 -0.0416 
 
(0.0400) (0.0375) (0.0461) (0.0421) 
Irrigation -0.0229 -0.0163 -0.0242 -0.0162 
 
(0.0284) (0.0286) (0.0306) (0.0300) 
Conservation farming -0.00353 -0.0169 -0.0195 -0.00684 
 
(0.0537) (0.0478) (0.0622) (0.0523) 
Animal manure -0.103** -0.0778* -0.117** -0.0831* 
 
(0.0472) (0.0426) (0.0523) (0.0470) 
Cover crops 0.0195 0.00778 -0.00680 -0.00445 
 
(0.0432) (0.0428) (0.0474) (0.0472) 
Crop rotation -0.0474 0.0361 -0.0462 0.0388 
 
(0.0430) (0.0385) (0.0444) (0.0407) 
Inter cropping -0.0245 -0.0615 -0.0161 -0.0504 
 
(0.0532) (0.0492) (0.0567) (0.0510) 
Rhizobiainoculation -0.0150 -0.0113 -0.0254 0.000283 
 
(0.0155) (0.0150) (0.0173) (0.0150) 
Chemical fertilizer 0.00326 0.00767 -0.00561 0.0189 
 
(0.0298) (0.0301) (0.0305) (0.0318) 
Row planting 0.0348 0.0208 0.0562 0.0385 
 
(0.0458) (0.0406) (0.0488) (0.0443) 
Plant spacing -0.0281 -0.0160 -0.0166 0.00418 
 
(0.0540) (0.0529) (0.0580) (0.0546) 
Organic pesticide -0.0355 0.00329 -0.0162 0.0143 
 
(0.0322) (0.0334) (0.0325) (0.0339) 
Inorganic pesticide 0.0264 0.0177 0.0383 0.0172 
 
(0.0352) (0.0387) (0.0365) (0.0416) 
Drying -0.108** -0.0790 -0.0895* -0.0718 
 
(0.0537) (0.0483) (0.0533) (0.0478) 
Threshing/shelling equipment -0.0110 0.0559 0.00296 0.0802 
 
(0.0540) (0.0500) (0.0528) (0.0504) 
Improved storage facilities -0.00540 -0.00798 0.0167 0.0131 
 
(0.0486) (0.0423) (0.0497) (0.0431) 
Pest control 0.0683 0.0209 0.0731 0.0362 
 
(0.0603) (0.0546) (0.0646) (0.0594) 
Grading -0.0225 -0.00513 -0.0142 -0.00868 
 
(0.0611) (0.0588) (0.0641) (0.0615) 
Note: In all regression models, the controls listed in Table 2.2 except country dummies are included 
(details available on request).  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
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Table 2.9: Estimated impact of intervention on the probability of land regulations and 




                                                      
Dependent Variables                         
Land regulations 
    
nrmbylaws -0.131 -0.107 0.0108 -0.000929 
 
(0.0889) (0.0874) (0.0708) (0.0712) 
landlaws -0.0959 -0.127 0.0511 -0.0213 
 
(0.0869) (0.0933) (0.0796) (0.0798) 
Marketing strategies 
    
notsold -0.0674 -0.0585 -0.0575 -0.0685 
 
(0.0602) (0.0601) (0.0612) (0.0629) 
consumers 0.0384 0.0611 -0.00995 0.0547 
 
(0.0339) (0.0378) (0.0374) (0.0380) 
middleman -0.0274 -0.00650 -0.0389 -0.0160 
 
(0.0351) (0.0350) (0.0365) (0.0362) 
on road side -0.0205 -0.00927 -0.0102 -0.0279 
 
(0.0297) (0.0288) (0.0332) (0.0301) 
local market -0.00508 0.00334 -0.0104 0.0188 
 
(0.0548) (0.0517) (0.0571) (0.0544) 
district town 0.00468 -0.0125 0.00439 -0.0121 
 
(0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0217) (0.0224) 
distant market -0.0477* -0.0366 -0.0449 -0.0274 
 
(0.0252) (0.0267) (0.0293) (0.0313) 
sold -0.0376 -0.0471 -0.0640* -0.0567 
 
(0.0374) (0.0356) (0.0377) (0.0354) 
Village resources 
    
wells 0.0422 0.0244 0.0393 0.0160 
 
(0.0881) (0.0843) (0.0962) (0.0884) 
veterinary -0.00523 -0.0640 -0.0285 -0.0969 
 
(0.0749) (0.0656) (0.0764) (0.0690) 
woodlots 0.0724 -0.0374 0.108 -0.0371 
 
(0.108) (0.109) (0.107) (0.110) 
waterbody -0.0435 -0.00289 -0.0683 -0.0776 
 
(0.115) (0.115) (0.125) (0.131) 
wateringpoint -0.232** -0.131 -0.232** -0.138 
 
(0.0901) (0.0863) (0.0945) (0.0888) 
agriresearch 0.0928 0.0211 0.0203 -0.0471 
 
(0.0594) (0.0598) (0.0615) (0.0595) 
 
    Note: Estimates from the regressions indicated in the text are given. In all regression, controls listed in 
Table 2.2 except country dummies are used during the estimation. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
We can focus on the choices made by the four IPs most successful from a poverty 
alleviation perspective: Bufindi, Chahi, Mudende, and Kituva.  For these IPs, adopted 
innovations appear predominantly institutional in nature.  Given the short time frame after 
the intervention (two years), this is perhaps not unexpected.  Insofar as it is easier to change 
institutions and governance arrangements than to pioneer with technical innovations and 
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upscale their use, we might expect institutional reform to have impact relatively quickly.  
Key innovations in successful IPs are enhanced market access (Chahi, Kituva), adoption of 
new land regulations (Bufindi), and improved access to village resources (Mudende).  
Occasionally these governance innovations were complemented with technical innovations 
(e.g. post-harvest pest control in Chahi, and mulching, irrigation, inter cropping, row 
planting, organic pest and post-harvest management in Kituva). 
While determining the exact mechanism linking innovations to poverty reduction is 
beyond the scope of the current paper, we emphasize this is an important area for follow-up 
work.  Both the selection of innovations as well as the impact of adoption of specific 
innovations appears to be context-specific.  For example, while successful IPs have focused 
on developing marketing strategies, changing access to land and the application of specific 
technologies, our dataset also provides counter examples to these success stories.  
Bweremana adopted the same technologies as Kituva, but in Bweremana this did not result 
in a lower poverty rate.  The match between local conditions and innovations determines 
the success of an IP, but this will have to be explored more carefully (perhaps using 
qualitative methods). 
2.8 Conclusions and discussion 
Conventional extension efforts have by and large failed to generate the widespread 
adoption of innovations that are considered necessary to advance the agricultural 
development agenda.  In response, the search is on for alternative mechanisms that foster 
innovation, adoption and diffusion, and alleviate poverty.  We report short-term evidence 
on the effectiveness of one such initiative—decentralized and participatory innovation 
systems.  As part of a large experiment, so-called innovation platforms have been 
introduced in a sample of selected villages.  The performance of these villages, in terms of 
poverty reduction, is compared to the performance of two different counterfactual groups; 
control villages and villages benefiting from traditional extension approaches.  Even though 
the period between baseline and follow-up survey was short, extending to not more than 2 
years, surprisingly we are able to document some impact of innovation platforms on 
poverty rates. 
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Our main conclusions are fourfold.  First, we reach to mixed results concerning the 
average treatment effects of the innovation system intervention.  On average, innovation 
platforms reduce poverty according to our focus group measure of poverty, but the 
platforms did not increase the food consumption.  Second, the participatory approach 
appears more effective than traditional extension efforts in alleviating poverty.  Third, the 
impact of the intervention according to our poverty measure is not limited to local elites.  
Instead, the impact does not vary (much) with household characteristics. Fourth and 
reflecting the decentralized nature of the innovation systems approach, different platforms 
prioritize different types of innovations.  We speculate this diversity reflects variation in 
local opportunities and constraints.  Next steps in our research agenda on innovation 
systems are (i) to analyze the mechanism linking IPs to poverty reduction (the adoption of 
specific innovations – see Chapter 3, which documents that the participatory model 
promotes the adoption of crop management innovations, but find no significant effects for 
other types of innovation), and (ii) to systematically compare the costs and benefits of 
IAR4D and alternative approaches to innovation and diffusion at IP level - yet we may 
argue that the program may be inefficient since we do not observe a robust negative impact 
on poverty and the program involves a cost.
22
 
 Two caveats should be mentioned.  First, we did not implement an RCT where 
villages are randomly assigned to either the IAR4D treatment, or to one of the two 
counterfactual groups.  We aim to control for potential selection bias by estimating 
difference-in-difference models and panel models, but cannot completely rule out that some 
estimation bias eventuates due to unobservable and time-varying factors.  Second, we 
obtain the most interesting results for our poverty data, which are not based on detailed 
household measurements but reflect the outcome of focus group discussions of local village 
leaders.  The reduction in poverty for some villages is dramatic, and is not consistently 
matched by improvements in our measure of food consumption.  This could point to an 
interesting empirical puzzle, inviting follow-up analysis, or could point to mismeasurement 
of local poverty rates.  Perhaps the focus group approach to data collection did not produce 
                                                          
22
  We cannot compare the efficiency of the conventional approach and IAR4D, as we do not have access to 
cost data for the conventional projects.. 
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precise measures of local poverty, or perhaps it resulted in biased assessments.  For 
example, the enhanced social interaction associated with the IP treatment could affect the 
outcomes of the poverty assessment (as both are inherently social processes).  
Alternatively, “local leaders” may have strategic reasons to misrepresent local poverty 
rates.  However, it is not evident (to us) whether they should over- or under-represent such 
rates.  If they do not want to disappoint the researchers, village leaders in IAR4D villages 
may under-represent poverty rates during the midline.  But if the aim is to attract additional 
funding and projects, then perhaps poverty rates are over-estimated (sending a signal of 
urgency).  Hence, and also in light of the observation that poverty rates were not balanced 
during the baseline, we emphasize the importance of efforts to verify our findings in other 
contexts, perhaps using alternative proxies for poverty and (food) consumption.
23
  
Notwithstanding these important caveats, the evidence suggests that decentralized 
innovation systems, based on participation of a wide range of stakeholders, may represent a 
promising vehicle to promote agricultural development.  It provides tentative support for 
the recent transition to “new demand-led approaches to extension” identified by the World 
Bank (World Bank, 2007).  However, other considerations are relevant and should be 
mentioned here.  First, while the innovation platform approach on average generates 
positive impacts, there are also platforms that apparently have failed to generate any short-
term benefits.  It is clearly a first order priority to analyse and explain the variation in 
performance.  Does short-term success depend on the nature of the platform 
implementation process—anecdotal evidence suggests there has been variation in the way 
these platforms have been initiated and governed—or does it depend on characteristics of 
the affected communities (e.g. pre-existing levels of social capital)? Or have farmers 
adapted new technologies without really understanding them technologies because they 
have felt that this has been expected from them and not been committed to the project – so 
is there a Hawthorne bias?  Or is it simply true that in some platforms a consensus was 
reached to focus on innovations that pay off in the longer term, so that lack of a short-term 
                                                          
23
 Note that our results may also be explained by non-random selection of IP sites for additional interventions.  
However, there is no evidence of “other interventions” systematically benefitting the villages selected for 
IAR4D.  We have not kept track of all “other interventions” in comparison areas, so we cannot rule out that 
another intervention targeted non-intervention sites and had negative impacts on poverty alleviation there 
(explaining the positive estimated impacts in our study).  However, we believe this to be unlikely. 
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effect is not indicative of platform failure at all?  Follow-up research is needed to analyse 
this issue.  Our preliminary analysis of the data suggests that the nature of the innovations 
selected and adopted varies across IPs—as is to be expected with a decentralized 
innovation approach. 
Second, decentralizing priority setting in the domain of innovation involves a trade-
off.  While decentralized approaches, such as IAR4D, allow tapping into pools of local 
knowledge and understanding, it might imply foregoing potential economies of scale in 
R&D.  A particularly bad outcome—not one that is consistent with our data—would be 
where many platforms are inventing the same wheel.  Moreover, a decentralized approach 
might induce a focus on bottlenecks that can be addressed locally.  The macro-perspective, 
involving large-scale investments in physical infrastructure or national, sectoral or trade 
policies, might be overlooked.  It appears important to give more space and attention to the 
use of the decentralized approach to innovation, while engaging policy makers of the “right 
level” as well.  The challenge will be to find the right balance between centralized and 
decentralized efforts to get African agriculture going.   
 






3. Do decentralized innovation systems promote 





Agricultural intensification and development is widely seen as a pre-condition for 
sustainable pro-poor growth in Africa (WDR 2007, Haggblade et al. 2007, Ligon and 
Sadoulet 2007, Christiaensen et al. 2010).  An important component of many agricultural 
development strategies is the promotion of (the adoption of) innovations.  Slow rates of 
technology adoption in African smallholder farming are a key factor explaining stagnating 
agricultural yields across the continent. Given that utilizing these technologies appears to 
be profitable in developing countries on average, rational profit maximizing farmers should 
have adopted these technologies theoretically. So, what are the reasons of imperfect? 
Shortly, recent studies provide four important theoretical explanations for this, which have 
been supported by empirical evidences, for this puzzle: (1) the farmers may have behavioral 
biases (risk aversion and present bias) distorting their investment decisions and leading to 
underinvestment and (2) may not be aware of the technology or do not know how to use it; 
(3) the returns to the technologies may be heterogeneous among farmers and very low for 
the non-adopters due to the context (infrastructure and trading opportunities) and 
characteristics (demographic factors and access to credit);  of farming households. 
Moreover, (4) there may be factors associated with the technologies themselves which 
                                                          
 This Chapter is based on following research paper: Pamuk, H., Bulte, E., & Adekunle, A. A. 
(2014b). Do decentralized innovation systems promote agricultural technology adoption? 
Experimental evidence from Africa. Food Policy. 44, 227-236. 
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make them less suitable for smallholders (for example, they may imply demands for 
complementary inputs that are not always available). Hence, it may not be optimal to adopt 
various new technologies.”  
 Another factor responsible for lagging adoption rates is the design of most extension 
programs, which by and large is based on the perspective that the diffusion of innovations 
resembles a ‘linear process.’  According to this perspective, key agricultural innovations are 
created by specialists (researchers), distributed by other specialists (extension workers), and 
adopted by producers (Leeuwis and van de Ban 2004, Knickel et al. 2009).  Such linear 
diffusion processes have been challenged by recent insights emphasizing social learning 
within (non-linear) networks (e.g., Bandiera and Rasul 2006, Conley and Udry 2009), and 
by academic work that identifies heterogeneity among smallholders so that ‘blanket 
recommendations’ are unlikely to be relevant for large swaths of the farming population 
(Duflo et al. 2008, Suri 2011).  These issues, combined with problems due to insufficient 
public funding and perverse incentive effects, have prompted policy makers and academics 
to probe alternative innovation and diffusion modalities.  For example, capacity building 
and farmer empowerment have gained in importance in recent years, at the expense of more 
prescriptive approaches (WDR 2007). 
 One recent attempt to revolutionize innovation and diffusion processes in rural 
Africa is the so-called Sub-Sahara African Challenge Program (SSA-CP; see below).  
Unlike conventional, top-down extension approaches, the SSA-CP articulates an 
“innovation system” perspective, integrating and building on knowledge and preferences 
from stakeholders across the production and distribution chain.  Innovation systems are 
intended to be “participatory,” and seek to engage not only research experts but also 
representatives from appropriate government bodies as well as producers, intermediaries, 
customers, and financial organizations.  These stakeholders are brought together in so-
called local “innovation platforms,” enabling bottom-up searches for solutions to local 
bottlenecks.  A priori it is not evident whether the traditional, centralized model or the 
participatory model represents the most efficient and effective vehicle to promote 
agricultural development.  While economies of scale in innovation and transfer argue in 
favor of standardized, centralized approaches, the decentralized approach allows tapping 
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into local knowledge about constraints, possibilities and priorities which may enhance local 
demand for innovations on offer.  
In a companion paper we have analyzed and compared the poverty impacts of 
traditional extension approaches and the decentralized innovation system approach (Pamuk 
et al. 2014a).  Based on experimental data collected in selected villages in the DRC, 
Uganda and Rwanda, we found that the decentralized innovation systems approach 
outperforms the traditional linear extension model in terms of poverty alleviation.    
However, we also documented considerable heterogeneity in performance across localities, 
and were silent on the mechanism linking innovation systems to poverty impacts. 
The main objective of this paper is to identify the impact of decentralized 
innovation systems on the adaption of different agricultural technologies, a potential 
mechanism linking innovation systems to poverty impacts.  In addition, we explore whether 
the benefits of the “innovation system” approach are widely shared within rural 
communities, or whether local elites are able to capture most of them (i.e., we probe the 
issue of intra-platform heterogeneity).  As before, we will base our analysis on 
experimental data collected during implementation of the SSA-CP (see below).  However, 
unlike the earlier analysis in Chapter 2 we will not focus on one specific learning site – the 
poverty analysis was based on data from Central Africa only.  Instead, we pull together data 
across all program sites in West, Central and Southern Africa.   In addition, we will move 
beyond village-level variables (i.e. poverty rates), and focus on household-level adoption 
and disadoption data.    
Our main results support and complement the findings in Pamuk et al. (2014a).  
Specifically, we identify one rather robust impact of innovation platforms on farm 
management across project sites – potentially a channel via which poverty rates are 
reduced.  In addition, while we document heterogeneity across platforms, reflecting that 
decentralized solutions reflect diversity in local priorities and challenges, we find no 
evidence of elite capture, or intra-village differences in impact.  Finally, we are not able to 
document any impact for a subsample of the platforms, and provide tentative evidence that 
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the impact of the innovation systems approach varies predictably according to local initial 
conditions. 
This paper is organized as follows.  In section 3.2 we briefly summarize key 
elements of the Sub Sahara African Challenge Program, and the nature of its main 
intervention—the creation of innovation platforms in selected villages.  Section 3.3 
summarizes our data and identification strategy.  In section 3.4 we present the results, 
paying most attention to the household-level impacts of innovation platforms in terms of 
farm management and marketing strategies.  Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Program description: The SSA-CP 
In 2004 the Challenge Program (SSA CP) introduced a new approach to promoting 
innovation and diffusion of innovations in African agriculture.  This so-called Integrated 
Agricultural Research for Development (IAR4D) approach was based on an innovation 
systems perspective, and created coalitions of stakeholders to identify and address local 
bottlenecks to agricultural development. Through this approach, the program aims to 
promote agricultural innovations by utilizing indigenous knowledge of the farmers through 
a participatory framework and interaction between different stakeholders. 
 A central concept in this approach is the so-called innovation platform (IP), which 
are decentralized local innovations systems. IPs are vehicles to bring together stakeholders. 
Each IP serves a group of villages, and theoretically chooses representatives from different 
stakeholders via a participatory process. These representatives of farmers’ associations, 
traders, researchers, extension workers, NGOs, and government policy makers regularly 
meet at these platforms, articulate their views, and negotiate joint strategies for action.  In 
light of diversity in challenges across localities, one would expect different IPs to prioritize 
different problems and to formulate different strategies for action such as research and 
adoption of new agricultural technologies, crops, introduction of new natural resource 
management practices, institutions ––IPs should be a springboard for participatory and 
bottom up processes.  In addition, the IPs should engage the broader communities within 
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which they are operational by raising awareness and the spreading of information via 
assigned IP members (FARA 2008).
24
    
The Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) coordinates the 
implementation of the SSA-CP.  To provide “proof of concept,” the IAR4D program was 
rolled out as a large experiment, whereby some communities received IPs (treatment 
communities) and others did not (control communities).
25
  A range of livelihood variables 
was tracked in both the treatment and control communities via two survey waves.  The 
current study is based on baseline data collected in 2008 and midline data collected in 
2010-2011.  This means we can only pick up short-term effects, and can only assess the 
impact of early maturing platforms.  An end-line survey is scheduled for late 2013, 
enabling additional analysis probing the robustness and sustainability of the preliminary 
results presented here.  As mentioned, a comparison of the dynamics of poverty rates for a 
subsample of the communities monitored over the period between baseline and midline 
(2008-2010) suggests that IAR4D managed to reduce local poverty (Pamuk et al. 2014a). 
To guaranty external validity of the lessons learned, IPs were introduced in three 
African sub-regions, or “project learning sites” (PLS): (i) “Lake Kivu (LK)” in Eastern and 
Central Africa, (ii) “Kano‐Katsina‐Maradi (KKM)” in West Africa, and (iii) “Zimbabwe‐
Malawi‐Mozambique (ZMM)” in Southern Africa.  The enormous variation across project 
learning sites, in terms of both geophysical and socioeconomic variables, enables 
verification whether any impact effects are robust to changes in contextual factors, or not.  
Per project learning site, multiple task forces were created to supervise the implementation 
and data collection process.  The identity of the implementing partner at the task force level 
varied from one locality to the next, depending on local and relevant expertise, and 
sufficient presence in the region.   
                                                          
24
 Please see section 2.3 for details of the program. 
25
 The SSA-CP has two types of control groups: (i) so-called ‘clean villages’ where heretofore no serious 
extension efforts (by either the state or NGOs) has been lacking and (ii) so-called ‘traditional extension 
villages,’ which in the past have been selected for such treatment.  The IAR4D villages were drawn from the 
pool of clean villages (see main text, below), so to attenuate concerns about selection effects, which could 
plague impact assessments of IAR4D vis-à-vis traditional extension villages, the pool of clean villages is used 
as the sampling frame in this study and we only compare the performance of the IAR4D treatment relative to 
the control group of clean villages. 
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To promote internal validity, as mentioned, the implementation stage was organized 
as an experiment with exogenous selection of villages into the IAR4D treatment.  The 
details of the sampling frame were slightly different across PLSs.  Specifically, in West and 
Southern Africa the intervention was implemented as a conventional RCT.  A sampling 
frame was constructed that included so called “clean villages” in the study region or 
villages relatively untouched by either conventional extension efforts or diffusion projects 
of non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  From this sampling frame, a subsample of 
villages was randomly drawn to receive the treatment, and a subsample of villages from the 
rest of the sampling frame was randomly selected to serve as control. Finally, a random 
sub-sample of villagers (households) was drawn from treatment and control villages and 
subsequently included in the waves of surveying. 
In the Lake Kivu region, capturing parts of Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC, a 
slightly different approach was followed.  To mitigate potential spill-over effects (benefits 
from treatment – ideas, innovations – affecting well-being of households in control 
villages), randomisation took place at a higher administrative level than the village level.  
That is, the sample frame consisted of wards (named sub-counties in Uganda, secteurs in 
Rwanda, and groupements in the DRC).  Next, 4 wards per country were randomly selected 
to receive the treatment, and 4 other wards were randomly selected to act as control wards.  
From these two sub-samples, random subsamples of treatment and control villages were 
drawn.  Obviously the gains in terms of reduced spill-over effects must be traded off 
against the costs of a compromised “balance” across treatment and control villages.  Since 
treatment and control villages are drawn from different populations (i.e., from different 
wards), there is less reason to assume that baseline values for the variables of interest are 
identical.  This is confirmed in the analysis (see below).  To control for any differences in 
the sampling approach we will consistently use Action Zone fixed effects
26
 in the analyses. 
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 Action Zone fixed effects refer to country fixed effects for Lake Kivu and ZMM pilot learning sites, and 
taskforce fixed effects for KKM. Since in KKM, 3 taskforces were active in two countries (Nigeria and 
Niger), we chose taskforce fixed effects to capture any geographic unobserved factors.   
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3.3 Data and identification strategy 
Initially, the SSA-CP was designed to include 3 project learning sites, 3 task forces per 
PLS, and 4 innovation platforms per task force.  Hence, in total 36 IPs were created.  
However, one of the task forces failed to collect baseline data on a key technology adoption 
variable, and another one failed to collect the end-line data in a timely manner.  These two 
task forces were dropped from our sample. Hence in this Chapter we use data from all PLSs 
(including data from LK-PLS used in Chapter 2), but some data are missing for some task 
forces within those PLSs.  The remaining sample consists over slightly over 3000 
households (slightly over 320 villages), rather equally spread across the treatment and 
control sample.  Details of the sampling frame are summarized in Table 3.1. These data 
suggest mild attrition, but for most models estimated below we will use samples sizes that 




Table 3.1: Sampling frame 
Survey Unit of analyses Intervention Control Total 
Baseline 
Households 1589 1572 3161 
Villages 159 165 324 
Midline 
Household 1484 1554 3038 
Villages 156 164 320 
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 We tested whether there are systematic differences between complete and incomplete questionnaires in 
terms of outcome variables. We regress a dummy variable (equal to 1 if the variable is missing for each 
technology group) on the midline dummy, IAR4D dummies, and control for action zone fixed effects 
(discussed in section 3.1). We find that education (+), midline (-),gender (-), and action zone fixed effects 
enter significantly. However, since the impact of IAR4D does not vary with education and gender of the 
household (see section 4 for detail), this should not introduce bias in our results.  The negative sign of the 
midline dummy implies that the quality of surveys has increased over time (we see the same trend for all 
technology groups).  
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Table 3.2: Definitions of our outcome variables and comparison of average level of 
outcome variables and households characteristics at IAR4D and control villages in 
baseline 
Variable Definition Comparison of outcome and household 
characteristics in baseline 
  
Outcome variables  ̅       ̅        
  
Totsw Total number of soil and water 




   
Totsf Total number of soil and fertility 




   
Totcm Total number of crop management 




   
Totph Total number of post harvest technologies 





Control variables-Household characteristics  ̅       ̅        
  







Age  Age of household head -1.049 
(0.706) 
[3144] 
   
Education  Equals 1 if household head has over 




   
Household size Total number of members of household -0.380 
(0.480) 
[3132] 
   
Agricultural 
Experience 





   
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses and numbers of observations are in 
brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We introduce our outcome variables and control variables in Table 3.2.  All 
outcome variables are measured at the household level, and capture whether or not the 
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household uses a specific production, management, or storage modality.  Variation in the 
use of specific technologies or modalities over time implies the household in question has 
adopted or disadopted specific practices.  Our identification strategy rests upon the 
correlation between such adoption measures and exposure to IAR4D.  We use four count 
data measures indicating how many technologies are used for a specific purpose.  We 
distinguish between technologies to promote soil and water management (totsw), soil 
fertility management (totsf), crop management (totcm), and post-harvest storage (totph).  
Details of these technologies are provided in the Appendix, as are summary statistics of the 
various control variables.  As controls we use years of agricultural experience, age, 
education and gender of the household head, and the size of the household.  
3.3.1 Comparing treatment and control variables at the baseline 
Since not all IAR4D and control villages were randomly selected from the sampling 
frames, we first probe to what extent the experiment produced a balanced sample.  To what 
extent do treatment and control villages have similar values for the variables of interest?  
Table 3.2 reports differences in outcome variables and household characteristics across the 
two samples.  In spite of the large number of observations and high power of the test, we 
find that for 8 out of 9 variables there are no significant differences between treatment and 
control villages.  The exception to the rule is soil fertility management – households in 
intervention villages were slightly more likely to engage in these activities than households 
in control villages. Since failing to account for such pre-existing differences may produce 
biased impact estimates, we will not base the empirical analysis on simple comparisons of 
end-line data.  Instead, the core of our analysis rests on differences in difference estimates, 
which under the assumption of parallel trends should address the absence of perfect balance 
at the baseline. In addition, we use baseline data to increase the power of our estimations, 
particularly for the IP level estimations based on relatively few observations (see section 
3.4). 
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3.3.2 IAR4D and adoption  
We now outline our identification strategy.  We are interested in analysing the impact of 
IAR4D on the adoption (or disadoption) of specific technologies and trade modalities.  We 
use a differences-in-difference (diff-in-diff) methodology that combines baseline and 
midline data.
28
  Specifically, we estimate the following model for outcome variable Y, and 
test the hypothesis: β1
j







1 (IAR4Dv × Midlinet) + β
j
2 IAR4Dv + β
j
3 Midlinet + β
j’
4 Xivt + ε
j
ivt  
where superscript j, and subscripts i, v and t denote innovation item, household, village and 
time, respectively. Y
j
ivt represents the outcome variable, or the set of variables summarized 
in Table 3.2.  IAR4D is a dummy variable, with value 1 if the village received the IAR4D 
treatment (and value 0 otherwise).  Midline is another dummy, indicating whether the 
observation in question was collected at the midline, or not (if so, the variable takes a value 
of 1).  Finally, X is a vector of controls and ε is the random error term.  
We estimate model (3.1) several times, for different samples and using different 
estimators. (1) We estimate simple Poisson models for our count data outcome variables 
respectively, without controls, using the largest sample possible (i.e. an unbalanced sample 
based on all observations).  (2) We re-estimate the same model, but now use a smaller 
sample (only including these households for which there are no missing observations for 
any of the control variables).  (3) Using the same sample as in (2), we now control for 
household characteristics.  (4) Further decreasing the sample we now focus on those 
villages for which we have both baseline and midline data (balanced sample).  (5) We 
check the robustness of the results obtained using the previous model by estimating an OLS 
model.  (6) We control for unobserved village characteristics by replacing action zone 
dummies by village fixed effects. (7) We again decrease the sample to the households for 
                                                          
28
 Our diff-in-diff strategy depends on the assumption that outcome variables for control and IAR4D villages 
have parallel trends.  The randomization produced comparable counterfactual groups having similar baseline 
characteristics (see section above), so we may expect that the trends in outcome variables would be similar if 
there was no treatment.  We cannot however test this assumption, because of lack of data for those variables 
from the periods before the intervention started.  If the villages have differences in terms of some unobserved 
characteristics or there are other outside factors affecting only IAR4D or clean villages, our results may be 
biased.  Therefore, we should be cautious while interpreting the results. 
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which we have baseline and midline data (balanced sample at household level). (8) Finally, 
we control for unobserved household heterogeneity by replacing village fixed effects by 
household fixed effects. 
3.3.3 Are Innovation Platforms able to deliver what is intended? 
Since IPs are supposed to identify and diagnose local problems, there is no a priori reason 
to suspect that all platforms will prioritize similar sets of innovations or technologies.  To 
test whether platforms are able to target locally relevant bottlenecks, we divide the sample 
of IPs into subsamples, based on local priorities as defined during early platform meetings, 
and next look technology adoption in the relevant domain.  That is, we again estimate (3.1).  
But for each outcome variable of interest, say crop management technologies, we now only 
include households from those IPs that intended to focus on that outcome variable.  IP 
priority setting and active policy areas (focus areas) are obtained from IP level reports, and 
IPs might set more than one priority in the meetings.  Hence, for each dependent variable 
our subsamples are not mutually exclusive.  For each subsample we again test whether β
j
1 
≠ 0.   Additionally, if we find that IPs with βj1>0 are the ones that were successful in 
reducing poverty in Chapter 2, then we can conclude IPs may reduce poverty through this 
channel.   
3.3.4 Heterogeneous treatment effects at the household level 
Insofar as IAR4D is able to increase innovation rates or the diffusion of new technologies, 
are all households able to capitalize on this opportunity?  Or does a non-random sub-sample 
of villagers seize these benefits, possibly accentuating pre-intervention differences in local 
income, well-being or power?  To probe this important issue, we estimate the following 
model in the same subsample discussed in section 3.3.3 and test whether α
j
1  0:  






1 (Zivt × IAR4Dv × Midlinet) + α
j
2 (Zivt × IAR4Dv) + α
j
3 (Zivt × Midlinet) 
  + β
j
2 (IAR4Dv × Midlinet) + β
j
3 IAR4Dv + β
j
3 Midlinet + β
j’
4 Xivt + ε
j
ivt  
where Z refers to various candidate household characteristics, such as the level of 
education, which might affect the household’s ability to benefit from IAR4D.   
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3.3.5 Heterogeneous treatment effects at the platform level 
In addition to heterogeneity at the level of participating households, we are also interested 
in heterogeneity at the level of IPs.  Specifically, we explore which baseline variables are 
associated with successful platforms, or with enhanced adoption of innovations.  We thus 
build on the earlier analysis, identifying the platforms able to raise adoption rates of 
innovations in priority policy areas (see section 3.3.3). In other words, we assume an IP as 
successful if on average villagers adapt a prioritized technology in the IP.
29
 
 We distinguish between two types of conditioning variables.  First, the success of 
IPs may depend on “community factors” such as social capital or resources available at the 
village (e.g. see Khwaja 2009).  We proxy the former using survey-based measures of 
participation in (and financial contribution for) community activities, trust among villagers, 
cooperation among people, gift giving, assistance to the local poor, resolution of conflicts 
and disputes, respect for local norms and bylaws, and gender equality.  Proxies for village 
level resources are the presence or absence of schools, clinics and health centers, places of 
worship, and centers for social activity, but also productive resources such as boreholes (or 
wells), village wood lots, all-weather roads passing through the village, water bodies 
(stream, ponds, rivers), public transport stop, or rural micro-finance bank.  It is evident that 
many of these village level resources are not proper exogenous explanatory variables.  In 
what follows we therefore refrain from making causal statements, and simply use a series 
of t-tests to document correlations or associations (future work could try to instrument for 
key context factors and try to tease out causal effects).  We also re-estimate model (3.1) for 
those context variables correlated with success, and test our hypothesis for the entire 
sample.  
 Second, the success or failure of IPs could be associated with the nature of the 
implementation strategy.  That is, while the philosophy behind innovation platforms is 
rooted in concepts like participation and bottom-up processes, the extent to which local 
stakeholders were actually engaged in priority-setting might vary from one platform to the 
next.  We obtain a rough proxy for the degree to which platforms appear to encourage such 
                                                          
29
 These are the IPs for which we find a significant and positive impact of intervention in Table 4 
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local variety, and again correlate this proxy to our measures of platform success.  Our 
proxy for the extent to which platforms were driven by participatory processes is based on 
variation in policy priorities across IPs at the task force level.   
Assuming that decentralized priority setting translates into some diversity in priority 
areas, we interpret the lack of such diversity as evidence of some degree of top-down 
planning.  Obviously such arguing might be misleading, as we cannot rule out that 
decentralized stakeholders converge to the same overarching concern within one 
taskforce’s territory.  We therefore interpret these correlations with even more caution than 
the other empirical results.  Nevertheless, and as a first attempt to operationalize this 
concept, to assess whether top-down platforms are more or less effective than bottom-up 
ones, we again estimate model (1), but now divide the sample based on this indicator for 
top-down planning.   
Specifically, we characterize an IP as ‘top-down’ if it belongs to a taskforce in 
which all IPs focus on the same bottleneck  For example, in Sudan Savannah all IPs focus 
on soil and fertility management and on crop management.  No IP focused on issues like 
soil and water conservation or post-harvest innovations.  We therefore define all IPs in 
Sudan Savannah as ‘top-down’ in terms of soil and fertility management (and crop 
management) technologies.  Similarly, all IPs in Zimbabwe focus on soil and water 
conservation, so we view these IPs as top-down in terms of soil and water conservation.  
Note that we characterize IPs as top-down for specific technologies (and not as top-down 
overall).  The reason is that IPs forced to focus on one technology may also decide to 
embrace another priority in a bottom-up manner.
30
  Details about priorities per IP are 
provided in the Appendix Table A.3.3.     
When exploring heterogeneous treatment effects at the IP level, we follow a simple 
methodology to improve the balance between treatment and control groups in terms of 
some household and village characteristics.  Specifically, rather than using all ‘clean 
villages’ from the Action Zone as the control group, we now construct IP-specific control 
                                                          
30
 In total there are 28 IPs.  Of these IPs, 4 IPs focus on soil and water conservation in a top-down fashion 
(=14%),  In addition, 8 are top-down IPs in terms of soil and fertility management (=0.28%), 12 are top-down 
IPs in terms of crop management (42%), and 4 are top-down focusing on post-harvest technologies (14%). 
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groups by selecting households from (relatively) nearby clean villages (i.e. from the same 
or most nearby ward, depending on the PLS in question).  Thus splitting our sample into 
smaller parts, we obtain more relevant comparisons of treatment and control households.
31
  
3.4 Estimation results  
We now turn to the regression results.  The main results for question 1, regarding the 
impact of IAR4D on the adoption of selected innovations, are summarized in Table 3.3.  
We only report the results for the coefficients of interest, or the coefficient associated with 
the IAR4D treatment, but most models have been estimated using a full set of controls and 
fixed effects (details of the estimation strategy are provided at the bottom of the Table).  
The different rows in the Table correspond with different innovations (from soil and water 
conservation efforts to post harvest technologies), and the columns refer to the different 
models summarized in Section 3.3.2.   
Across the board, the regression results of these pooled models provide little 
evidence of robust impact.  The exception to the rule is the uptake of crop management 
innovations – across all models and samples we estimate we find a positive correlation 
between the presence of innovation platforms and the adoption of novel crop management 
techniques.  This may reflect that crop management was identified as a priority across 
many IPs, so that a significant average treatment effect materializes.  It could also reflect 
that innovations such as the application of (in)organic pesticides and intercropping are 
relatively easy compared to the more demanding innovations in other domains, or the 
presence of strong extension support on most of the platforms.  We find no robust effects 
for soil management, or the prevention of post-harvest losses.  However, and as argued, the 
lack of robust associations across the pooled data may obscure the existence of positive 
treatment effects at the level of specific IPs – those platforms were soil management or 
post-harvest losses were identified as a key bottleneck.   
                                                          
31
 For IP level analysis, we cannot determine the counterfactuals for Musawa, Safana, Shanono, Bunkure, 
Wedza and Murewa. Instead, we create pairs of IPs (Musawa/Safana, Shanono/Bunkure and Wedza/Murewa) 
for which we can determine close geographic counterfactuals. As a result, we report results for 25 IPs instead 
of 28 (see section 4).    
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Table 3.3: Summary table for outcome estimates of β
j
1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variable: totsw 
 ̂ 
 
 0.0863 0.0651 0.0599 0.0643 0.0703 0.111 0.0953 0.0955 
 (0.0977) (0.101) (0.0986) (0.0995) (0.0979) (0.101) (0.106) (0.143) 
N 5,725 5,417 5,417 5,354 5,354 5,354 4,192 4,192 
 Dependent variable: totsf 
 ̂ 
 
 -0.123 -0.154 -0.107 -0.0953 -0.0329 -0.0555 -0.107 -0.108 
 (0.126) (0.133) (0.107) (0.107) (0.103) (0.107) (0.110) (0.148) 
N 6,055 5,599 5,599 5,534 5,534 5,534 4,516 4,516 
 Dependent variable: totcm 
 ̂ 
 
 0.267** 0.241** 0.286*** 0.275*** 0.272** 0.275** 0.313*** 0.308* 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.105) (0.106) (0.106) (0.112) (0.118) (0.159) 
N 5,819 5,384 5,384 5,321 5,321 5,321 4,134 4,134 
 Dependent variable: totph 
 ̂ 
 
 -0.164 -0.115 -0.0757 -0.0732 -0.0798 -0.125 -0.160 -0.158 
 (0.159) (0.160) (0.153) (0.154) (0.143) (0.145) (0.157) (0.215) 
N 5,914 5,482 5,482 5,419 5,419 5,419 4,308 4,308 
               
Methodology Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Sample Unbalanced 
Unbalanced  
& No missing  
controls 
Unbalanced 






















Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Action Zone FE NO YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Village FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO 
Household FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Notes: For Poisson estimations marginal impact estimates at mean levels are reported. N refers to the number of 
observations used in the estimations. Robust standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. We use 
household head's education, agricultural experience, age, gender and size of household as control variables when 
indicated. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 To probe the issue of heterogeneous treatment effects we examine the association 
between the adoption of innovations and the IAR4D treatment for a subsample of the data – 
for those villages where platform priorities match with the specific outcome variable.  First, 
we investigate average treatment effects for all platforms in that subsample.  Results shown 
in Table 3.4 are similar to those of the pooled model: treatment does not enhance the rate of 
adaption of technologies except for crop management technologies.  However, within this 
subsample there may still be successful as well as unsuccessful IPs ones in terms of the 
implementation of the policies.  
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Table 3.4: Estimates for β
j
1 for IPs focused on agricultural technologies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variable: totsw 
 ̂ 
 
 0.274 0.249 0.228 0.233 0.255 0.252 0.275 0.277 
 (0.215) (0.223) (0.224) (0.229) (0.225) (0.231) (0.261) (0.354) 
N 1,711 1,621 1,621 1,582 1,582 1,582 1,202 1,202 
 Dependent variable: totsf 
 ̂ 
 
 -0.201 -0.310 -0.243* -0.236 -0.0743 -0.110 -0.149 -0.167 
 (0.170) (0.197) (0.147) (0.147) (0.130) (0.137) (0.135) (0.179) 
N 3,184 2,846 2,846 2,837 2,837 2,837 2,328 2,328 
 Dependent variable: totcm 
 ̂ 
 
 0.221 0.173 0.211* 0.213* 0.205* 0.193 0.219 0.213 
 (0.140) (0.148) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.131) (0.136) (0.184) 
N 3,874 3,571 3,571 3,564 3,564 3,564 2,866 2,866 
 Dependent variable: totph 
 ̂ 
 
 -0.567 -0.570 -0.538 -0.526 -0.452 -0.459 -0.435 -0.425 
 (0.421) (0.421) (0.414) (0.417) (0.273) (0.281) (0.292) (0.399) 
N 1,237 1,227 1,227 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,084 1,084 
               
Methodology Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Sample Unbalanced 
Unbalanced  
& No missing  
controls 
Unbalanced 




















 No missing 
 controls 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Act. Zone FE NO YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Village FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO 
Hous. FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Notes: For Poisson estimations marginal impact estimates at mean levels are reported. N refers to the number of 
observations used in the estimations. Robust standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. We use 
education, agricultural experience, age, gender of household head, and size of household as control variables 
when indicated. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 To explore whether there are successful IPs, we examine IP level treatment effects 
in this subsample Results are summarized in Table 3.5, and again are rather mixed.  Each 
row in the Table corresponds with a specific IP, and for each IP we have estimated whether 
it has been successful in promoting the adoption of innovations in its priority domain.  For 
example, for the Kubau platform we did not find reference to our priority areas in platform 
documents
32
, but the Dandume platform intended to focus on soil and water management 
and soil fertility management.  According to our models, it successfully enhanced the 
adoption of innovations in the former domain, but was unable to boost adoption of soil 
fertility innovations (relative to the control group).  According to Table 3.5, no IP was able 
to improve the adoption of post-harvest innovations.  However, two IPs increased the 
                                                          
32
 In fact, in Kubau, the focus was on livestock technologies which are not the scope of this paper. 
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uptake of innovations in soil and water management (Dandume and Balaka), one IP 
increased the adoption of soil fertility innovations (Ikara, but two other platforms 
apparently lowered the uptake of innovations), and five IPs increased crop management 
adoptions (Ikara, Madarounfa, Musawa, Kituva, Chahi).  In what follows we consider 
these platforms as ‘successful’ IPs: Dandume, Ikara, Madorounfa, Kituva, Chahi, Balaka, 
Musawa and Safana.  Casual inspection of the results suggests that older platforms – 
operational for two years rather than one year – are more likely to be successful than 
younger ones.
33
  Arguably this reflects both the extra “time to achieve impact” as well as 
the effect of platform maturity, or the extent to which it is able to function as intended.   
This result may also imply that IAR4D may reduce poverty through promoting 
agricultural technology adoption. 2 IPs from Lake Kivu PLS, Kituva and Chahi, which are 
successful at promoting technology adoption, have also been successful at bringing down 
poverty at Lake Kivu PLS (see Table 2.6 in Chapter 2). Hence there is (limited) evidence 
suggesting that there is a correlation between the success in technology adoption and 
poverty reduction.  
Are the benefits of platforms shared widely within treatment communities, or is a 
subsample of village members able to capture most of them?  We start analyzing this 
question in Table 3.6, where we report coefficients of the relevant interaction term (see 
3.3.4).  We seek to explain whether adoption rates vary with the level of education of the 
household head – a leading candidate variable for conditional impacts.  We find no robust 
evidence that adoption rates vary across education levels. To economize on space, we do 
not report estimates for other household characteristics we have considered (such as such as 
age and gender of the household head, years of experience in farming, household size) but 
the same is mostly true (the estimates are available upon request).
34
 It appears that the 
benefits of IAR4D in terms of enhanced adoption, if any, are widely shared within the 
community. 
                                                          
33
 It is also important to note that the power of IP level estimates is relatively low because we only have few 
observations. Hence, we are vulnerable to type II errors: to falsely conclude that there is no treatment effect, 
even if there actually is one. 
34
 There are only two exceptions to this. First, in soil and fertility management and crop management domains 
experienced households adopt more technologies as a result of intervention. Second, it seems that larger 
households benefit more from the treatment in the adoption crop management technologies. 
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Table 3.6: Summary table for count data outcome estimates of α
j
1-Education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent variable: totsw 
       
 ̂ 
 
 2.25e-05 -0.0604 0.148 0.102 0.288 0.366 
 (0.379) (0.382) (0.383) (0.400) (0.446) (0.589) 
N 1,621 1,582 1,582 1,582 1,202 1,202 
 Dependent variable: totsf 
 ̂ 
 
 0.101 0.0878 0.0417 -0.0363 -0.805*** -0.727* 
 (0.298) (0.299) (0.268) (0.282) (0.280) (0.417) 
N 2,846 2,837 2,837 2,837 2,328 2,328 
 Dependent variable: totcm 
 ̂ 
 
 -0.00153 -0.00739 0.00795 -0.00506 0.390 0.404 
 (0.217) (0.217) (0.219) (0.229) (0.265) (0.391) 
N 3,571 3,564 3,564 3,564 2,866 2,866 
 Dependent variable: totph 
 ̂ 
 
 1.609*** 1.552*** 0.267 0.109 -1.616*** -1.642** 
 (0.540) (0.542) (0.339) (0.361) (0.413) (0.649) 
N 1,227 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,084 1,084 
       
Methodology Poisson Poisson OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Sample 
Unbalanced 




















 No missing 
 controls 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Action Zone FE YES YES YES NO YES NO 
Village FE NO NO NO YES YES NO 
Household FE NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Notes: For Poisson regressions marginal impact estimates at mean level are reported in the table. Robust 
standard errors clustered at village level are in the parentheses. We use education, agricultural experience, 
age, gender of household head, and size of household as control variables when indicated. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, we tentatively examine the issue of heterogeneity at the platform level (see 
3.3.5).  We ask whether the duration of the platforms (years in the field) matters for 
adoption patterns and whether the success of platforms varies with initial social capital or 
village resources variables.
35
  Simple correlation statistics shown in Table 3.7 indeed 
suggest this is the case, for a sub-sample of these village level variables.  As reported 
above, successful IPs tend to be established earlier, suggesting that it takes some time for 
these platforms to mature and deliver impact.  On average, successful IPs are 0.54 years 
older, which is statistically significant (t-statistics=1.79).  Similarly, successful IPs are 
                                                          
35
 The impact of platforms also varies systematically with the composition of the platform.  However, since 
platform composition is arguably endogenous, we will leave this question for future research. 
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characterized by higher scores on our local cooperation index (0.52 points higher on a 4 
point scale, associated t-statistics=2.07), and are more likely to have a common place for 
worship (probability is 20% higher, associated t-statistics=1.95).
36
  These findings suggest 
that ‘platform maturity’ and social capital explain some of the variation in platform 
performance.  This is confirmed in complementary regression analysis where we include 
the various household and community controls, and split the sample according to the age of 
the platform (older or younger than 2 years), the level of cooperation in the village, or the 
presence of a worship place.  Details of these regression models are available on request.  











at  the village (0/1) 
Success (0/1) 0.540* 0.523* 0.200* 
 (0.301) (0.253) (0.103) 
N 25 22 22 
Notes: Estimates are from IP level estimation of simple linear regressions success is explanatory variable, 
and village or IP characteristics are dependent variables. As numbers of estimates are limited, we do not 
control for household characteristics, action zone, village and household fixed effects. Since there is no 
available information of cooperation among people and worship places for 3 IPs, estimations are conducted 
for 22 IPs. Standard errors are in the parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
                                                          
36
 There are no significant correlations platform success and the remaining village-level variables (details are 
available on request).  Again, however, it is important to reiterate that the power of these t-tests is quite low as 
the analysis is at the IP level.  Thus, again, the risk of type II errors looms large, and we can only identify the 
conditional impact of those baseline factors that have a very large effect on the likelihood of IP success 
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Finally, we ask whether the success of IPs depends on platform implementation––in 
particular the degree of top-down planning. The lack of local variety in priorities may be 
interpreted as a sign of top-down priority-setting (an open question, admittedly), we may 
probe whether top-down planning is associated with platform success.  We detect some 
patterns in the data supporting the view that local variation in priority setting might be 
beneficial for IAR4D impact—taskforces with variation in priorities across IPs seem to do 
a better job in promoting the adoption of innovations than taskforces that lack such 
variability. In Table 3.8, we compare estimates for ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ IPs for each 
technology domain. Specifically, the adoption rate of crop management technologies is 
significantly higher in IPs characterized by bottom-up priority setting.  Also note that the 
adoption of soil fertility innovations is significantly lower in IPs characterized by top-down 
priority setting.  These outcomes are consistent with the interpretation that allowing 
platforms to capitalize on local knowledge about preferences and constraints (i.e., 
promoting flexibility) improves platform performance.  However, and as mentioned, we 
acknowledge that the link between top-down planning and reduced diversity in priorities is 
tenuous, and debatable.  Therefore we emphasize that these findings should be seen as 
tentative, and as an invitation for additional research in this issue. 
3.5 Conclusions and discussion 
Conventional extension efforts have produced disappointing results, and have failed to 
promote the adoption of agricultural innovations.  Pamuk et al. (2014a) provide early 
evidence that alternative mechanisms, based on the innovation system perspective to 
innovation and diffusion, are better able to promote agricultural development and reduce 
rural poverty.  In this paper we examine the mechanisms behind that finding, and try to 
open the black box linking innovation platforms to poverty alleviation.  We emphasize that 
the impact assessment is based on an analysis of baseline and midline data, collected only 
one or two years after establishment of the platforms.  This implies that insofar as impact 
varies with platform maturity, and it takes time for platforms to mature, we may be 
underestimating the genuine long-term impact.  Future research will be necessary to shed 
light on this issue. 
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Our main conclusions are twofold.  First, while some types of innovations are 
robustly associated with the creation of innovation platforms – namely innovations in the 
domain of crop management – the same is not true for innovations in other domains.  
Specifically, it appears as if the demand for innovations in the domains of soil fertility 
management, soil and water management, and post-harvest management are much more 
context-specific – varying across space.  A standardized, top-down innovation agenda is 
therefore unlikely to fit, and priority setting at the local level seems to be better able to 
capture this need for diversity.  Second, while we find no evidence of heterogeneous 
treatment effects at the level of individual households – successful platforms seem to 
encourage the adoption of innovations across various social groups – we also find that the 
success of platforms is heterogeneous.  That is; some platforms “work” and promote the 
adoption of innovations, and others do not (yet).  This may not be surprising in light of the 
immature status of many of the platforms (midline data collected one or two years after 
platforms were created).
37
  We also find that the success of interventions varies with some 
measures of ex ante social capital and the quality of platform implementation (especially 
the degree to which local, tailor-made problem diagnosis and priority setting is facilitated).  
This provides scope for both improved targeting, and room for operational improvements 
when rolling out the decentralized innovation agenda. 
We believe evidence suggests that the decentralized approach to promoting 
innovation and adoption hold promise, and needs to be considered as an alternative to 
dominant extension modalities.  However, two caveats are relevant. First, we only find a 
positive and significant effect for one technology domain, and there is considerable 
heterogeneity in the results at the IP level.  While we provide tentative evidence regarding 
the factors determining the success of IPs, identifying the institutional, technological or 
organizational factors that determine the performance of IPs should be a priority. Second, 
we are aware of the trade-offs associated with such a transition from central to 
decentralized approach.  Decentralized approaches such as IAR4D facilitate capitalizing on 
local knowledge and understanding, but may also involve foregone economies of scale in 
                                                          
37
 Anecdotal evidence supports the idea that platform maturity matters.  One program member described to us 
how successful IPs go through phases – from “forming” to “storming” to “norming” as he phrased it.  High 
performance may not be expected until later stages are reached. 
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R&D.  Moreover, too much emphasis on decentralized approaches could imply a focus on 
bottlenecks that can be addressed locally – not necessarily the most binding constraints to 
agricultural development (which may require sectoral policy reform).  Arguably the most 
successful strategy to unleash agricultural productivity on African involves integrating the 
local and the macro perspective.  Currently, in many African countries the balance appears 
skewed towards the latter. 
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3.A Appendix: Additional tables 
 
Table A.3.1: Agricultural technologies considered each count data outcome variables 
 
Soil and Water Management Innovations  Crop Management Innovations  
 Mulching   Row Planting 
 Trenches and Terraces   Plant Spacing 
 Water Harvesting   Organic Pesticides 
 Irrigation  Inorganic Pesticides 
 Conservation Farming  Other 
 Other 
 Soil and Fertility Management Innovations  Post Harvest Innovations  
 Animal Manure   Drying 
 Cover Crops    Threshing/Shelling Equipment 
 Crop Rotation    Improved Storage Facilities 
 Intercropping   Pest Control 
 Rhizobia Inoculation   Grading 
 Chemical Fertilizer  Other 




Table A.3.2: Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Totsw 5725 1.14 1.20 0 5 
Totsm 6055 2.48 1.48 0 6 
Totcm 5819 1.83 1.44 0 5 
Totph 5914 2.22 1.50 0 6 
Gender  6146 0.76 0.43 0 1 
Age  6167 47.29 14.63 16 105 
Education  5820 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Household size 6155 8.62 8.57 0 275 
Experience 6100 24.48 14.66 0 80 
 
 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4. Implementation matters:  Heterogeneity in the 





Agricultural growth is considered an important factor for sustainable alleviation of poverty 
(Haggblade et al. 2007; Ligon & Sadoulet 2007; World Bank 2007; Christiaensen et al. 
2011).  Policy makers have applied a wide variety of strategies to boost agricultural 
productivity and production in developing countries. A relatively new view in those 
strategies is the implementation of the innovation system perspective to support agricultural 
research and development for resource-poor farmers.  The innovation system approach is a 
multi-stakeholder and participatory method integrating the knowledge of stakeholders from 
the value chain via so called “innovation platforms (IPs)”.  At IPs, the stakeholders are 
expected to come together to find solutions to local bottlenecks and to design and 
implement policies at the local level (Leeuwis & Van den Ban, 2004; Hall et al. 2006; 
Knickel et al. 2009).  Many IPs have recently been introduced to enhance agricultural 
production and productivity of resource poor farmers through adoption of suitable and 
efficient agricultural techniques (Nederlof et al. 2011).   
Few evaluation studies have quantitatively explored the impact of these IPs.   
Exceptions are studies that assessed the effect of the Sub Saharan African Challenge 
Program (SSA CP).  The SSA CP adopted the Integrated Agricultural Research for 
                                                          
¥
 This Chapter is based on following research paper: Pamuk, H. & van Rijn, F. (2014). 
Implementation Matters:  Heterogeneity in the Impact of Decentralized Innovation Systems in 
Africa . Unpublished manuscript 
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Development (IAR4D) approach as its main philosophy through the implementation of 
local decentralized IPs.  Chapter 2 shows that, on average, the program does not have an 
impact on food consumption.  Chapter 3 and van Rijn and Nkonya (2012) also suggest that 
IPs have mixed impact on agricultural innovation and household social capital 
respectively..  Moreover, the outcomes at IP level are highly variable: ranging from 
significantly positive to non-significant to significantly negative.   
The policy evaluation literature suggests two answers to explain differences in 
impact at the IP level.  First, the impact of any policy may be a function of characteristics 
of the region where the project is implemented (Heckman et al. 1997; Deaton 2010).  
Second, even if the policy is implemented among the same population, its outcomes may 
still vary if the policy is implemented by different organisations; the organisations may 
possess different organisational and managerial capacities and have different efficiency 
levels (Heckman et al. 1997; Deaton, 2010; Allcott & Mullainathan 2012; Bold et al. 2013).  
The aforementioned studies evaluating the impact of IPs investigate the first factor: 
heterogeneity across target populations.  This paper investigates the role of the latter: 
heterogeneity in implementation.   
We explore heterogeneity in implementation of the SSA CP, and the effects thereof 
on program impact.  We argue that differences in program impact might be explained by 
the extent to which IPs actually adopted the core principles of IAR4D.  The objective of 
this Chapter is twofold.  First, to capture heterogeneity in implementation, we quantify the 
IAR4D principles and summarise them into an overall “IAR4Dness” index.  Second, we 
analyse whether differences in impact result from differences in the level of IAR4Dness.   
We analyse differences in impact by using data from West, Central and Southern 
Africa collected by SSA-CP (used in Chapter 3) and econometric techniques as well as 
correlation analysis.  The way IAR4D approach implemented by innovation platforms may 
be correlated with (1) the baseline characteristics 2) change in those characteristics (e.g. 
poverty, income, FCS, and etc.) during the implementation.  To control for these 
confounding factors, we utilize the panel feature of our data set, many control variables, 
and use an instrumental variables approach.   
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Results indicate that implementation matters.  IAR4Dness is positively related to 
food security of intended beneficiaries, our main outcome variable after controlling for 
regional time trends.  We find that attendance of stakeholders in program activities – in 
particular to information sharing activities and field visits – determines how successful IPs 
are in increasing household food consumption. Although our results do not explain entire IP 
level heterogeneity in program impact on food consumption, which is found in Chapter 2, 
they explain some part of the it within each region or country: Being other factors are 
constant, we observe higher food consumption score for the IPs at which  attendances to the 
field and information sharing activities are higher.  Nevertheless, we do not find evidence 
that this relationship results from the adoption of agricultural technologies, marketing 
strategies or changes in levels of household social capital - three of the potential impact 
channels.   
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 4.2 gives a brief conceptual framework 
including a description of the Sub Saharan African Challenge Program.  In section 4.3 we 
present our data set.  In section 4.4, we describe the IAR4Dness indices, explain how they 
differ across IPs, and discuss their correlation with baseline characteristics of innovation 
systems.  Section 4.5 introduces the identification strategy.  In section 4.6, we analyse 
whether the index explains differences in impact of the IPs on food security and discuss 
robustness of the results.  In Section 4.7, we explore whether the impact of IAR4Dness 
stems from selected intermediate outcomes.   Finally, Section 4.8 concludes.  
4.2 Conceptual framework  
IAR4D was introduced as part of the SSA CP in 2004.  The approach is based on the 
paradigm of innovation systems.  According to this perspective, innovation is the result of 
the integration of knowledge from various actors and stakeholders (e.g. Leeuwis & Van den 
Ban 2004) .  With IAR4D this approach was shaped by the creation of decentralized IPs; 
coalitions of stakeholders to identify and address local bottlenecks to agricultural 
development.  Representatives of farmers’ associations, traders, researchers, extension 
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workers, NGOs, and government policy makers regularly meet at these platforms, articulate 
their views, and negotiate joint strategies for action (FARA 2008). 
38
  
To promote external validity, IAR4D was implemented in three African project 
learning sites (PLSs): (i) “Lake Kivu (LK)” in Eastern and Central Africa, (ii) “Kano‐
Katsina‐Maradi (KKM)” in West Africa, and (iii) “Zimbabwe‐Malawi‐Mozambique 
(ZMM)” in Southern Africa.  Each region was divided into three sub-regions and in each 
sub region 4 IPs were implemented covering various villages.  In total, 32 IPs became 
operational.
39
  The overall program has been coordinated by the Forum for Agricultural 
Research in Africa (FARA).  However, different agencies have been responsible for the 
implementation and facilitation of the IPs (see Appendix 5.1 for an overview).   
IPs had to fulfil five criteria to abide with the IAR4D approach (FARA 2008; 
Hawkins et al. 2008): (1) IPs should be representative, inclusive and with diverse 
partnerships, (2) there should be non-linear, collective and collaborative interaction among 
IP actors, (3) research addresses key constraints and opportunities agreed upon by IP 
members in the context of entire value chains, (4) the research process is multidisciplinary 
and participatory, and (5) there is institutional and human capacity building for IAR4D 
actors to effectively participate.  We define the extent to which IPs abide with these criteria 
“in the field” as the level of “IAR4Dness”.  Because of the decentralized nature of the IPs 
and the different implementing agencies, we expect to find variation in the level of 
IAR4Dness across platforms.   
As explained by Pamuk et al. (2014a), Pamuk et al. (2014b) and van Rijn et al. 
(2012), the IAR4D approach as implemented may have an impact on poverty through 
increased agricultural technology adoption, changes in marketing strategies, and increased 
levels of social capital.   Adoption of modern technologies is a candidate channel through 
which IAR4D could enhance agricultural production and reduce poverty.  Agricultural 
innovation can have a direct influence on agricultural production by increasing 
                                                          
38
 Please see section 2.3 for further details of the program. 
39
 Although 36 IPs were to be established 4IPs in ZMM never became operational and data were not collected 
for those IPs. 
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productivity, by decreasing production cost, or by reducing risk associated with adoption 
(De Janvry & Sadoulet 2002).  Changing marketing strategies is another important 
intermediate outcome of the IAR4D policy.   This could enable specialization and the 
creation of surpluses.   However, the immediate impact of IAR4D is perhaps not to directly 
influence agricultural technology or marketing strategies, but to create an enabling setting 
in which such intermediate outcomes may materialize (see van Rijn et al. 2012 for an 
overview of why social capital and agricultral innovation are naturally linked).  Therefore, 
household social capital measuring the interaction of households with other agents is also 
considered an important intermediate outcome variable, which is in line with the innovation 
system perspective.   
4.3 Data description 
4.3.1 Sample 
The IAR4D program was implemented as a large experiment, where some communities 
“received” IPs (treatment communities) and others did not (control communities).  Even 
though details of the sampling design vary slightly across the different regions, it generally 
followed a randomized controlled trial approach (see FARA 2009; Pamuk et al. 2014b for 
details on the sampling frame).  Within each village, a random sub-sample of 5-15 
respondents (households) was drawn from treatment and control villages.  Baseline and 
midline data were collected at village and household level in 2008/2009 and 2010/2011.  In 
this chapter, as in chapter 3, we use data from all PLSs.  This includes the data from Lake 
Kivu, used in Chapter 2.  However, we now focus on the subsample of treatment villages 
because we are interested in differences in impact within these treated communities.  Hence 
we do not use data from conventional and control villages.  
4.3.2 IAR4Dness 
To determine the level of IAR4Dness we used the data collected in a small survey among 
IP coordinators by e-mail in mid-2012 (see Appendix 2 for details of the survey).
40
  This 
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 All IP coordinators responded to the e-mail. 
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survey included questions capturing the extent to which the five IAR4D principles were 
respected during the implementation stage.  The first principle is captured by the number of 
different types of stakeholders involved.
41
  The second principle was captured by the level 
of involvement of the stakeholders in different activities, and the variance in involvement 
of different types of stakeholders.  The third principle was captured by the percentage of 
different stakeholders involved in problem identification and the percentage of problems 
prioritized and acted upon.  The fourth principle was captured by stakeholders’ 
involvement and implementation of activities and the percentage of different stakeholders 
involved in the policy design.  The fifth indicator was captured by stakeholders’ 
involvement in capacity building activities including information sharing, training and field 
visits.  For all indicators we calculate the average of those stakeholders involved and/or 
those problems identified, and normalise data from 0 to 100.  Summary statistics are 
provided in Table 4.1, where higher values mean higher scores in terms of IAR4Dness, and 
Figure 4.1 shows detailed distributions for the variables. We observe that in particular 
Principle 2a and Principle 4a has very similar distribution and overlap with each other. 
4.3.3  Outcome variables  
Lacking income data for various IPs, we use household food security as our main outcome 
variable (see Panel A of Table 4.2).   We use agricultural technology, marketing strategies, 
and household social capital variables as intermediary outcome variables (see Table A.4.3 
in the Appendix for details).  To measure household food security, we employ the Food 
Consumption Score (FCS) index measuring weekly consumption of food items, weighted 
by the nutritional value added.  To test the mechanism behind the impact of IAR4Dness on 
food security, we use three different sets of dummy variables for agricultural technology 
adoption, marketing strategies and social capital variables. 
                                                          
41
 Stakeholder include farmers, researchers, extension agents, marketing organisations, policy makers, NGOs, 
input suppliers, traders, private businesses and others. 
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Table 4.1: IAR4Dness variables 
Principle Definition Obs. Mean Std. Min Max 
Principle 1 Number of different stakeholders involved 32 75.3 14.9 50.0 100.0 
Principle 2a Average involvement in listed activities 32 78.0 13.6 54.5 100.0 
Principle 2b Difference to average participation* 32 76.6 17.1 27.1 100.0 
Principle 3a % Of stakeholders involved in problem identification  32 32.6 19.9 8.3 100.0 
Principle 3b % Of problems identified being prioritized and addressed 32 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 
Principle 4a Average involvement joint planning and implementation 32 77.3 13.1 54.5 100.0 
Principle 4b % Of stakeholders involved in policy formulation 32 45.4 26.7 8.3 100.0 
Principle 5 Average involvement in information sharing and field visits 32 77.3 16.3 44.0 100.0 
Note: all variables are normalised in the range [0,100]  
*this indicator is rescaled so that smaller variances (more equality) is reflected by higher scores 
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Table 4.2: Outcome variables and household, village and social capital variables 
Variable Definition Obs† Mean Std. Min Max 
Panel A: Outcome variables 
FCS Weekly food consumption score 3322 48.0 21.4 0 108.5 
Panel B: Household characteristics 
gender Equals to 1 if household head is male, 0 
otherwise 
3456 0.7 0.4 0 1 
Age Age of household head 3433 46.6 14.7 16 105 
Education Education level of household head 3242 3.3 2.3 1 10 
Size Household size in logarithms 3436 1.9 0.6 0 4.8 
Panel C: Village Characteristics 
school Equals to if there is a school at the village, 
0 otherwise 
332 0.66 0.47 0 1 
hospital Equals to if there is a hospital at the 
village, 0 otherwise 
322 0.30 0.46 0 1 
worship Equals to if there is a worship place at the 
village, 0 otherwise 
339 0.81 0.39 0 1 
socialhall Equals to if there is a social hall at the 
village, 0 otherwise 
302 0.22 0.42 0 1 
roads Equals to if village is connected with 
weather road(s), 0 otherwise 
315 0.73 0.44 0 1 
mobilenetwork Equals to if village has mobile network 
connection, 0 otherwise 
336 0.88 0.33 0 1 
Panel D: Village social capital 
Participation  Participation in community activities (0-
4) 
129 2.8 1.0 0 4 
Trust Extent of trust among people (0-4) 128 2.6 1.0 0 4 
Cooperation Cooperation among people (0-4) 126 2.7 1.0 0 4 
Gift exchange Extent of giving or exchanging gifts (0-4) 130 2.2 1.1 0 4 
Contrcomm Extent of financial contribution for 
community activities/problems (0-4) 
130 2.4 1.2 0 4 
Contributgr Extent of financial contribution to group 
activities (0-4) 
128 2.3 1.2 0 4 
Helping Spirit of helping others especially the 
poor (0-4) 
129 2.0 1.4 0 4 
Conflicts Extent of settling conflicts or disputes 
among people (0-4) 
128 2.9 1.0 0 4 
Norms Extent of abiding by the norms and 
byelaws (0-4) 
131 2.6 1.1 0 4 
Womenconfid Women confidence to speak in public (0-
4) 
131 2.5 1.0 0 4 
Consdwomen Men's respect and consideration of 
women (0-4) 
131 2.7 1.0 0 4 
Panel E: Instruments 
Dyearinfield Equals to 1 if  number of years passed 
after the IP started field 
 activities is more than 1.5, 9 otherwise 
32 0.34 0.48 0 1 
Notes: We report number of households and villages for the outcome variables/household characteristics and village 
characteristics/social capital variables respectively. For instruments, numbers of IPs are shown. 
 
4.3.4 Household and village characteristics 
To control for differences in IP context, and for the potential influence on project 
implementation, we use various household and village level variables (see Panel B and C of 
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Table 4.2).  Our household level variables include gender, age, formal education level of 
household head, and household size.  Our village level variables include a list of village 
amenities.  To explore whether the level of cohesion in the community affects IP 
performance we include a third set of variables, namely baseline village social capital 
(Panel D of Table 4.2).  These are different indicators than the social capital outcome 
variable mentioned earlier, which was measured and defined at the household level.  
Information regarding village level social capital was collected during community 
discussions by asking participants to evaluate social cohesion in their village (on a 0-4 point 
scale). These questions do not include information about interaction of villagers with 
others.  Instead, they measure the quality of and order in social life.  
4.4 Constructing an “IAR4Dness” index 
We used three approaches to capture the level of IAR4Dness at the IP level.  IAR4Dness is 
an aggregate index of the indicators, or an unweighted average of the five Principles.  This 
reflects the idea that IAR4Dness is best captured by the different components rather than by 
its separate components.  However, we also want to explore whether certain components 
matter more.  Therefore, we also decompose the aggregate IAR4Dness index into the five 
principles listed before.  This means we create a principle-specific average of principle 2a 
and 2b, 3a and 3b, and 4a and 4b.  A third, and more data-driven approach, is to look at 
correlation between the different IAR4Dness variables, and create new components based 
on factors extracted via principal factor analysis.  The number of factors (components) is 
determined by the variance extracted within each factor, or eigenvalue.  According to the 
Kaiser criterion, only factors with an eigenvalue above 1 are retained.  We use a varimax 
rotation method to maximize the variance across factors (see Kaplan 2008 for more 
technical details). 
 The IAR4Dness indices are presented in Table 4.3.  The table reports the descriptive 
statistics for IAR4Dness, principle specific averages and factor variables - Principles 1 and 
5 have also been reported in Table 4.1.  There is little variance in aggregate IAR4Dness 
index, with a mean of 0.74 and a standard deviation of only 0.07.  However, there is more 
variation when zooming in on individual principles, indicating some differences 
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implementation across IPs.  The factor analysis results in two factors (see Appendix 5.2).  
The first factor mainly captures participation in activities organised by the IP.  The second 
factor captures the number of stakeholders involved and equality of involvement.  Both 
factors are also correlated with the percentage of stakeholders involved in problem 
identification or policy formulation –albeit negatively.  This indicates that, perhaps not 
surprising, even though more stakeholders are involved in the IP, not all stakeholders are 
represented when it comes to problem identification or policy formulation.   
Table 4.3: IAR4Dness indices 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Min Max 
IAR4Dness Aggregate index 71.5 7.4 55.6 82.4 
Principle 1 Representative, inclusive and diverse 75.3 14.9 50.0 100.0 
Principle 2 Non linear, collective and collaborative 77.3 11.4 54.3 94.9 
Principle 3 Key constraints and opportunities addressed 66.3 10.0 54.2 100.0 
Principle 4 Multidisciplinary and participatory 61.3 16.0 41.4 96.8 
Principle 5 Capacity building 77.3 16.3 44.0 100.0 
Factor 1 Increase with participation in activities and 
decrease with involved in problem 
identification. 
0.0 1.0 -1.7 1.8 
Factor 2 Increase with # of stakeholders  and decrease 
with involvement in policy formulation 
0.0 1.0 -2.5 1.6 
 
4.5 Correlation analysis 
To investigate which factors explain the general variation in the change in FCS and 
IAR4Dness variables and check the exogeneity of the project implementation quality to 
baseline characteristics, we examine the IP level correlation between (1) the change in FCS 
and IP characteristics and (2) the quality of project implementation and IP characteristics in 
this section. 
For the first correlation analysis, we calculate the change in FCS by subtracting 
midline IP level average of FCS from baseline IP level averages and estimate its correlation 
with IAR4Dness variables, baseline household and village characteristics at IP level and 
regional dummies.  Table 4.4 reports the pair-wise correlation coefficient estimates 
between the change in FCS and those variables.   The results shows that the change in FCS 
is positive and significant at the IPs where duration of field activities are longer, share of 
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male household head and larger household size are higher, and spirit of helping and abiding 
to the norms and bylaws are more developed.  In addition it seems that there is regional 
correlation in the direction of change in FCS at IP level as the correlation estimates are high 
and statistically significant for DRC and Sudan Savannah.    




Principle 1 -0.27 
Principle 2 -0.19 
Principle 3 0.12 
Principle 4 0.24 
Principle 5 0.13 












Mobile network -0.07 
Village social capital 
Participation  0.24 
Trust 0.16 
Cooperation 0.09 






Women confid. 0.10 





Norther Guinea Savannah 0.18 
Rwanda 0.02 




Notes: * statistically significant at 10 percent level. 
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Table 4.5: Pair-wise correlation estimates between IAR4Dness, Principles and 
baseline characteristics   
 IAR4Dness Principle 1 Principle 2 Principle 3 Principle 4 Principle 5 
Household characteristics       
Gender 0.18 0.17 0.08 0.24 -0.48* 0.14 
Age 0.23 0.28 0.27 0.19 0.05 0.20 
Education 0.12 0.11 0.03 0.27 0.33* 0.16 
Size 0.04 0.18 0.22 0.38* 0.16 0.06 
Village Amenities       
School 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.38* 0.10 
Hospital 0.33* 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.52* 0.04 
Worship 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.04 0.33* 0.07 
Socialhall 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.16 0.20 0.24 
Roads 0.24 -0.45* -0.47* 0.34* 0.25 0.13 
Mobile network 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.24 0.17 0.10 
Village social capital       
Participation  0.09 0.29 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.18 
Trust 0.06 0.20 0.16 0.27 0.39* 0.14 
Cooperation 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.25 0.41* 0.23 
Gift exchange 0.05 0.27 0.16 -0.32* 0.39* 0.04 
Contrcomm 0.28 -0.43* -0.35* 0.21 0.08 0.09 
Contributgr 0.29 -0.54* -0.42* 0.26 0.17 0.03 
Helping 0.12 -0.42* -0.35* 0.16 0.39 0.23 
Conflicts 0.05 0.17 0.09 -0.32* 0.05 0.19 
Norms 0.30 -0.54* -0.52* 0.17 0.24 0.05 
Women confid. 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.17 
Consd. women 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.20 0.02 0.17 
Regions       
DRC 0.41* 0.58* 0.57* -0.29 -0.14 0.31* 
Malawi 0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 
Mozambique 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.01 
Northern Guinea Savanna (Nigeria) -0.42* -0.22 -0.42* 0.47* -0.12 -0.62* 
Rwanda -0.29 -0.38* -0.35* 0.12 -0.10 -0.05 
Sudan Savannah (Nigeria and Niger) 0.36* -0.17 0.05 -0.39* 0.70* 0.49* 
Sahel (Nigeria) 0.04 0.21 0.09 0.03 -0.22 0.04 
Uganda -0.08 -0.11 -0.03 -0.19 0.13 -0.06 
Zimbabwe -0.31* -0.15 -0.18 0.13 -0.30* -0.21 
Notes: * statistically significant at 10 percent level. 
  Do baseline characteristics affect the quality of project implementation? If the 
answer to this question is “Yes”, the quality of project implementation may not be 
exogenous to baseline IP characteristics.  We again answer this question by estimating pair-
wise correlation coefficients between baseline household and village characteristics as well 
as region dummies at IP level and IAR4Dness index.   Table 4.5 presents the estimates.  
Results indicate there is a correlation between most of the IAR4Dness principles and 
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baseline characteristics, and implementation quality differs in the regions. This may reflect 
the fact that the performance of IPs is correlated with the development level of and social 
cohesion in the villages surrounding IPs.  As some of those factors are also correlated with 
our outcome variables (see Table 4.4 above,) we will design our identification strategy 
accordingly to estimate the impact of IAR4Dness on food security (see below for details).   
4.6 IAR4Dness and FCS 
4.6.1 Identification strategy  
We now summarize the identification strategy that we use to investigate the effect of 
IAR4Dness on outcome variables.  To control for the potentially confounding effect of 
household, village and IP level characteristics on our outcome variable and IAR4Dness, we 
use data from the baseline survey conducted in 2008 and the midline survey conducted in 
2010/2011, and define our outcome variables at the household level whereas our 
IAR4Dness variables are defined at IP level.  We also use clustered robust standard errors 
at the IP level for the estimations to control for within IP correlation of error terms.     
If the IAR4Dness was random across IPs, we could estimate the following model, 
for outcome variable       and test the hypothesis that α2≠0: 
(4.1)                                              
where subscripts i, p, r and t denote household, IP, region and period respectively.       
represents our main variable of interest, the IAR4Dness indices, and equals zero for the 
baseline period because IAR4D was introduced after the baseline period.  We use rescaled 
values for indices identified in Table 4.3 (and Table 4.1 when necessary) having a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one to ease the interpretation of the estimates.      is a 
dummy variable, equals to 1 for midline survey, and controls for the general trend between 
two survey periods.     is a region fixed effect,      is region trend,    is IP fixed effect, 
and      is a IP level trend.          is the random error term.  To eliminate the IP and 
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(4.2)                            ∆                                       
where (   ∆     )        is the error term in our regression.  To control for   , we use 
region level dummy variables in the estimations.
43
  We also add baseline household and 
village characteristics to the estimations to control for   .
44
  If there is any correlation 
between    and   , we assume that this is controlled for through the control variables used 
in our main specifications.  In robustness checks (see below), we will relax this assumption 
by using an instrumental variable strategy, and test the robustness of our results. 
We start our analysis by estimating (4.2) for the overall index.  Then, to explore 
through which principles and factors the impact of the index is driven, we refine our results 
by estimating (4.2) for each principle and factor separately.
45
  Separate estimation of the 
models prevents the inflation of standard errors in the estimations as some of the 
IAR4Dness principles are highly correlated (see appendix 3 for details).  These correlations 
between the principles result from the definition and the construction of the variables (see 
section 4.3).    
4.6.2 Baseline estimation results for food security 
The estimation results of model (4.2) for our main outcome variable, FCS, are summarized 
in Table 4.6.  We report the estimates for our coefficients of interest: average IAR4Dness, 
principles and factors at each column.  We control for household and village characteristics 
as well as region fixed effects in all regressions.  The results show that FCS levels are 
                                                          
42
 In the main estimations, we use 31 IPs instead of 32 since we cannot identify the households balanced 
household for an IP due to missing household identifier variables in the dataset. However, our results are 
robust to using unbalanced sample and an alternative specification to first difference where we control for IP 
level fixed and region trends. The results are available upon request.  
43
 In the data, there is substantial heterogeneity at region level, and therefore our estimation results are 
sensitive to adding region level dummy variables.  Our estimates are not statistically significant if we do not 
control for them.   
44
 We do not control for the village characteristic in panel D of Table 2 in our main estimation results because 
they were only collected in 28 IPs in baseline surveys. However, our main results are robust to estimating our 
models for only 28 IPs and controlling for these village level social capital variables. 
45 
Our results are robust to the inclusion of the two factor variables in one model. 
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higher in the villages where the level of IAR4Dness is higher.  One standard deviation in 
IAR4Dness index increases the FCS by 6.42.  To explore which principles matter most, we 
repeat model (4.2) for each principle in columns (2-6).   The relation between IAR4Dness 
and FCS mainly stems from two IAR4Dness principles: non-linear, collective and 
collaborative interaction (principle 2) and institutional and human capacity building for IP 
actors (principle 5). These results are in line with the results shown in column 7 and 8. IPs 
with active participation to the activities, factor 1, have higher levels of FCS.  However, not 
depending on whether the main explanatory variable is statistically significant estimated    
do not vary between models. This implies that most of the variation in FCS is explained by 
region dummies, and IAR4Dness and Principles explain a small part of the variation. This 
limits the interpretation of our analysis.  
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Table 4.6: Regression estimates for IAR4Dness and food security 
Dependent variable: ∆FCS ∆FCS ∆FCS ∆FCS ∆FCS ∆FCS ∆FCS ∆FCS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IAR4Dness 6.42*** 
       
 
(1.51) 




      
  
(1.64) 




     
   
(1.68) 
     
Principle 3 
   
2.56 
    
    
(3.16) 
    
Principle 4 
    
1.10 
   
     
(2.29) 
   
Principle 5 
     
5.18** 
  




      
4.94*** 
 




       
-0.22 
        
(1.66) 
Constant 25.30*** 16.11** 17.66*** 14.96** 17.46** 23.04*** 23.27*** 15.79** 
 
(6.19) (6.27) (6.23) (6.43) (8.22) (6.89) (6.72) (6.37) 
         
Observations 1335 1335 1335 1335 1335 1335 1335 1335 
R-squared 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.14 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Robust standard errors clustered at IP level are in the parentheses.  
All regressions include regional dummy variables. We present estimates for the variables of interest to 
economize on space 
To explore the key factors behind our main result we next explore the correlation 
between FCS and the sub indicators concerning involvement in IP activities: Principle2a, 
Principle 2b, Principle 4a and Principle 5.  We predict that related sub-components of the 
indices might be the key factors behind the positive correlation between FCS and the 
principles.  To test whether our conjecture is true, we estimate (4.2) for four additional 
specifications.  We replace    with the average involvement in listed activities (Principle 
2a), difference in average participation (Principle 2b), average involvement in planning and 
joint implementation (Principle 4a) and average involvement in information sharing 
activities and field visits (Principle 5) (see Table 4.7).   
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Table 4.7: Involvement indicators and food security 
Dependent variable: ∆FCS ∆FCS ∆FCS ∆FCS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Principle 2a 5.37***    
 
(1.50)    
Principle 2b  -0.54   
 
 (1.58)   
Principle 4a   3.31*  
 
  (1.69)  
Principle 5    5.18** 
 
   (2.09) 
Constant 23.95*** 15.99** 20.08*** 23.04*** 
 
(6.68) (6.51) (7.16) (6.89) 
 
    
Observations 1335 1335 1335 1335 
R-squared 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.16 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Robust standard errors clustered at IP level are in the parentheses.  
All regressions include regional dummy variables. We present estimates for the variables of interest to 
economize on space. 
 The results in Table 4.7 confirm our conjecture that average participation in the 
activities is positive and significantly correlated with FCS.  Moreover, the type of activities 
seems to be key in improving food security.  Participation in information sharing activities 
and field visits is more important than participation in activities concerning joint planning 
and implementation as the estimates are bigger and statistically more significant for the 
former.  Finally, equal participation of stakeholders to these activities does not seem to be a 
critical factor for our results.   
4.6.3 Robustness checks 
Our identification strategy rests on two assumptions.  First, clustering standard errors at the 
IP level gives correct estimates for standard errors.  Second, the level of IAR4Dness is not 
correlated with IP level time trends that may also influence our outcome variables.  In this 
section, we relax these assumptions and test the consistency of our estimates.  In Tables 4.8 
and 4.9, we report the estimates from alternative models specified to test the robustness of 
our main results.  We focus on the impact of Principle 2a, Principle 4a and Principle 5 on 
FCS because we found that our results are mainly driven by attendance to IP activities.   
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Table 4.8: IP level estimates 
  IP level estimates 
Dependent variable: ∆FCS ∆FCS ∆FCS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Principle 2a 6.12**   
 
(2.59)   
Principle 4a  2.24  
 
 (2.98)  
Principle 5   6.60* 
 
  (3.41) 
Constant 17.22*** 13.51** 16.36** 
 
(6.05) (6.34) (6.11) 
 
   
Observations 32 32 32 
R-squared 0.46 0.41 0.47 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Robust standard errors clustered at IP level are in the parentheses.  
All regressions include regional dummy variables. We present estimates for the variables of interest to 
economize on space. 
As a first robustness test we re-estimate model (4.2) at IP level.  Although the 
standard errors of our main model are clustered at the IP level, household level analysis still 
might produce low standard errors, and overstate the significance of our estimates because 
IAR4Dness is measured at the IP level (Wooldridge, 2003).  For this analysis, we use the 
difference of IP level average of FCS as the dependent variable, and drop household and 
village level controls.  Columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 4.8 show that estimates for Principle 2a 
and Principle5 are statistically significant and are in line with our previous estimates but 
the estimate for Principle4a is not statistically significant.   
 As a second robustness analysis, we estimate a 2SLS model to isolate the potential 
impact of unobserved time varying determinants at IP level.  Unobserved factors such as 
economic and income shocks that happened after the baseline period may have directly 
affected both FCS and IAR4Dness.  This might create an endogeneity problem for our 
estimates.  To address this concern, we employ exogenous variation in the duration of field 
activities of IPs as an instrument (see Panel E in Table 4.3 for variable descriptions).  Some 
IPs started their field operations later than others due to organisational challenges.  Hence, 
(more) mature IPs had more opportunity to organize IAR4Dness activities.  Besides, to our 
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knowledge, the start-ups of IPs were not delayed by IP level shocks; therefore we argue that 
the duration is not correlated with other unobserved factors time varying factors.  However, 
having more time to adopt and use the proposed technologies households can benefit more 
from the intervention and have higher food consumption levels; therefore a direct effect of 
the duration of exposure to the IAR4Dness program on FCS may exist and a reason of 
concern for the validity of the instrument.  To circumvent this concern, before presenting 
the 2SLS estimates below, we will first conduct a weak exogeneity test for the instrument 
by inserting it to the IP level estimations, together with the main explanatory variables.  If 
the duration of field activities has a direct impact (not an indirect impact only through the 
Principles) on FCS, the coefficient estimates for the instrument will not be statistically 
significant in those estimations.   
 The specification of 2SLS model employed is as follows.  The following is the first 
stage equation via which we predict the Principle2a, Principle4a and Principle5: 
(4.3)                       
where    is region fixed effect and      refers to error term.     denotes our excluded 
instrument which equals 0 in baseline survey period as there is no field activity and 1 when 
years of field activities for corresponding IP is more than 1.5 years (median level) in 
midline survey period.
46
  Again, we control for region fixed effects by adding region 
dummy variables into our models.  We justify the use of the same IV for both principles 
because they both relate to attendance (in fact Principle5 and Principle4a are sub elements 
of Principle 2a), and years of field activities should explain both.  As our instrument is at 
the IP level, the predicted values for    from (4.3) are used again to estimate (4.2) at IP 
level for Principle2a, Principle4a and Principle5 by using 2SLS estimation.   
                                                          
46
 We use dummy variable as instrument to increase the precision of the estimates. When we use actual years 
of field activities but not dummy variable as the instrument, then our coefficient estimates are very close but 
imprecise and thereby not statistically significant.   















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 4: Heterogeneity in the impact of decentralized innovation systems in Africa? 
89 
 
Before presenting the 2SLS estimates, we also assess how relevant the endogeneity 
concerns are by using Durbin-Wu-Hausman test proposed by Davidson and Mckinnon 
(1993).  Test results show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis - there are no 
endogeneity in the estimates for the Principle 2a, 4a and 5 at 27, 12, and 39 percent 
significance levels.  Hence the concerns regarding endogeneity of our main explanatory 
variables, in particular for Principle 5, should be limited.  Yet we provide the results for the 
exogeneity tests, first stage estimation results, and 2SLS estimates in Table 4.9.  Columns 
1, 2, and 3 show the estimation results for the exogeneity tests where   added as an 
additional explanatory variable to the original models presented in Table 4.8.  The 
coefficient estimates for the duration of field activities are insignificant in the estimations; 
it is therefore not correlated to FCS directly (only through the Principles) and satisfies the 
exclusion restriction.  Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the first stage estimates for Principle2a, 
Principle4a and Principle5 respectively. A longer period of field activities enhances the 
information sharing activities and field visits but not average involvement in other activities 
(F-statistics for Principle 5 equals 7.31).  Finally, columns 7, 8 and 9 present the 2SLS 
estimates for Principle2a, Principle4a and Principle5 respectively.  The estimates are 
positive and statistically significant for only Principle 5.  Hence, results confirm that our 
estimates for only Principle 5 is consistent when we isolate the impact of unobserved time 
varying factors using years of field activities as an instrument.  
To summarize, the results imply that the IPs that have been more successful in 
enhancing participation in information sharing and field activities may perform better in 
improving food consumption at region level. For instance Gataraga and Bufindi from Lake 
Kivu are among the IPs having highest participation rate to the activities, and Chapter 2 has 
shown that they have performed better than IPs located at the same countries in enhancing 
FCS.  Hence our results also shed some light on the heterogeneity within each region in 
terms of the program impact on FCS, but do not completely explain the source of the 
heterogeneity. 
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4.7 Examining the mechanism: Impact of Participation to Field 
Activities on Intermediate Outcomes 
How does participation in information sharing and field activities (Principle 5) increase 
food security?  To probe this question, we tentatively investigate the effect of Principle 5 on 
three sets of intermediate outcome variables: agricultural technology, marketing strategies, 
and social capital variables (see section 4.3.3 for variable details).  We use the 20 
intermediate outcome variables introduced in Table A.4.3, and estimate (4.2) for each of 
them separately.  To economize on space we do not report these estimates, but they are 
available upon request.   
 We find mixed results concerning the impact of Principle 5 on intermediate 
outcome variables.  Households seem to change their preferences for agricultural 
technology adoption in IPs with more participation in field activities.   First, estimates show 
that increased participation in field activities promotes the adoption of two agricultural 
technologies: adoption of mulching and chemical fertilizer usage.  However, it is negatively 
correlated with the adoption of animal manure and three post-harvest technologies – 
threshing and shelling equipment, storage facilities and pest control.  Second, households 
change where they market their products as a result of information sharing and field 
activities.  Estimates for marketing strategies indicate that households in “high Principle 5 
IPs” are less likely to sell their products on-farm to consumers and or local/village market 
in the villages.  Finally it appears that field activities did not promote interaction of 
household with others, as Principle 5 is not significantly correlated with any social capital 
variables at household level.   
 Because Principle 5 is positively related with only mulching and chemical fertilizer 
usage, we tentatively test whether Principle 5 leads to an increase in food security through 
the adoption of those technologies.  To do this, we estimate two new specifications of (4.2) 
in which we respectively use changes in the adoption of mulching and chemical fertilizer as 
explanatory variables (in addition to Principle 5).  If the impact of Principle 5 on FCS stems 
from adoption of those technologies, adding those technology variables to the specifications 
should result in smaller coefficient estimates for Principle 5, and technology variables will 
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be significantly correlated with FCS.  Also we note that we cannot use the estimate for 
Principle 5 reported in Table 4.5 to compare with our new estimates, because samples used 
for the new estimations are smaller due to missing values for the technology variables.  
Therefore we obtain two new benchmark estimates for Principle 5 for comparison by 
estimating (4.2) for Principle 5 by using the households for which observations for change 
in mulching and chemical fertilizer usage are not missing respectively.    
Table 4.10: Test for mechanism 
Dependent variables: ∆FCS ∆FCS ∆FCS ∆FCS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Principle5 5.53*** 5.54*** 6.40*** 6.35*** 
 









   
0.99 
    
(2.10) 
Constant 18.51*** 18.59*** 24.15*** 23.82*** 
 
(6.33) (6.31) (7.45) (7.39) 
     
Observations 1,054 1,054 1,188 1,188 
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Robust standard errors clustered at IP level are in the parentheses.  
All regressions include regional dummy variables. We present estimates for the variables of interest to 
economize on space. 
Table 4.10 reports the results for the impact Principle 5 and change in the adoption 
of mulching and chemical fertilizer on FCS.  Estimates for Principle 5 in column 1 and 3 
serve as the new benchmarks for the estimates in column 2 and 4 respectively.   Results 
show that the increase in the adoption of these technologies did not cause the increase in 
food security since the estimates for the change in technology usage are not statistically 
significant, and the estimate for Principle 5 in column 2 and 4 are not smaller than the ones 
in column 1 and 3 respectively.  These results may imply that adoption of technologies by 
itself may not improve food security, and should be supported by other policies which we 
do not observe and identify here.   
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 Several caveats are relevant.  First, the power of our estimates for technology 
variables is low as we observe only 32 IPs.  So we may fail to reject a false hypothesis and 
may not identify a potential mechanism.  Second, our intermediate outcome variables are 
far from perfect as we do not observe the intensive margin for them.  For instance 
households may produce and sell more agricultural goods in high Principle 5 IPs.  
However, our intermediate outcome variables cannot capture such changes as they are 
binary variables.  Third, the list of intermediate outcome variables may be incomplete as we 
do not have information concerning intermediate outcomes such as improved variety usage, 
employment levels and access to finance of households which may directly affect food 
security.   Last but not least it may be difficult to detect the exact mechanism due to 
decentralized policy design and implementation processes of IPs.  In the decentralized 
innovation systems, each IP focuses on a different technology or marketing strategy, 
reflecting needs and opportunities of the villages.   
4.8 Conclusion 
There is considerable heterogeneity in the impact of the innovation system approach on 
resource poor farmers at IP level.  In this study, we argued this may be because there is 
heterogeneity in implementation: IPs may not have equally implemented the principles of 
the IAR4D approach.  We explore heterogeneity in implementation, and the effect thereof, 
by quantifying the five defining principles of IAR4D into an IAR4Dness index and linking 
these to the main survey data.  We find that the IAR4Dness index is correlated positively 
and significantly to FCS, our proxy for food security.   
This relation between IAR4Dness and FCS mainly stems from an IAR4D sub 
principle: institutional and human capacity building for IP actors (principle 5).  Looking at 
the sub-components of the principle, especially participation in information sharing 
activities and field visits is crucial.  Success of IPs thus seems to depend on the attendance 
and contributions of stakeholders to the activities of the IPs;  Thus IPs which are better at 
making stakeholders participate to those meetings than other IPs at the same regions have 
higher food consumption levels than those IPs.  Yet we cannot argue that this factor is the 
only reason among the heterogeneity between IPs, as the level of participation to 
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information sharing and field activities explain only a small part of the variation in the FCS 
between IPs. 
More specially, we believe this result may indicate that IPs only become beneficial 
for villagers when they (and other IP stakeholders) participate in capacity building events 
such as field visits and information sharing activities.  Recent case study evidence from 
improved maize legume and production systems in Nigeria supports our findings, and 
explains how capacity building activities help the platform perform.  Dangbegnin et al. 
(2011) state that the platform organised capacity building activities on IAR4D and team 
building to enhance problem solving, team working and learning skills of platform 
members.  They argue that these activities “enabled platform members to work as equal 
partners” (p. 92). 
It is also interesting to note that other IAR4Dness (sub) indicators of IAR4D do not 
seem to matter in terms of impact on FCS.  For example, the different types of stakeholders 
involved or equal participation of these stakeholders to activities.  Apparently average 
participation is more important than diversity per se.  In fact it is easy to imagine some sort 
of trade-off between the number of stakeholders involved in an IP and the average 
participation of these stakeholders.  This was supported by our factor analysis.  It could 
well be that this means that IPs with less diverse partnerships, but overall higher average 
participation because of this, are more successful than IPs with many additional but low 
participating partners.  Perhaps it becomes more difficult to manage the IP as it becomes 
bigger: i.e. it might be harder to align different goals and objectives and coordinate the IP.   
We also find that the effect of IAR4Dness on FCS does not operate through 
increased use of agricultural technologies, increased use of different marketing strategies or 
increased levels of household social capital.  However, we only investigate three potential 
channels through which IPs can boost FCS.  There are many other potential channels such 
as improved variety or access to finance.  There is need for future research to shed light on 
these channels.   
Finally, we note three methodological issues regarding our results.  First of all, we 
show that researchers can investigate the heterogeneity in the implementation of a project 
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and the performance of the project partners by applying a survey to the partners after the 
treatment.  However, we are aware of the fact that our IAR4Dness measures might be 
subject to measurement errors as we utilize a set of objective questions directed to platform 
members after two to three years implementation of the project.  To minimize the error, a 
better approach might be collecting data from all stakeholders through a consistent 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) survey during implementation.  Secondly, we use data 
from baseline and midline surveys conducted merely two to three years after the platforms 
are established.  This means that our results reflect only the short-term effects of 
IAR4Dness from early maturing platforms.  An end-line survey is scheduled for late 2014.  
By using the new data set from matured platforms, follow up research should probe the 
robustness and sustainability of the preliminary results presented here. Finally, we observe 
limited number of IPs; hence consistency of our estimates may be questionable.  Future 
work should investigate whether the results we reach are consistent by using additional data 
to be collected in the future. 
  




Appendix: Project learning sites, countries, implementing agents and IPs 
West Africa (KKM): Niger and Nigeria  
 INRAN: IPs related to livestock-feed, millet-cowpea, vegetables, and groundnut.  
 IFDC: IPs related to livestock-feed, maize-legume-livestock, vegetables, and rice 
 IITA: IP related to maize-cowpea-livestock, and 2 related to sorghum-cowpea-
livestock 
East Africa (LK): DRC, Rwanda and Uganda 
 CIAT: IPs related to banana, Irish potatoes, beans and cassava 
 ISAR: IPs related to NRM, livestock, milk, seed potato and maize 
 Makerere/ICRISAT: IPs related to potato, soil and water conservation, pineapple 
and sorghum 
Southern Africa (ZMM): Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique  
 CIAT: IPs related to conservation agriculture 
 Bioversity International: IPs related to horticulture  
Appendix: Characterization of IAR4D as implemented by FARA 
Please note this is a modified version of the actual 2.5 page survey. All data collected is 
listed, but to economize space, the structure has been revised. The text in italic between 
brackets refers to pre-defined answer categories. 
 
Identification IP 
Name of the organisation; Name of the Innovation Platform (IP); Country of the IP; District 
of the IP; Sub country/other of the IP; When was the IP formed (month and year). 
 
Identification respondent 
Your Name; E-mail address; Your position in the organisation; Your role in the IP.  
 
IP formation and functioning 
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How did the IP originate? (from scratch, builds on existing networks, already fully existed) 
How is the IP facilitated? (researchers, by local stakeholders, jointly) 
How are participants selected for the IP?         
 
IP participation of stakeholder 
Which of these stakeholders are represented in the IP? (yes, no - see footnote 41 for list of 
stakeholder ) 
How often (approximately) do the following partners in your IP conduct or attend a) joint 
planning of activities; b) joint implementation of activities; c) information sharing; d) field 
visits or workshops; e) seminars and training events? (daily, weekly, monthly, every six 
month, every year or less) 
 
Problems addressed 
Is the problem area addressed in IP? (yes, no) a) low agricultural technology use; b) access 
to inputs; c) market access and strategy problems; d) land related problems; e) other. 
Who identified the problem (list of stakeholders in footnote 41) 
Was the problem prioritized (yes, no) 
Was an action implemented (yes, no) 
Who designed the policy (list of stakeholders in footnote 41) 
What is the action? 
  
Chapter 4: Heterogeneity in the impact of decentralized innovation systems in Africa? 
97 
 
Appendix: Additional tables  
Table A.4.1: Factor analysis IAR4Dness indices (n=32)  
Variable Factor1 Factor2 
Principle 1   0.9428 
Principle 2a 0.993   
Principle 2b 0.968 
Principle 3a -0.512   
Principle 3b*   
Principle 4a 0.831   
Principle 4b -0.438 
Principle 5 0.927   
Note 1: blank spaces are loading < .4  
*excluded because the same (1) for all IPs 
 
 
Table A.4.2: Correlation coefficient estimates for IAR4Dness index and principles 
(n=32) 
  IAR4Dness Principle 1 Principle 2 Principle 3 Principle 4 Principle 5 
IAR4Dness 1 
     
Principle 1 0.65* 1 
    
Principle 2 0.85* 0.91* 1 
   
Principle 3 -0.40* -0.41* -0.55 1 
  
Principle 4 0.52* -0.17 0.07 -0.15 1 
 
Principle 5 0.80* 0.36* 0.66* -0.6 0.41* 1 
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Mulching equals 1 if a household uses mulching , 0 otherwise 3129 0.32 0.47 
Trenches/terraces equals 1 if a household uses trenches/terraces, 0 otherwise 3070 0.29 0.45 
Water harvesting equals 1 if a household uses water harvesting, 0 otherwise 2754 0.17 0.38 
Irrigation equals 1 if a household uses irrigation techniques, 0 otherwise 3090 0.27 0.44 
Conservation farming equals 1 if a household uses conservation farming, 0 otherwise 2892 0.24 0.43 
Animal manure equals 1 if a household uses animal manure 0 otherwise 3260 0.69 0.46 
Cover crops equals 1 if a household uses cover crops, 0 otherwise 2803 0.29 0.45 
Crop rotation equals 1 if a household uses crop rotation, 0 otherwise 3085 0.60 0.49 
Inter cropping equals 1 if a household uses inter cropping, 0 otherwise 2609 0.56 0.50 
Rhizobiainoculation equals 1 if a household uses Rhizobiainoculation , 0 otherwise 2502 0.03 0.17 
Chemical fertilizer equals 1 if a household uses chemical fertilizer , 0 otherwise 3259 0.55 0.50 
Row planting equals 1 if a household uses row planting , 0 otherwise 3067 0.67 0.47 
Plant spacing equals 1 if a household uses plant spacing, 0 otherwise 2988 0.58 0.49 
Organic pesticide equals 1 if a household uses organic pesticide, 0 otherwise 3029 0.25 0.44 
Inorganic pesticide equals 1 if a household uses inorganic pesticide, 0 otherwise 3115 0.48 0.50 
Drying equals 1 if a household uses drying, 0 otherwise 3137 0.75 0.43 
Threshing/shelling  
equals 1 if a household uses threshing shelling equipment, 0 
otherwise 
3104 0.47 0.50 
Improved storage 
facil. 
equals 1 if a household uses improved storage facilities, 0 
otherwise 
3062 0.24 0.43 
Pest control equals 1 if a household uses pest control, 0 otherwise 3142 0.47 0.50 
Grading equals 1 if a household uses grading, 0 otherwise 2957 0.47 0.50 
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Strategies   
      
Consumers 
equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product on farm to 






equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product on farm to 





On the roadside 







equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product at the local/village 






equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product at the district town 












Household level social capital 
Development 
Projects 









Equals 1 if household financially contributed to community activities or 







Equals 1 if household involved in settling conflicts or disputes among 








Equals 1 if household visited other farmers within community to learn about 








Equals 1 if household visited other farmers outside community to learn 




































5. Market integration and the evolution of trust: 




Economic analyses have revealed a positive correlation between trust levels and economic 
performance (e.g. Knack & Keefer, 1997).  Trust lowers transaction costs, which facilitates 
trade and invites static and dynamic efficiency gains.  “Virtually every commercial 
transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a 
period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the 
world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence” (Arrow, 1972: 357).  For trade to 
flourish and extend beyond “flea market” barter or cash-and-carry modes of exchange, 
moral obligations of fairness and reciprocity should extend to anonymous others.  While 
fairness and reciprocity norms extending to kith and kin may regulate exchange in 
traditional societies based on self-provision, generalized morality and trust should develop 
and spread for broader (and more beneficial) patterns of trade to take off (Platteau 1994; 
Fafchamps 2011; Tu & Bulte 2011).  In light of this observation it is no surprise that 
searching for the determinants of trust has emerged as an important research topic in the 
social sciences. 
 The role of market integration as a determinant (rather than a result) of trust, 
fairness and reciprocity has received some attention in recent years (e.g., Tabellini 2008, 
Henrich et al. 2010; Siziba & Bulte, 2012).  The breadth and intensity of market exchange 
                                                          
 This Chapter is based on following research paper: Pamuk, H., Bulte, E., & van Soest, D. (2014). 
Market Integration and the Evolution of Trust: Evidence from West Africa. Unpublished manuscript  
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varies across societies, and has varied over time within societies.  The transition from 
subsistence farming and local, personalised exchange to specialisation and long-distance, 
impersonal exchange is widely regarded as an essential component of overall economic 
development (e.g. Fafchamps 2011).  This process of market integration implies important 
changes in the social structure of societies.  For example, Kumar and Matsusaka (2009) 
emphasize the difference between “village social capital” and “market social capital.”  
Village social capital typifies rural economies in poor countries, and takes the form of 
kinship ties, patron-client relations, and repeated personalised exchange.  In contrast, 
market social capital involves access to and knowledge about third-party punishment, 
including courts, auditors, credit ratings, and so on.  To reap the potential benefits from 
specialisation and trade, communities should adjust the composition of their (structural) 
social capital stocks––divesting in village capital and investing in market capital.
47
   
However, the implications of broader and deeper integration into markets may be 
more fundamental than this, and extend to the cognitive domain of social capital as well – 
affecting levels of trust and trustworthiness in society.  Using an RCT design, Al-Ubaydli et 
al. (2013) find that ‘priming’ experiment participants for market participation positively 
affects expectations about the trustworthiness of others, and increases amounts sent in a 
trust game.  Supporting this evidence, Buchan et al. (2012) show that individual and 
country level indexes of connectedness to global economic and social networks are 
positively related to cooperation with strangers, which is measured by the money shared 
with groups from different countries, in a multilevel sequential cooperation experiment 
conducted in 7 different countries.  Based on an extensive study that involved the collection 
of experimental data across various societies, Henrich et al. (2010) propose that “market 
norms may have evolved as part of an overall process of societal evolution to sustain 
mutually beneficial exchanges in contexts where established social relations (for example, 
kin, reciprocity, status) were insufficient” (p.1480).  Hence, market integration “involved 
the selective spread of those norms and institutions that best facilitated successful 
exchange…” (p.1484).  If so, market integration speaks to the puzzle of the origins of 
                                                          
47
 Theoretical models have probed such investment trajectories and emphasized that the desired 
transformation may not occur in the presence of strategic complementarities (e.g., Kranton, 1996; Kumar & 
Matsusaka 2009).  If so, a poverty trap might eventuate. 
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human prosociality.  Behavioral evidence and observational data suggest most people 
display fair, trusting and cooperative behaviour – even with strangers and in one-shot 
encounters.  Such behavior is arguably supported by norms of fairness and trust, sustained 
by internalization, punishment, or signalling and reputation effects––begging the question 
about the origins and evolution of such norms.  If market integration fosters trust through 
spreading these norms and if trust, in turn, promotes market integration, then trade and trust 
are complements in development.  Supporting this important thesis, Henrich et al. (2004, 
2010) document a strong and robust positive correlation between experimental measures of 
trust and fairness on the one hand, and an objective measure of market integration on the 
other hand.  
The final word about the complex inter-relationship between trust and trade, 
however, remains to be written.  The evidence provided by Henrich et al. (2004, 2010) is 
based on cross-sectional data collected in 15 societies.  The sample of societies included in 
this study is (intentionally) diverse, implying that the risk of omitted variables looms large.  
Correlation between trust and market integration thus need not imply any causal 
relationship between these variables.  Cross-section studies may also gloss over potentially 
considerable intra-regional heterogeneity of various relevant variables, which renders 
interpretation difficult and may produce biased estimation results (Imbens & Angrist, 
1994).   
In addition, related theories also imply that the relationship between market 
integration and trust may be more complex than the story Henrich et al. (2004, 2010) 
propose.  For instance, in his seminal model, Tabellini (2008) shows that increased trade 
may let generalized morals spread in society through generations. Without formal 
regulations enforcing trade contracts, generalized trust can secure cooperation between 
socially distant agents; therefore parents may prefer transmitting general morals to their 
children so that new generations can benefit from distant trade.  Acemoglu and Wolitzky 
(2012) however suggest that the relationship might be negative as well.  They show phases 
of distrust between trading parties may occur in repeated interaction between traders from 
different groups (i.e. societies, communities) due to the combination of imperfect 
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information between trading partners and product quality problems.  Hence, the 
relationship between trust and trade may be negative as well as positive. 
For these reasons it seems prudent to complement the above analyses by probing the 
relation between market integration and trust using data from a large and culturally 
relatively homogenous sample of households in Northern Nigeria and Niger (see below).  
We seek to extend the pioneering work of Henrich et al. (2004, 2010) by moving beyond 
correlations to establish the causal effect of market integration on trust.  We identify 
exogenous variation in market integration, and use a system’s approach to statistically 
analyse how trade affects trust.  Insight in this particular causal effect allows us to evaluate 
the hypothesis that market integration and trust are complements––mutually reinforcing 
each other in a co-evolutionary process of (economic) development.  From a normative (or 
policy) perspective, this is relevant information.  If trade and trust are complements in 
development, a short-term exogenous “shock” or policy intervention could place autarchic 
societies on a self-propelling trajectory of increasing trust and market integration.  From a 
positive perspective, this raises the question why not all communities are characterized by 
high trust and high market integration. 
The objective of this Chapter is to analyse the causal effect of market integration on 
various survey-based measures of trust in a society at an early level of economic 
development and characterized by relatively low levels of trade.  We distinguish between 
trust in fellow villagers (personalized trust) and trust in strangers (generalized trust), and 
are especially interested in assessing whether market integration fosters trust in strangers.  
Our main result is that trade does not invite such trust—the opposite appears true for our 
sample of African villagers.  We typically find that, if anything, higher levels of market 
integration reduce the various types of trust, although this causal effect is only statistically 
significant in communities with below-average quality institutions.  Hence, increased 
market integration does not necessarily put villages on a path to economic prosperity––
formal institutions play an important mediating role.  We speculate this may explain the 
persistence of low levels of market integration and trust in large pockets of the developing 
world. 
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This paper is organized as follows.  In section 5.2 we introduce our data and outline 
our identification strategy.  Section 5.3 contains our results – extensive series of OLS, 
probit, and 2SLS estimates.  We also present some preliminary and tentative results 
sketching the mechanism linking market integration to trust.  In section 5.4 we discuss our 
main findings, placing them into the wider context of trade and trust, and draw some 
conclusions. 
5.2 Data 
We use data collected in Northern Nigeria and Niger (the “Kano-Katsina-Maradi region”) 
as part of the so-called Sub-Saharan African Challenge Program (see FARA 2009 for 
details).
48
  Ten households per village were sampled in 180 villages. Survey data were 
collected during two waves: a first wave in 2008, which included detailed data about 
expenditures (allowing us to construct household-level proxies of market integration), and a 
second wave in 2010, which included several questions about personalized and generalized 
trust.  There are no trust data for 2008, and no detailed expenditure data for 2010, so there 
is no scope for a full-fledged panel analysis.  Instead, we will merge the 2008 and 2010 
waves to construct one cross-section dataset, and analyze the complex interrelationships 
between market integration and trust via an instrumental variables strategy (see below).  
The most important variables are summarized in Table 5.1.  From the original data 
set of 1800 observations we omitted those households which we do not observe in both 
waves, and we also omitted those with total expenditures in the 99
th
 expenditures percentile 
because we suspect some of these are plagued by either measurement error or wrong data 
entry. As a result, the largest sample available for our analysis includes 1633 households––
but we still have many missing observations for some of the variables of interest. The 
summary statistics of this data set are presented under Sample 1 in Table 5.1.  
 
                                                          
48
 Of the three study regions included in this Challenge Programme, detailed household expenditure data are 
available only for the Kano-Katsina-Maradi region, and hence we could not use data for the other two regions. 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 5: Market integration and the evolution of trust 
107 
 
Panel A of Table 5.1 contains 3 complementary trust measures, based on variations 
of the conventional survey questions as used in the World Value Survey.  One question 
asked was the following: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be 
trusted, yes or no?” This first question seeks to measure somebody’s overall or general trust 
attitude, capturing a combination of “personalized and generalized trust.”  Next, 
respondents were asked to state, from a range from 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good), how 
they would describe their trust in people from the same village, and also their trust in 
complete strangers. Our second trust measure thus focuses on (within-village) personalized 
and repeated exchange and serves as our proxy of “personalized trust”, and our third trust 
measure captures “generalized trust” as it is most closely related to the type of trust that 
fosters anonymous market exchange.  Since the first trust variable was collected as a binary 
variable (“trust or no trust in most people”), we also converted the other two (categorical) 
trust variables (regarding other people in the same village, and regarding complete 
strangers) into binary ones. A trust score of 4 or 5 on the 5-point scale is transformed into a 
score of 1, and a categorical score of 1, 2 or 3 is coded as zero.  In our sample trust in 
complete strangers is lower than trust in people from the same village whereas level of 
general trust is in between these two.
49
 
Panel B in Table 5.1 contains our market integration proxies.  Similar to Heinrich et 
al. (2004), we want to measure the importance of market exchange for households.  
Henrich et al. uses share of household’s total calorie that is purchased from the market as a 
proxy for market integration  Unfortunately we do not have information on the share of 
calorie purchased from the market; therefore we consider three variables, which are close 
proxies of Henrich et al.’s (2010) measure and summarize the monetary transactions of 
households with others: Total expenditures, food expenditures and non-food expenditures 
(including expenditures on repairs, education, health and clothing).  To guarantee that these 
variables indeed capture market integration, and not wealth or income, we control for the 
latter two in our regressions.  Also, purchased food may be a small portion of total food 
consumption, and may not reflect the true market integration of the families if subsistence 
                                                          
49
 We also estimate all the models by using the original categorical variables to test the robustness of our 
estimates and discuss them below while introducing our robustness checks.   
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production is common and households usually consume self-produced food.  Therefore, we 
exploit another indicator of market integration, and that is the purchases of non-food 
commodities that cannot conceivably be produced within the household.  We also control 
for household size, so our expenditure data do not pick up that some households are larger 




Hence, similar to Henrich et al., we measure integration in markets involving 
money
51
 and increased expenditures should measure the importance of market transaction 
in the villagers’ life as opposed to subsistence production.  Expenditures may be a better 
measure than some other market integration indicators that have been used in the literature 
such as agricultural sales, access to roads, or labor market participation.  Those indicators 
measure interaction of economic agents with only one market (e.g. labor market, crop 
market, input markets, and etc.), whereas expenditures are summary indicator for the 
transactions during purchase of goods and services in many different markets.
52
    
These, and other, control variables are summarized in Panel C of Table 5.1.  FCS 
measures total food consumption within a certain time period (a week), capturing both 
subsistence production and food purchased on the market.  The “durable good” variable is 
intended to pick up ownership of assets, and hence is a proxy of wealth.  The other 
variables are included in some of the analyses below to control for factors known to be 
correlated with trust, and should shrink the confidence intervals associated with our 
coefficients of interest.  These controls include the age, gender and religious group 
                                                          
50
 Because some households are subsistence farmers with zero expenditures, we construct the expenditure 
variables by taking the natural logarithm of 1 + “expenditures in 1000s of international dollars” rather than by 
taking the logarithm of “expenditures in 1000s of international dollars” directly. 
51
 Integration to markets involving money vs. barter (gift) exchange markets may have different impacts on 
the evolution of personalized and generalized norms. Reciprocal and personalized exchanges are more likely 
in barter and gift exchange economies than market exchange (Kranton, 1994), and therefore integrating to 
them may develop personalized morals sustaining reciprocity in gift markets, and may hinder generalized 
norms (Platteu, 1994). On contrary, reciprocal and personalized relationships are not necessary in monetary 
markets; therefore positive impact of integration to markets involving money may not have a positive impact 
on personalized trust. 
52
 To our knowledge there are only two additional measures for market integration that have been used in 
empirical studies: Access to weather roads (Jakiela, 2011) and sales to the market (Siziba & Bulte, 2012).  
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membership status of the household head, and whether or not a mobile phone network 
and/or an agricultural extension policy
53
 are in place in the village.  
Panel D of Table 5.1 summarizes the instruments we use to identify exogenous 
variation in potentially endogenous regressors of interest––market integration.  The 
instruments are the number of markets within a 50 km radius, and the number of (local) 
markets in the village in which the household resides.  We speculate the presence of (local) 
markets lowers transaction costs and encourages market exchange, but does not affect 
extant trust levels other than via market integration.  Below we provide the results of 
specific tests to support these assumptions.  As Table 5.1 documents, there are missing 
observations for quite a few variables of interest among the 1633 households in Sample 1.  
These variables include trust measures, expenditure proxies and control variables. To be 
able to compare our estimates for different trust measures, market integration proxies and 
regression models within the same sample, we report main estimation results using a 
subsample of 1177 households.  The summary statistics of these households are presented 
under Sample 2 in Table 5.1.  According to the relevant tests, robustness checks, and 
instrumental variable regression results (see robustness related discussion below)
54
, our 
estimates do not change when using 1633 or 1177 households. 
                                                          
53
 Agricultural extension policies include introduction of improved variety crops, education for the application 
of chemical fertilizers and pesticide application and soil and water conservation techniques via extension 
agents who works for government officials or NGOs active in the region or in cooperation with them.  
54
 We have tested whether there are systematic differences between complete and incomplete questionnaires 
in terms of trust measures. We regress a dummy variable (equal to 1 if at least one of the trust measures is 
missing for a household) on the total expenditure and control variables by using probit estimation technique 
and robust standard errors clustered at village level. We find that membership to religious group (-) and one of 
the province fixed effects enters significantly. Among the estimations religiosity is positively correlated only 
with general trust (See Table-2). We also tested whether that estimation result change according to religiosity 
of the households and find that there is no significant difference. For this reason we believe that attrition due 
to missing trust measures does not bias our results. Additionally, our main instrument is missing for only one 
village and if there is any selection bias due to attrition of households in OLS and Probit estimates, this will 
be corrected in 2SLS procedure assuming it is exogenous.   




Figure 5.1: Spatial distribution of villages by provinces and market integration levels 
Finally, Figure 5.1 shows the spatial distribution of the villages and the level of 
market.
55
  To measure market integration, we use village level average of total expenditures 
and number of markets within 50km radius around the villages in Panels A and B 
respectively, and define the villages below (above) median regional integration level as low 
(high) market integration villages.  Villages below (above) median regional integration 
level are defined as low (high) integration villages and marked by x (hollow circle), and the 
                                                          
55
 We illustrate fewer villages in the Figure than we have in the original sample, as the coordinates for many 
villages are missing. 
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economic centre of each state is shown by squares.  The Figure shows that high (low)-
integrated villages are not spatially concentrated in certain regions; hence spatial 
correlation is not a major concern.   Moreover market integration appears to be uncorrelated 
with distance to economic centres, as both high and low integrated villages are located 
close to the state economic centres. Yet, circumventing any concern, we will control for 
distance economic centres in the regression analysis discussed in the robustness checks.    
5.3 Does market integration foster trust? 
Does increased market integration affect the likelihood of trusting others?  We estimate the 
following model: 
(5.1)  Yiv = 0 + 1Eiv + Xiv  + iv,  
where i and v denote household i and village v, iv denotes an error term, Xiv refers to a 
vector of household and village level controls, and Eiv measures the extent to which the 
household is integrated in markets.  Yiv measures trust (personalized or generalized trust), 
and since this variable is a dummy we commence by estimating (5.1) using a probit 
specification.  In all models we cluster standard errors at the village level and also control 
for unobserved state level effects by including dummy variables for each state/region.  The 
thesis that market integration fosters trust is supported if γ1 > 0.   
As stated above, we have three different trust measures (a general trust measure, a 
measure capturing personalized trust, and a measure reflecting trust in complete strangers), 
and we have three different indicators of market integration (total expenditures, and 
expenditures of food and on non-food items). This gives rise to 9 different Probit regression 
models.  After having converted the coefficients into marginal effects, we present the 
results in Table 5.2. 
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Before turning to the coefficients on the key variables of interest, our three different 
measures of market integration, note that all other covariates perform similarly across all 
nine specifications.  Importantly, household size, total assets and food consumption score 
(FCS) are included to control for the amount of expenditures (on food and/or on non-food 
items) that are associated with the number of mouths to be fed, food intake, and wealth – 
leaving the expenditure variables to capture the impact of market integration on trust. FCS 
is positive and significant in all 9 regression models, while household size is never 
significantly different from zero. The performance of the assets variable is more unequal; it 
is significant (at the 5 or 10% level) in explaining general trust, but it is not significantly 
correlated to personalized trust or generalized trust.  Most importantly, regarding the 
correlation between our measures of market integration and the three types of trust, the 
results are very robust – we invariably find that households that are better integrated in the 
local economy tend to place less trust in both people from the same village and in complete 
strangers.  The same negative correlation results when using general trust as our dependent 
variable – we find γ1 < 0 in all nine models.  
 The results in Table 5.2 are obtained using standard probit regression analysis, 
which pick up correlations, but not necessarily causal relations. There may be unobserved 
factors that are correlated with both market integration measures and trust, or - even though 
it is less likely
56
 -  a reverse causality problem may exist if low trust agents are more likely 
to actively participate in markets.  To circumvent the quite stringent assumptions 
underlying IVprobit (especially regarding joint normality of the error terms
57
; Wooldridge 
2002), we proceed as follows.  We first re-estimate the nine models presented in Table 5.2 
using OLS, and check whether the coefficients obtained are qualitatively similar to the ones 
obtained using Probit.  Next, we run 2SLS models for all nine specifications to allow for 
causal interpretations of the coefficients obtained.  The 2SLS model we employ is specified 
as follows.  We “predict” Eiv using the following equation:  
                                                          
56
 We may expect that people who trust more are more likely to move towards markets and existence of this 
selection effect make our results stronger, as the selection will bias our estimates positively and make them 
converge to zero. So the estimates are big enough to be statistically significant and negative even if there is 
even such a selection bias. 
57
 In IVprobit, our first stage error term might violate the normality assumption because both the dependent 
and instrumental variables are censored at zero as we use log(1+x) of both (see above). 
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(5.2)  Eiv = α0 + Mv΄ α1 + X΄iv α2 + μiv, 
where μiv denotes the error term and M is a vector of excluded instruments. Our main 
instrument is the number of markets which are not located in the village but which are 
within a 50 km radius of the village in 2008.
58
 We expect a positive correlation between our 
market integration and instrument as more markets around the village mean more 
opportunities for trade and exchange for households. Our identification strategy rests on the 
usual assumptions that (1) the instrument is strongly correlated with expenditure variables, 
and (2) the number of markets around the village is not correlated with unobserved village 
level factors that may be correlated with market integration measures. To show whether the 
first assumption holds, we test the level of significance of our instruments in the first stage 
estimations, and report the F-statistics (see below). To satisfy the second assumption, we 
utilize information from detailed survey questions, and control for the omitted factors that 
may be correlated with both number of markets and trust levels.  Hence, we add various 
village level control variables to our 2SLS model and test the consistency of our estimates 
to inclusion of those in robustness checks.  
We also use the number of markets in the village as an additional instrument in 
robustness checks. Because the number of markets within the village is not a strong 
predictor of one of our measures of market integration, food expenditures, we consider our 
estimations based on a single instrument (number of markets within 50km) as our main or 
preferred set of estimates. The outcomes of models with both instruments serve as a 
robustness check, and we are mainly interested in checking the consistency of our results.  
Using (5.2) we calculate predicted values of Eiv, which we subsequently use in 
(5.1).  We thus re-ran the same 9 specifications that were used in the Probit regressions (as 
already presented in Table 5.2) and also use OLS and 2SLS.  We present the key results of 
all 27 regressions in Table 5.3.  To economize on space we do not report the full outcomes 
of all these regression models – instead, Table 5.3 only presents the 27 estimates of γ1, the 
coefficient on the relevant measure of market integration.  The full regression results of the 
                                                          
58
 The instrument is constructed by using survey questions asking how many markets are there within 50km 
radius and in the village; no usable information is available about the distance to the closest market measures 
– but see footnote 15.  
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2SLS models are presented in Table A.5.1 in the Appendix, while the exact regression 
results of the OLS models are available upon request.
59
  Our main result is that, in contrast 
to the theoretical prediction that γ1>0 and despite the fact that we are controlling for key 
factors like income, wealth and household size, we find that all 27 estimates are negative 
and significant.  Estimation results imply 50 percent increase in total expenditures – which 
is a plausible scenario in our study context where sample average and standard deviation 
for total expenditures equals to 16 and 30 U.S dollars respectively - decreases the 
likelihood of general, personal and generalized trust by 41, 12 and 20 percentage points 
respectively.   
 While the OLS and Probit coefficients are of roughly equal size (recall that we 
converted the Probit coefficients into marginal effects), the 2SLS coefficients are 
considerably larger, but the estimates are less precise as the standard errors are higher.  This 
may reflect that measurement errors in market integration indicators, which lead to a 
downward bias in OLS and Probit estimates, are large, or that the Probit and OLS 
correlations pick up a significant opposite effect (i.e., trust promoting trade).
60
  The 
estimation results of the first stage of our 2SLS models, including various test statistics, 
support our instrumentation strategy and suggest there is no weak instrument problem.  
Specifically, the F-values of the excluded instrument are much higher than 10 in all 
regressions (see Table A.5.1 for details).
61
 
                                                          
59
 The coefficients of the OLS regressions on all the covariates other than γ1, are very similar to the 
coefficients obtained in the second stage of the 2SLS models. Including these here would thus not provide any 
useful new insights. 
60
 Unfortunately, the data do not permit us to usefully explore this reverse relationship.  As stated in section 2, 
the expenditure data were collected in the first wave of data collection in 2008, while the trust data were 
elicited in the second wave, in 2010.  While the timing of data collection strengthens our beliefs that the 
relationship uncovered in the 2SLS regressions are indeed causal, a similar analysis of the reverse relationship 
would only be reliable if trust would be time-invariant. 
61
 Weak instruments is less of a concern in our just identified models, in which we use one excluded 
instrument. (See Angrist and Pischke,2009, p.209). 
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When comparing the results for trust in people from the same village and to that in 
strangers, we observe that the eroding effect of market integration on trust is more 
pronounced for strangers than for fellow villagers.  Both the correlations and the 2SLS 
causal estimates are almost twice as large for the generalized trust model as for the 
personalized trust model.  While this is intuitive, as trade may intensify interaction with 
strangers and enlarge the probability of being cheated or disappointed by the behavior of 
trading partners, it is surprising to note that market integration also reduces personalized 
trust.  Perhaps this reflects the gradual substitution of informal institutions and sharing 
arrangements for formal, market-mediated ones (cf. Ahlerup et al. 2009 for a theoretical 
analysis), setting in motion a process of erosion of village social capital. 
We thus find that market integration (proxied by expenditures, controlling for 
income and food consumption) is associated with lower levels of general trust, personalized 
trust, and generalized trust.  The negative coefficients in Table 5.3 are consistent with 
results by Siziba and Bulte (2012),
62
 but opposite to those found by Henrich et al. (2010).  
The latter may be caused by the fact that Henrich et al. derive their trust variable from 
(incentive-compatible) experiments, rather than survey questions.  However, while this 
methodological difference will undoubtedly affect point estimates (estimated “levels of 
trust”) it is not obvious why it would reverse the comparative statics with respect to market 
integration.  Next, while it may be easy to reconcile our 2SLS results with their OLS 
estimates – their correlations may pick up other dimensions of the complex 
interrelationship between trade and trust – it is puzzling that market integration enters 
negatively in our Probit and OLS models.  Perhaps the sign reversal is due to differences in 
the way we operationalize market integration.  Henrich et al. (2010) base their study on the 
percentage of calories consumed that is purchased on the market.  Arguably our measure of 
food expenditures is comparable to this variable.  However, controlling for the overall level 
of food consumption (the variable Food Consumption Score, based on the nutritional value 
of various food items consumed over a period of time – regardless of whether they are 
                                                          
62
 Siziba and Bulte (2012) use an RCT design to document a negative relation between market integration and 
stated trust among a sample of farmers in Mozambique.  In a related vein (albeit not focusing on trust 
directly), Jakiela (2011) uses effort games in Kenya, and finds that proximity to markets decreases the level of 
offers in dictator games. 
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home-produced or purchased), the food expenditures variable also consistently enters with 
a negative sign.  The same is true for non-food expenditures, so we do not believe our 
results are driven by specific features of food as a consumption item.  Might the sampling 
difference in terms of market integration levels between our study and Henrich et al. 
explain the sign reversal? Henrich et al.’s study sample various communities from across 
the globe; it includes the communities that are fully integrated to the markets (such as the 
communities from U.S purchasing 100 percent of their diet at the markets) and also 
communities that are not integrated in the markets.  We analyze households with moderate 
level of market integration; hence they fall within the spectrum covered by Henrich et al. 
We followed several routes to probe the robustness of these findings.  For example, 
we have estimated “parsimonious models” without controls, and also gradually added 
different combinations of control variables (gradually reducing sample size).  Our main 
results, in particular those for general and generalized trust, go through for such more 
parsimonious specifications and larger sample sizes.
63
  We also estimated all the models 
presented by treating generalized and personalized trust as categorical variables rather than 
binary ones (see Tables A.5.2 and A.5.3 in the Appendix for detailed estimation results).  
This generally does not affect the qualitative nature of our results for our generalized trust 
measure.
64
  Similarly, we find that our results are robust to including alternative 
specifications of income.  While monetary income measures are available for only a rather 
small sub-sample of our respondents, all results go through when focusing on this 
subsample and controlling for income.   
                                                          
63
 As an extra robustness test we also estimated a general model and replaced all missing values of the 
explanatory variables by zeros, combined with inserting dummies for these missing observations.  This does 
not affect our results. 
64
 When trust in complete strangers is our dependent variable, we find statistically significant and negative 
estimates for total expenditure and non-food expenditure variables in Ordered Probit and OLS estimations. 
When measuring market integration with food expenditures, the associated coefficient is again negative, but 
fails to be statistically significant at the 10% or better. We reach negative and statistically significant 
estimates for all expenditure variables in 2SLS where number of markets within 50km around the village used 
as the instrument and trust in complete strangers is the dependent variable. Moreover, these estimation results 
are robust when we estimate gradually adding control variables, control for income, and use number of 
markets in the village as an additional instrument in 2SLS estimations. However, for personalized trust 
variable our results are not robust with former estimates; the coefficient estimates for expenditure variables 
are negative but not negatively significant - except in Ordered Probit estimations where total nonfood 
expenditure is our main variable of interest.  
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As a further robustness check, we also included additional village level controls in 
our 2SLS models (a village poverty measure, population size, soil fertility
65
, distance to 
closest economic centre
66
 and dummy variables for village infrastructure
67
) to control for 
village characteristics such as urbanization level which may be correlated with trust and the 
location of the markets and trust.  Again, our estimates are robust.
68
  We have also re-
estimated the various 2SLS models with both excluded instruments (rather than one), and 
the p-values of Hansen’s J test consistently exceed 0.10 so we cannot reject the exogeneity 
of our instruments
69
. Additionally, we have estimated all models including both excluded 
instruments by using the LIML estimation technique (producing consistent outcomes when 
instruments are “weak”), and estimates are still robust with former estimates. We also 
estimate IV Probit models to test the robustness of the 2SLS outcomes.  We found, again, 
that all results summarized in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 are robust to such extensions.  Details of 
all results are available upon request.   
 We thus find no support for a “virtuous cycle” between market integration and trust, 
as market integration decreases trust for the average household.  This analysis is based on 
the assumption that the relationship between market integration and trust is orthogonal to 
local institutional quality – which may not be the case in practice.  To explore the role of 
instrumental quality as a mediating factor, we hypothesize that increased market integration 
                                                          
65
 Our village level soil fertility measure is the categorical answers (1=the soil is poor to very poor…., 
2=various crops can be grown in this soil …, 3=the soils are rich in nutrients and humus content…) to the 
question “How would you assess soil fertility?” by extension workers. 
66
 To construct the distance to closest economic centre measure, we used geographic coordinates of the 
villages for which data are available, and the coordinates of the economic centres of Kaduna, Katsina, Kano 
and Maradi provinces (the provinces closest to the villages used in the study). We calculated the geographic 
distances of each village to those provinces’ centres, and then we used the minimum distance among the four 
for each village. 
67
 The set of dummy variables for infrastructure (equal to 1 if a specific kind of infrastructure is present in the 
village)  include schools, health centers (hospitals, clinics), places of worship (churches, mosques), 
community structures (meeting halls, centers), irrigation infrastructures (boreholes, wells), veterinary 
extension services (cattle dips, veterinary centres), village wood lots, land line telephones, mobile phone 
network radio reception, newspapers, all weather roads; water bodies, livestock watering points, public 
transport stops, rural micro-finance banks, government extension offices for agriculture and livestock, 
agriculture research site. 
68
 The coefficient on market integration in the personalized trust model is negative but is not statistically 
significant. When we control for the coefficients on distance to closest economic centres in trust in complete 
strangers models, the coefficients on market integration and distance to closest economic centres are not 
statistically significant.  
69
 This is a valid test for the exogeneity only if one of the instruments, number of markets within or around 
50km radius, is exogenous. 
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reduces trust because not all market transactions are completed truthfully and faithfully.  
We tentatively test this by analysing whether high-quality local institutions attenuate the 
negative causal effect of market integration on trust.  If households can resort to arbitration 
by formal institutions in case of trade conflicts, they are less likely to be exploited in the 
trade relationship.  If so, faith in trading partners may not erode as fast as in regions where 
households cannot resort to formal institutions. 
 Unfortunately, the survey does not contain any truly exogenous institutional quality 
measure, but it does contain a question on villagers’ trust in local government institutions.  
Perhaps the average level of trust of co-villagers in the local government is a good proxy of 
institutional quality while at the same time being exogenous to the household level trust. 
We construct a dummy variable for institutional quality that is equal to 1 if the average trust 
in the local government of all other households in a village exceeds 3.
70
 The 2SLS results
71
, 
for each of the two subgroups, are presented in Table 5.4, where we again instrument for 
market integration by the number of markets within a 50km distance. 
The results are robust and interesting.  While the coefficient on the predicted level 
of market integration continues to be negative and significant in villages with low 
(perceived) institutional quality, the estimates are still negative but either imprecisely 
estimated (general trust) or lower for personalized and generalized trust, and as a result they 
are not statistically significant in villages with high institutional quality.  We may thus find 
support for a trap mediated by formal institutions: Villages are locked into a low trust, low 
market integration situation, unless the quality of local institutions is sufficiently good; high 
trust households starting to trade with strangers may lose their trust if the institutional 
quality is low, and therefore eventually do not participate in the market. 
                                                          
70
 For the definition and descriptive statistics of the institutional quality variable, see Panel E in Table 1. We 
exclude the villages where trust in local government officials reported by less than 4 households, since such 
small numbers of villagers likely produces a very noisy measure of the quality of institutions.  This explains 
why these models are based on a slightly smaller sample. 
71
 Estimates from OLS models are similar to 2SLS estimates. 
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Table 5.4: Market integration and Trust: Heterogeneity with respect to institutional 
trust in local government 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Dependent var: General Trust  Trust in people from same 
village 
 Trust in complete strangers 






 Others’ trust 
in loc. 
gov.=0  
Others’ trust in 
cent. loc.=1  




in loc. gov.=1  
         
Total Expenditure -0.430*** -0.490  -0.193*** -0.0477  -0.227*** -0.104 
 (0.1395) (0.3697)  (0.0671) (0.1636)  (0.0695) (0.2971) 
FCS 0.00206 0.000539  0.00154 0.00219***  0.00195* 0.00167 
 (0.0016) (0.0013)  (0.0010) (0.0007)  (0.0011) (0.0014) 
Assets 0.0425* 0.0443**  0.0335** -0.00183  0.0325** -0.00804 
 (0.0228) (0.0174)  (0.0135) (0.0097)  (0.0133) (0.0164) 
Gender 0.349*** 0.345**  0.142 0.0428  0.165** -0.102 
 (0.1164) (0.1669)  (0.1274) (0.1117)  (0.0663) (0.1369) 
Age 0.00429 0.00240  0.000923 -0.00192  0.00106 0.000321 
 (0.0027) (0.0030)  (0.0018) (0.0016)  (0.0017) (0.0025) 
Education 0.0515 0.0889  -0.0410 -0.0146  -0.0242 0.0837 
 (0.0884) (0.0733)  (0.0520) (0.0380)  (0.0512) (0.0760) 
Household size 0.000783 0.00171  -0.000559 0.00287**  -0.00208 0.00493* 
 (0.0031) (0.0025)  (0.0026) (0.0012)  (0.0020) (0.0026) 
Religious group 
mem. 
-0.0350 0.0594  -0.0315 0.0150  0.0325 -0.0220 
(0.0580) (0.0608)  (0.0414) (0.0334)  (0.0495) (0.0497) 
Extension policy -0.0171 -0.138**  -0.0334 -0.0532*  -0.000734 -0.0225 
 (0.0764) (0.0585)  (0.0467) (0.0319)  (0.0413) (0.0513) 
Mobile network 0.122 0.294  0.167* -0.0124  0.0393 -0.0540 
 (0.0982) (0.1812)  (0.0896) (0.1061)  (0.0600) (0.1544) 
Constant 0.287* 0.481**  0.583*** 0.725***  0.0817 0.513** 
 (0.1542) (0.2404)  (0.1721) (0.1268)  (0.1083) (0.2074) 
         
Observations 460 652  457 652  442 612 
Method 2SLS 2SLS  2SLS 2SLS  2SLS 2SLS 
Root mean sq. error 0.561 0.568  0.392 0.325  0.417 0.481 
F-stat (Instrument) 22.17 4.763  22.15 4.763  22.39 3.896 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at village level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Number of 
markets within 50km radius households resides in used as instrument for total expenditure. Province fixed effects are 
added to the model but not reported in the table. 
 
5.4 Discussion and conclusions 
We use data on 1633 households in Niger and Northern Nigeria to test whether market 
integration fosters trust.  If trade and trust are complements in development, policy 
interventions that increase either trust or market integration would put autarchic societies 
on a “virtuous” trajectory of increasing prosperity and trust.  We seek to extend Henrich et 
al.’s (2010) ground-breaking work by focusing on within-country variation in market 
integration and trust, and by identifying exogenous variation in market integration (via an 
instrumental variables approach).  Using three measures of market integration 
Chapter 5: Market integration and the evolution of trust 
122 
 
(expenditures on food, expenditures on non-food items and expenditures on both) and 
controlling for wealth and food intake, we find that increased market integration reduces 
trust.   
Closer inspection reveals this effect is entirely driven by villages with low-quality 
local institutions.  In other words, the trust-eroding effect of market integration is mediated 
by the quality of local institutions, and virtuous cycles between trade and trust may exist––
but only if the quality of institutions is sufficient high. We believe this has important 
implications for policy makers.  Specifically, in a context of “low institutional quality” it 
will be difficult to kick-start processes of increasing trade and trust.  Improving the quality 
of local governance and institutions, or building local confidence therein, seems a pre-
condition for virtuous cycles to emerge.  
Opportunities for improvement remain.  First, one may doubt whether the density 
markets is an exogenous measure.  Our instrument satisfies the exclusion and relevance 
tests, and the results are robust.  However, we are constrained by the dataset, and there may 
be still unobserved factors that we do not control for and correlated with both market 
integration and trust measures.  Hence, we recognize that there is need for future research 
utilizing quasi-experimental variation in market integration.  Second, our measure of 
institutional quality is not perfect, and we believe that studying the channels through which 
market integration affects trust is an important issue for future work. 
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5.A Appendix: Additional tables 
 
Table A.5.1: The second stage regression results 




























          
Total Expenditure -0.408***   -0.122*   -0.206***   
 (0.1220)   (0.0656)   (0.0776)   
Food Expenditure  -0.581***   -0.172*   -0.287**  
  (0.1633)   (0.0975)   (0.1152)  
Nonfood Expenditure   -0.432***   -0.130*   -0.221*** 
   (0.1333)   (0.0699)   (0.0834) 
FCS 0.00131 0.00223* 0.00101 0.00238*** 0.00267*** 0.00228*** 0.00230** 0.00279*** 0.00214** 
 (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Assets 0.0414*** 0.0120 0.0471*** 0.0107 0.00157 0.0125 0.00908 -0.00650 0.0121 
 (0.0128) (0.0115) (0.0142) (0.0082) (0.0076) (0.0088) (0.0104) (0.0087) (0.0113) 
Gender 0.304*** 0.245*** 0.307*** 0.0953 0.0743 0.0958 0.0372 0.00153 0.0358 
 (0.0920) (0.0863) (0.0924) (0.0733) (0.0709) (0.0728) (0.0736) (0.0730) (0.0731) 
Age 0.00268* 0.00184 0.00264 -0.000456 -0.000719 -0.000455 0.000957 0.000471 0.000957 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Education 0.0711 0.0740 0.0644 -0.0170 -0.0158 -0.0190 0.0321 0.0316 0.0300 
 (0.0515) (0.0582) (0.0514) (0.0301) (0.0320) (0.0302) (0.0476) (0.0489) (0.0487) 
Household size 0.00176 0.00475** 0.000776 0.000985 0.00183 0.000698 0.00153 0.00315 0.00102 
 (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0016) 
Religious group mem. 0.0225 -0.00181 0.0320 -0.00697 -0.0133 -0.00436 0.00303 -0.0102 0.00760 
 (0.0388) (0.0436) (0.0389) (0.0262) (0.0281) (0.0258) (0.0358) (0.0400) (0.0357) 
Extension policy -0.0703 -0.0318 -0.0817* -0.0440 -0.0322 -0.0471* -0.00734 0.0116 -0.0129 
 (0.0434) (0.0471) (0.0446) (0.0281) (0.0285) (0.0283) (0.0336) (0.0372) (0.0334) 
Mobile network 0.166** 0.0821 0.172** 0.0768 0.0520 0.0787 -0.00516 -0.0539 0.000460 
 (0.0827) (0.0771) (0.0849) (0.0577) (0.0493) (0.0585) (0.0624) (0.0626) (0.0634) 
Constant 0.447*** 0.262** 0.423*** 0.616*** 0.562*** 0.610*** 0.359*** 0.272** 0.351*** 
 (0.1375) (0.1321) (0.1362) (0.0974) (0.1001) (0.0970) (0.1222) (0.1210) (0.1208) 
          
Observations 1,177 1,177 1,177 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,081 1,081 1,081 
Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
F stat. (Instrument) 21.45 19.27 20.25 20.44 19.87 19.05 22.34 22.01 20.18 
RMSE 0.550 0.599 0.566 0.364 0.371 0.366 0.466 0.485 0.471 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at village level are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Province fixed effects are 
added to the model but not reported in the table. 
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Table A.5.1 (continued): First stage regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Total Exp. Food Exp. 
Non- 
food Exp. 
Total Exp. Food Exp. 
Non- 
food Exp. 
Total Exp. Food Exp 
Non 
-food Exp. 
                    
Markets within 50km radius 0.292*** 0.205*** 0.275*** 0.291*** 0.206*** 0.273*** 0.307*** 0.221*** 0.287*** 
 (0.0630) (0.0466) (0.0612) (0.0644) (0.0463) (0.0625) (0.0650) (0.0470) (0.0639) 
FCS -0.000337 0.00134 -0.00102 -0.000562 0.00129 -0.00128 -0.000755 0.00114 -0.00143 
 (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0014) 
Assets 0.0568*** -0.0108 0.0669*** 0.0592*** -0.0109 0.0694*** 0.0618*** -0.00991 0.0715*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0156) (0.0175) (0.0179) (0.0156) (0.0176) (0.0184) (0.0160) (0.0182) 
Gender 0.323*** 0.124 0.313*** 0.388*** 0.153* 0.368*** 0.398*** 0.161* 0.365*** 
 (0.1057) (0.0811) (0.1007) (0.1025) (0.0789) (0.0982) (0.1224) (0.0913) (0.1159) 
Age 0.00552** 0.00244 0.00513** 0.00561** 0.00245 0.00527** 0.00548** 0.00224 0.00511** 
 (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0024) 
Education 0.145* 0.107 0.122 0.143 0.108 0.119 0.154* 0.109 0.134 
 (0.0851) (0.0794) (0.0840) (0.0870) (0.0814) (0.0861) (0.0882) (0.0828) (0.0872) 
Household Size 0.000193 0.00527* -0.00210 0.000543 0.00529* -0.00169 -0.000243 0.00547* -0.00255 
 (0.0039) (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0040) 
Religious group membership -0.103** -0.114*** -0.0750 -0.110** -0.115*** -0.0832 -0.101* -0.118** -0.0737 
 (0.0517) (0.0434) (0.0531) (0.0516) (0.0439) (0.0531) (0.0542) (0.0463) (0.0557) 
Extension policy in  0.0232 0.0824 -0.00447 0.0116 0.0765 -0.0133 0.0154 0.0769 -0.0106 
place (0.0713) (0.0531) (0.0718) (0.0717) (0.0536) (0.0718) (0.0731) (0.0550) (0.0734) 
Mobile Network 0.332** 0.0890 0.328** 0.334** 0.0929 0.328** 0.381** 0.103 0.381** 
 (0.1433) (0.0911) (0.1416) (0.1456) (0.0917) (0.1441) (0.1532) (0.0944) (0.1516) 
Constant -0.0544 -0.358** -0.108 -0.112 -0.391** -0.151 -0.177 -0.428** -0.201 
 (0.2233) (0.1620) (0.2248) (0.2238) (0.1622) (0.2246) (0.2393) (0.1715) (0.2424) 
          
Observations 1,177 1,177 1,177 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,081 1,081 1,081 
R-squared 0.360 0.202 0.334 0.363 0.204 0.335 0.345 0.200 0.315 






























Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at village level are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Province fixed effects are 
added to the model but not reported in the table. 
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Table A.5.2 Market integration and trust in people from same village (categorical 
variables 1-5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES          
          
          
Total  -0.08**   -0.04   -0.11   
Expenditure (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.16)   
Food   -0.05   -0.03   -0.15  
Expenditure  (0.05)   (0.03)   (0.22)  
Non-food    -0.08**   -0.04   -0.12 
expenditure   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.17) 
FCS 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Assets 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Gender 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) 
Age 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Household Size -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Religious group  -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
membership (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Extension policy -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Mobile Network 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.19 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) 
Constant    3.24*** 3.22*** 3.24*** 3.26*** 3.21*** 3.26*** 
    (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
          







OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at village level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients reflect marginal 








Table A.5.3 Market integration and trust in complete strangers (categorical variables 
1-5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES          
          
          
Total  -0.09**   -0.09**   -0.59***   
Expenditure (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.21)   
Food   -0.05   -0.05   -0.82***  
Expenditure  (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.31)  
Non-food    -0.09**   -0.08**   -0.63*** 
expenditure   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.22) 
FCS 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Assets -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Gender 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.32 0.22 0.32 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
Household Size 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Religious group  -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.09 -0.13 -0.08 
membership (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
Extension policy 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.00 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
Mobile Network -0.25* -0.29** -0.25* -0.24* -0.27** -0.24** 0.01 -0.13 0.03 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) 
Constant    2.52*** 2.49*** 2.52*** 2.66*** 2.42*** 2.64*** 
    (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) 
          







OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at village level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Province fixed effects are added 










6. Entrepreneurial saving practices and reinvestment: 




In developing countries, intermediation costs and enforcement frictions constrain access to 
external finance by micro and small enterprises (MSEs) - leaving entrepreneurs’ earning 
retention as a key element for small business growth. But, what drives entrepreneurial 
decisions to reinvest in their own businesses?  Given the limited access to formal financial 
services, many entrepreneurs use informal mechanisms of saving and liquidity management 
to facilitate their earnings retention.  In this paper, we utilize a novel dataset from Tanzania 
to explore whether entrepreneurial saving practices can explain variation in entrepreneurs’ 
reinvestment decisions.  Specifically, we gauge whether the decision to save with formal 
financial institutions, individually (under the mattress), within the household or via other 
informal arrangements, such as rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), affect 
the decision to reinvest entrepreneurial earnings. We motivate our empirical work with a 
simple theoretical model that shows that an entrepreneur’s reinvestment decision depends 
on the entrepreneur’s saving practice, in addition to productivity and borrowing capacity of 
her entrepreneurial firm. 
 In the absence of easy access to external finance, saving for business purposes 
should be positively correlated with entrepreneurial investment.  However, the saving 
mechanism itself might be a critical element in determining the ability to reinvest.  On the 
one hand, for formal savers the opportunity cost of consuming business profits instead of 
                                                          
§
 This Chapter is based on following research paper:  Beck, T., Pamuk, H., & Uras, B. R. (2014). 
Entrepreneurial Saving Practices and Reinvestment: Theory and Evidence from Tanzanian MSEs 
(Working Paper No. 2014-15). Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford. 
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reinvesting them is not only the loss of financial reserves but also the foregone interest 
income.  On the other hand, for instance, the “informal savers” might be less likely to 
reinvest because of redistributive pressure on “with household members” from kin and 
family members.  If the remaining household members are aware of the existence of 
entrepreneurial savings, it can be hard to prevent the funds from being exploited for the 
general consumption needs of the household.  In addition to these two extreme cases, we 
could also think of the “individual savers” and the “informal finance network savers” as 
other saving practice types.  Comparing “individual savers” with “informal network 
savers”, we note that although the interest income from informal finance networks should 
have an impact on the opportunity cost of consumption and foster investment, the 
inflexibility to withdraw savings at informal financial institutions might offset this income 
effect and reduce the earnings retention.
72
 
 In order to inform our empirical hypotheses, we first present a simple theoretical 
model to explain the relationship between entrepreneurial investment decisions and saving 
practices.  We show that entrepreneurs are more likely to invest in their businesses if they 
save in a fashion which allows them easy access to their funds, such as formal savings 
accounts or personal saving mechanisms. 
 To test the empirical relationship between savings patterns and entrepreneurial 
reinvestment decisions, we use an MSE survey held among over 6,000 Tanzanian 
entrepreneurs undertaken in 2010.  The sample of entrepreneurs surveyed covers a large 
variety of enterprises in different locations, of different gender, educational profile and 
sectors.  We document that entrepreneurs’ saving practices do indeed co-vary with the 
likelihood of earnings retention at MSEs.  The survey design allows us to differentiate 
between different savings vehicles, including within household saving, saving under the 
pillow, informal savings clubs, and formal deposit accounts.  Our results reveal that the 
probability of reinvestment is significantly higher for savers and that when compared 
                                                          
72
 The rate of return to savings in social saving clubs is typically lower compared to formal financial 
institutions. For related discussion see Vonderlack and Schreiner (2002). Entrepreneurs saving via informal 
channels are more likely to have limited access to their savings. For instance, members of ROSCAs cannot 
access their savings until their turn comes (see Besley et al. (1993) for a theoretical discussion of ROSCAs), 
unless there is a relevant secondary market (Calorimis & Rajamaran, 1998). Similarly, moneylenders may 
postpone repaying the savings or it might be hard to reach them. 
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against formal deposit account holders, entrepreneurs who give their savings to other 
household members to keep them safe are significantly less likely to reinvest.  Specifically, 
we find that when we compare the practice of keeping savings within the household against 
the practice of having a deposit account at a formal financial institution, the latter is more 
likely to be associated with reinvestment than the former. 
 We conduct a series of checks to ensure the robustness of our results to the 
inclusion of additional control variables and alternative model specifications.  Furthermore, 
to address the potential reverse causation of high reinvestment on saving practices we 
utilize the distance to the nearest bank and entrepreneur’s age as instruments in recursive 
bivariate probit regressions.  Those variables can explain whether the savings will be kept 
in a bank account or shared with the rest of the household, but they are not directly 
associated with reinvestment decisions.  The coefficient estimates in the instrumental 
variable regressions remain stable and significant across all specifications.  Finally, we 
explore the differential effects of saving patterns on reinvestment decision across groups 
with different intra-household bargaining power.  We find that the negative relationship 
between saving within the household and reinvestment decisions is stronger for 
entrepreneurs with lower intra-household bargaining power, such as females and non-
household heads. 
 Tanzania is a perfect setting to test the relationship between different saving 
practices and entrepreneurial investment decisions.  Tanzania is a low-income country in 
East Africa, whose private sector is dominated by micro and small enterprises.  While the 
financial sector was liberalized in the 1990s and there is a large number of formal financial 
institutions, access to formal financial services is very low, with only 17% of adults having 
a formal bank account (World Bank, 2012).  Tanzania shares many characteristics with 
other low-income countries in Africa, including a very disperse population and a high 
degree of informality. 
 This paper relates to several distinct literatures.  First of all, our study investigates 
the role of saving practices on business investment.  Past research on finance and 
entrepreneurial investment has shown that entrepreneurs invest more if they expect high 
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private returns from their investment activity (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; 
Johnson et al., 1998).  Moreover, there are several studies investigating the impact of access 
to external finance on investment for microenterprises (Karlan & Zinman, 2010; Kaboski & 
Townsend, 2011; Attanasio et al., 2012; Banerjee et al., 2013).  We add to this literature by 
focusing on savings patterns as additional factor explaining variation in reinvestment 
decisions across micro- and small entrepreneurs. 
 Our most important contribution is to the growing literature concerning the 
implications of access to different saving instruments in developing countries.  There are an 
increasing number of studies exploring the impact of access to formal banking services on 
the level of savings (Pande & Burgess, 2005; Kaboski & Townsed, 2005; Dupas & 
Robinson, 2013a).  A recent experimental study by Dupas and Robinson (2013a) shows 
that entrepreneurs with formal bank accounts save and invest more in their businesses than 
entrepreneurs who do not save in formal banks.  In a companion study (Dupas & Robinson, 
2013b), the authors compare the health investment performance of women saving via 
various informal saving instruments and find that some of them boost investment in health.  
Similarly Brune et al. (2013) evaluate the effect of commitment to keep savings accounts 
on several outcomes for Malawian cash crop farmers.  We contribute to this literature by 
comparing the investment likelihood of formal savers with different types of informal 
savers such as individual savers, savers via other household members, informal savings 
club members and moneylenders. 
 Our paper also relates to the literature on barriers to saving in developing countries 
(see Karlan, Ratan and Zinman, 2014, for an overview).  In addition to geographic, 
monetary and regulatory barriers, there are significant social constraints on saving 
behavior, partly related to the position of the entrepreneur within the household.  Previous 
research has linked participation in informal savings clubs, such as ROSCAs, to intra-
household bargaining problems (e.g., Besley et al. 1993; Anderson and Baland, 2002).  
Social constraints can also explain why entrepreneurs save and borrow at the same time.  
Critically, the literature has shown that the relative position within the household is 
important for saving and investment decisions.  For instance, de Mel et al. (2008) show that 
as the decision making power of women in the household increases, returns to capital and 
Chapter 6: Entrepreneurial saving practices and reinvestment 
131 
 
investment for women increase as well.  Ashraf (2009) in a lab experiment in Philippines 
documents that subjects are more likely to save the randomly allocated money in their 
private deposit accounts if their spouse is not aware of the money, while they prefer to 
consume if the spouse knows about it.  Evidence from an experimental study with 142 
married couples in Kenya showed that husbands increase private spending if they receive 
an income shock.  But if their wives receive the shock they do not increase their 
consumption (Robinson 2011).  Likewise Schaner (2013) finds that well matched Kenyan 
couples are more likely to use joint accounts instead of costly individual ones.  Our study 
supports these findings by showing that members of the household who have potentially 
less power in decision making are less likely to turn their household savings into 
investments. 
 Unlike many other papers in this literature that implement randomized control trials 
(RCTs), our paper relies on cross-sectional survey data and thus faces the usual 
endogeneity issues.  We address these concerns by using instrumental variables and by 
exploring the differential relationship between savings patterns and reinvestment decision 
across different entrepreneurial groups.  Beyond these methodological differences, 
however, our analysis also allows a broader exploration of reinvestment decisions across 
different savings patterns.  In addition, we realize that such savings patterns are the 
outcome of repeated interactions and persistent habits and are thus harder if analyse using a 
randomized control trial. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 6.2 presents a theoretical 
model to show how saving practices can influence entrepreneurial investment decisions.  
Section 6.3 discusses the regression set-up and the set of control variables.  Section 6.4 
presents the data we use for our analysis.  Section 6.5 discusses our main findings, while 
section 6.6 discusses the determinants of saving choice, tests for reverse causality and 
studies sub-sample heterogeneity concerning our key estimation results.  Section 6.7 
concludes. 




We develop a partial equilibrium heterogeneous firm model to study how informal 
entrepreneurial savings practices for business purposes (as opposed to formal saving 
practices) may interact with the reinvestment likelihood.
73
 Parallel to our research question 
and the reinvestment and saving practice variables that we use in the empirical specification 
in section 6.3 (see below), we define reinvestment as directly investing some of the 
business profits back into the business. By this we mean that entrepreneurs do not 
transform earnings first into savings and then into bulky capital investments.  In our model 
entrepreneurial heterogeneity has three dimensions: productivity, borrowing capacity, and 
saving practice.  In the benchmark model all of the three dimensions are exogenous.  We 
also extend the benchmark model in section 6.2.4, where we endogenize the saving practice 
as an entrepreneurial decision.  In the following, we first present the economic 
environment, and the entrepreneur’s maximization problem, before deriving optimal 
investment behavior.  This allows us to obtain several empirically testable hypotheses. 
6.2.1 Environment 
There are two time periods, 1 and 2; a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by   and a good 
- call it cash - that can be invested, saved, or consumed.  Entrepreneurs have linear 
preferences over their life-time consumption such that  
(6.1)                   
where    is life-time utility and      and      are consumption levels in period-1 and in 
period-2 respectively.  The parameter   is a discount factor.  The linear preference 
specification is not essential for the qualitative findings of the model. 
 At the beginning of period-1, entrepreneurs are endowed with    which we assume 
to be homogeneously distributed among all entrepreneurs in the economy. This endowment 
includes the net earnings in preceding, non-modelled periods.  Entrepreneurs in this 
economy utilize these earnings,  , as a resource to reinvest as well as consume and save for 
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 In the model we ignore the channel that not having a safe place to store your money, you make many small 
investments rather than in just one bulky opportunity. 
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business purposes. So savings do not have a direct relationship with reinvestment, but an 
indirect relationship - we will discuss this in detail below.  Entrepreneur   decides on 
whether to consume,     ;  save cash for business purposes from period 1 to period 2,      ; 
and reinvest in productive capital      , (e.g. inventory, machinery, building, and etc) in 
period-1.  So the budget constraint for period-1 is  
(6.2)                      . 
In period-2, entrepreneur  's technology yields         units of cash if and only if the 
entrepreneur is capable of injecting a minimum amount of cash    ̅ per unit of capital ,       , 
to utilize the investment.  Parameter   >1 captures the productivity heterogeneity across 
entrepreneurs; a high    can be associated with better training, education or some sort of 
intrinsic ability to manage a firm.   ̅ captures the expected liquidity needs per capital 
invested - for instance working finance requirements of the business which is necessary to 
utilize the technology.  It does not affect the return on investment projects as long as it can 
be financed at the beginning of period-2.  
Entrepreneurs can finance their liquidity need,   ̅     via two sources:  
1. They can use savings for business purposes,    , at a rate    with     .  In this 
formulation,    captures saving practice (in)efficiency of the entrepreneur.  We assume 
that there are two general saving practice types: Formal      and informal     . We 
suppose that      with certainty, whereas    is drawn from a distribution function 
with     . The monetary costs associated with informal saving practices as opposed 
to formal saving practices motivate the relative inefficiency of informal saving 
practices. These costs include the lack of interest income through informal practices (in 
particular for saving with other household members and at a secret hiding place), 
informal taxes for the saving collected by the members of the family, kin or social 
network, or limited access to the savings (in particular when the entrepreneurs save via 
ROSCAs and informal moneylenders).  The heterogeneity in informal saving 
(in)efficiency can be motivated, for instance, by the cross-sectional variation in within-
household bargaining power, as we will discuss below.  We also assume that saving 
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formally may involve utility losses due to social and transaction costs when compared 
with saving informally, and these costs may limit the use of formal saving tools.  We 
will explain the utility costs in detail and how they will allow us to endogenize the 
model saving practice in section 6.2.4 below.    
2. They can borrow cash in period-2, denote by     , which they should repay at the end of 
the period.  Having limited access to finance in our developing country context, the 
entrepreneurs in our model can borrow up to a fraction    of   ̅      in the financial 
market with no interest rate, where    is an entrepreneur-specific parameter capturing 
the ability to raise liquidity - working capital - externally.
74
  The borrowing capacity   
is drawn from a distribution function at the beginning of the period-1, and is publicly 
observable. Hence, the borrowing constraint associated with working capital finance 
can be shown via following inequality 
(6.3)               ̅    . 
To summarize, the constraint that ensures that there is sufficient liquidity at the beginning 
of the period-2 - financed by saving for business purposes          and borrowing        - is 
(6.4)       ̅                 . 
Utilizing the condition imposed by (6.4), we can summarize the entrepreneurial 
output at the end of the period-2,     , as follows: 
(6.5)                                                ̅      
                                                                  ̅       
(6.5) shows that if and only if the expected liquidity needs in period-2 can be financed, the 
output available to entrepreneur   includes extra cash generated by the technology,       , 
in addition to net savings for business purposes,        carried from period-1 to period-2, 
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 We do not take into consideration that borrowing capacity may be dependent on the amount of savings - the 
entrepreneur can use savings as collateral for bank finance -, as our focus is on saving practice and 
reinvestment relationship.  
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and borrowings      in period-2.
75
  Hence, in this economy, firms must have the capacity to 
manage liquid reserves in order to be able to undertake productive investment 
opportunities
76
, and savings for business purposes have an indirect impact on reinvestment 
through liquidity needs. 
Finally,  
(6.6)                    
is the budget constraint for period-2 and implies that entrepreneurs use      to consume or 
repay borrowed cash in period-2. 
 As a final remark concerning the environment, we would like to note that in this 
model the exact timing of   investment is not essential.  All we need is that   is invested 
before the liquidity injection is made.  This means allowing parts of the saving for business 
purposes s to finance   will not alter the qualitative properties of the model that we 
highlight in section 6.2.3. 
6.2.2 Optimizing behavior 
The decision variables in this model are     ,     ,     , and     .  Entrepreneurs maximize 
life-time utility in (6.1) subject to budget constraints (6.2) and (6.6).   An immediate 
implication of this model can be summarized in the following: 
Lemma 6.1: The entrepreneur sets      if and only if he has sufficient capacity to 
finance his liquidity needs in the second period.  
The rest of the qualitative properties of the model are as follows. Entrepreneurs who 
choose a        exhaust their borrowing limit,   .  This is implied by the assumption that 
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 This type of a production function specification has been previously utilized in finance and development 
literature by Aghion et al. (2010). In their dynamic general equilibrium model, the authors introduce a 
complementarity between the ability to cope with future liquidity needs and current long-term investment and 
explain the negative correlation between volatility and growth observed in cross-country data. 
76
 We assume that   ̅ is a common parameter among all firms in the economy. The qualitative features of the 
model would remain identical if we assumed heterogeneity and stochasticity in liquidity demand. 
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saving is inefficient           in this economy for informal type of saving practices and 
borrowing is free.
77
  Therefore,  
(6.7)         ̅         ,  
 as long as     .  
 Using (6.4) and imposing equality, we get:  
(6.8) 
     
      
  
  ̅      
       
Equation (6.8) implies that the lower   the higher is the savings for business purposes - for 
those entrepreneurs who choose to invest.  But, as we show below a low    implies a low 
likelihood of earnings retention and as a result a low likelihood of saving for business 
purposes. 
 Using (6.8) in budget constraints (6.2) and (6.6) yield:  
(6.9)                             ̅    , 
(6.10)                      ̅    . 
By using (6.9) and (6.10), we derive the idiosyncratic rate of return from postponing 
consumption from period 1 to period 2  
(6.11)                         ̅                
which is the unit rate of return from undertaking an investment project for an entrepreneur. 
 Combining (6.1) and (6.11), we find that the optimal consumption plans implied 
                              , 
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 If we introduce an interest rate for borrowing,   to the model, as long as it satisfies        the 
implications and solution of the model do not change.  
Chapter 6: Entrepreneurial saving practices and reinvestment 
137 
 
(6.12)                             .  
 
 The entrepreneurs with a sufficiently high net rate of return on their investment (that is, 
      ) invest in their projects and consume the investment returns at the end of the 
period-2.  When    is lower than    , the entrepreneur does not invest and consumes the 
endowment   at the end of the period-1. 
6.2.3 Theoretical predictions of the model 
A high    increases the likelihood that an entrepreneur will reinvest. This leads to the 
following key empirically testable implications of the model as in the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 6.1: Entrepreneurs with an efficient saving practice (high   ) are more likely 
to invest.   
Proof: Taking the partial derivative of   with respect to   we can see that  





 (  ̅       (           ̅))
[    ̅ (








   
■  
That the (in)efficiency of an entrepreneur’s saving practice raises the likelihood of earnings 
reinvestment will be the key hypothesis of our empirical analysis.  However, we also 
provide the following two testable propositions. 
Proposition 6.2: Entrepreneurs with a high borrowing capacity (high   ) are more likely to 
invest.   
Proof: Defining    (
    
  
 ) and taking the partial derivative of   in (6.12) with respect to 
 :  
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  ̅
  
       
[    ̅    ]
    
■  
Proposition 6.3: Productive entrepreneurs (high   ) are more likely to invest.   
Proof: Using (6.12) we have   
      
 
    ̅   
   
■   
6.2.4 Endogenizing the Saving Practice 
Our theoretical model implies that if an entrepreneur’s saving practice is inefficient, she is 
induced to save a lot which makes postponing consumption from period-1 to period-2 
inefficient.  Therefore, an entrepreneur’s saving practice is likely to be an endogenous 
variable, where the decision to save formally might be a costly action. 
 To formalize this argument, suppose that there are two saving options available for 
an entrepreneur as spelled out previously - formal and informal.  In order to be able to save 
formally the entrepreneur needs to sacrifice a utility loss worth of    units of consumption 
for each unit of funds deposited formally. This basically implies that formal savings impose 
a non-monetary cost, and these costs may be type specific.  The utility loss might be due to 
shame, fear of retaliation - if savings are discovered by family or kin - (e.g. hiding savings 
from family members (social network) at a bank account) or physical costs (e.g. 
transportation costs) as well as idiosyncratic factors.
78
 These costs may be captured by age 
of the entrepreneur and distance to the bank.  In addressing the potential reverse causation 
of investment on entrepreneurial saving practice in section 6.6, we use these variables as 
instruments. 
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 Lack of understanding how formal savings institutions work may hinder entrepreneur’s access to formal 
savings. However we do not use them to identify the model, as they may be highly correlated with the human 
capital of the entrepreneur.   
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 The efficiency of the formal saving practice is denoted with    and the efficiency of 
the informal saving practice is denoted with   , where         for all the individuals 
who save informally.  Using equation (6.12) from the entrepreneurial optimization problem, 
an entrepreneur   is willing to save formally if and only if  
  
(6.13)                         ̅ (
 
    ̅             
 
 
    ̅              
)     , 
which would hold if (a) the entrepreneur has a low cost of accessing a formal financial 
institutions and/or (b) a high enough productivity and/or (c) and limited access to 
borrowing. 
 We utilize the theoretical argument we derived in equation (6.13), when we study 
the reverse causation of re-investment likelihood on entrepreneurial saving practice in 
section 6.6. 
6.2.5 Impact heterogeneity 
The entrepreneurial (in)efficiency associated with informal saving practice is expected to 
be a function of accessibility to savings.  Such accessibility constraints could be related to 
the repayment structure for the case of informal saving networks (e.g. Rotating-Saving-and-
Credit-Associations) and within household bargaining power for the case of in-household 
savings.  This implies, for instance, that entrepreneurs with low household bargaining 
power would have a lower   .  The bargaining power of an individual could vary according 
to the position of the individual in the household in developing country contexts.  Because 
of social norms and pressure, for instance female household members and children are 
naturally at a more disadvantageous position than males and household heads in terms of 
claiming from the common resources of the household.  They are less likely to claim 
money from the common savings pot of the household to finance their liquidity needs 
thereby reinvesting less likely.  We will utilize this intuition in our sample-split empirical 
analysis while studying impact heterogeneity in section 6.6. 
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6.2.6 Empirically testable hypothesis 
In our regression equations we will control for a vector of variables to test the empirical fit 
our model to the data based on the theoretical results we obtained in propositions 1 through 
3.  Specifically, the empirically testable hypotheses resulting from our model as the 
following:  
1.   : Entrepreneurs who can save efficiently (high  ), - saving formally in a formal 
bank account, MFI or savings cooperatives as opposed saving informally - are more 
likely to reinvest. 
2.   : Entrepreneurs with a high borrowing capacity (high  ) – who have used external 
finance for business purposes - are more likely to reinvest.  
3.   : Entrepreneurs with high productivity (high  ) - with better training, higher 
education and higher income - are more likely to invest.  
4.   : Entrepreneurs with high utility loss due to saving formally (low  ) - at lower 
ages and living faraway from formal banking services for saving - are less likely to 
save formally.  
6.3 Empirical methodology 
To test whether saving practices affect the decision to reinvest, we use the binary outcome 
variable reinvest, which equals 1 if the entrepreneur invests some of the profits back into 
business and 0 otherwise, and estimate the following model:  
 (6.14)                 
     
             ,  
where i denotes the entrepreneur, S is a vector of saving practices comprised of dummy 
variable(s) which take(s) the value of 1 if the entrepreneur has the corresponding saving 
practice (see below for details) and ε is the error term.  The vector of control variables 
included in the benchmark model is composed of an array of entrepreneurial and enterprise 
characteristics that we discuss in the following. 
 First, in line with our theoretical model, we control for firms’ ability to borrow.  
Specifically, Borrowed is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the entrepreneur 
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has ever borrowed to cover business needs, and this is a proxy for the    parameter in the 
theoretical model.  Businesses that have access to external finance are expected to reinvest 
more frequently even in the absence of regular entrepreneurial savings. 
 Second, we use income level, education and business training history of 
entrepreneurs as proxies of entrepreneurial productivity   .  We conjecture that 
entrepreneurs with a higher household income can save more and as a result reinvest more 
often.  To control for the entrepreneur’s income, we use self-reported monthly personal 
income levels.
79
 Entrepreneurs with high levels of human capital are expected to be more 
committed to business growth, and to have higher rates of earnings retention.  We therefore 
use the highest level of formal education completed by the respondents, as well as an 
indicator of entrepreneurial training, as this should matter for expected business 
performance and reinvestment behavior. 
 Third, although they are not discussed in our model, we additionally control for 
gender and marital status as previous studies showed that both can influence investment 
decisions (Iversen et al., 2006; Ashraf, 2009; de Mel et al., 2009 and Fafchamps et al., 
2013).  Specifically, we expect female entrepreneurs to face more claims on their income 
from spouse and family members.  Similarly, married entrepreneurs might face more 
claimants on the business profits and might therefore be less likely to re-invest.  Finally, we 
include sectoral dummies to control for sectoral performance that might explain 
reinvestment heterogeneity, as well as regional dummies to control for geographic 
heterogeneity in profitability and reinvestment. 
 Our survey allows us to identify two types of saving practices among Tanzanian 
entrepreneurs which we classify as follows: 
1. Save formal: This practice includes the entrepreneurs who save their funds at formal 
financial institutions such as commercial banks, microfinance institutions or saving 
& credit cooperatives. The entrepreneurs who save only formal and save both 
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 Each respondent is asked which income range (e.g. TSHS 35 001 - TSHS 40 000 per month) describes their 
income level best. We use the median of that range (e.g. TSHS 37500.5) as the income level of the 
respondent. 
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formal and informal (please see below for the definition) are considered in this 
group.   
2. Save informal: We consider entrepreneurs who do not save formally in this group.   
Yet, our survey allows a finer classification to exploit the considerable heterogeneity in 
terms of informal saving practices.  Therefore we first divide save informal into two groups 
and distinguish individual saving practices and practices involving interaction with other 
people as follows: 
1. Save informal individually: A large fraction of entrepreneurs in Tanzania save 
their funds only in a secret hiding place or piggy bank.
80
 We classify this 
behaviour as “informal individual saving” practice. 
2. Save informal with others: We classify the practices of saving funds via 
informal savings clubs, such as ROSCAs, or moneylenders or within household 
savers under “saving with others”.  We do not include respondents who also 
save formally in this group.
 81
  
 To distinguish whether our entrepreneurs save through people living in the 
household or people who are not member of a household, we decompose the practice of 
“Save informal with others” further into two groups. 
1. Save with household members: The group comprises entrepreneurs who give 
their funds to other household members for safe keeping. 
2. Save with people outside household: The group contains entrepreneurs who save 
through ROSCAs or moneylenders.  The entrepreneurs who both save informal 
with household members and save informal with people outside household are 
considered in this group.
82
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 Piggy bank is a coin container. 
81
 Our results are robust when we create a separate dummy variable for this group having both saving 
practices and add them to the regressions. 
82
 We do not include this group having both practices save informal both with people outside household and 
with household members to our main regression specifications as  only a few respondents (7) have both 
practices.   
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We again conjecture that entrepreneurs in the second group have more control over their 
savings than entrepreneurs in the first group, especially if the latter have limited intra-
household bargaining power.  In our regression analysis, we will use a dummy variable for 
each saving practice above (see Table 6.1 below for the descriptions) and work with 
different samples to compare both savers and non-savers but also different groups of savers 
in their reinvestment behaviour. 
6.4 Data 
The dataset is based on a novel enterprise survey conducted at the MSE-level in Tanzania.  
The survey data was collected by the Financial Sector Deepening Trust Tanzania in 2010 
from a nationwide representative cross-section of 6,083 micro- and small enterprises.  The 
respondents of the questionnaire are entrepreneurs with an active business as of September 
2010.  Table 6.1 presents both detailed definitions of the variables and descriptive statistics 
of the sample. 
 The descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 6.1 shows that the average number of 
employees among Tanzanian MSEs is 1.5 workers, ranging from one (i.e. self-employed) to 
80 employees.
83
 However, 97% of entrepreneurs are self-employed.  The median initial 
capital is about 35 USD and average monthly sales are 149 USD.  The key question which 
we exploit to capture entrepreneurs’ earnings retention asks whether the respondent 
reinvests some of the profits back into business.  As presented in Table 6.1, 76% of the 
sample entrepreneurs engage in earnings retention. 
 The sectoral breakdown in Panel B of Table 6.1 exhibits substantial variation: 54% 
and 30% of the businesses operate in the trade and service sectors, respectively, while 15% 
of enterprises operate in manufacturing. 
 Panel C of Table 6.1 presents characteristics of entrepreneurs and enterprises.  
About 50% of the entrepreneurs in the sample are female, 10% of the entrepreneurs are 
single.  30% of the sample entrepreneurs received business related training, and about 87% 
                                                          
83
 The relationship between business owners’ saving and re-investment decisions might be weak in large 
businesses because of managerial layers. We test the robustness of our main result by excluding the 
businesses larger than 10 from our sample. Estimates reported in Table 6.3 do not change. 
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of the entrepreneurs have less than completed secondary education.  75% of the enterprises 




Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for the main variables 
Panel A: Firm  
characteristics 
Description Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Reinvestment Equals to 1 if respondent re-invest 
some of the profit back to 
business, 0 otherwise 
6083 0.76 0.43 0 1 
Employee Number of employees business 
has (including owner) 
6083 1.47 1.61 1 80 
Initial capital Logarithm of initial capital of the 
business, in Tanzanian Shillings 
6083 10.62 2.21 0 25.33 
Panel B: Sectoral  
breakdown of firms 
Number of companies %          
Trade 3291 54.1     
Service 1841 30.3     
Manufacturing 931 15.3     
Other 20 0.3     
Panel C: Entrepreneur 
characteristics 
Description Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Education Education level of the respondent, 
(0 none-6 university) 
6077 2.00 0.89 0 6 
Female Equals to 1 if respondent is 
female, 0 otherwise 
6083 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Single Equals to 1 if respondent is single, 
0 otherwise 
6083 0.10 0.29 0 1 
No training Equals to 1 if respondent has no 
business related training, 0 
otherwise 
6083 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Rural Equals to 1 if respondent lives in a 
rural area, 0 otherwise 
6083 0.75 0.44 0 1 
Income Logarithm of personal income 
level of the respondent in 
Tanzanian Shillings 
5868 11.94 1.15 9.90 15.20 
Bank branch within  
one hour  
walking distance 
Equals to 1 if there is a bank 
within a one hour walk from the 
home of the respondent,  0 
otherwise 
6083 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Min. distance to ATM,  
bank branch, or MFI   
Minimum distance of the ward 
entrepreneur lives to the nearest 
ATM,  
bank branch or MFI, in 
logarithms, at ward level) 
583 2.04 1.78 -4.35 6.12 
       Age Age of the respondent 6083 36.84 10.58 16 91 
 
  
                                                          
84
 This is computed with the average exchange rate for 2010.  If using PPP exchange rates, the corresponding 
median income would be 288 dollars. 
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Table 6.1 (continued): Descriptive statistics for the main variables 
Panel D: Finance  
variables 
Description Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Save Equals to 1 if respondent saves for business 
purposes, 0 otherwise  
6083 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Save formal Equals to 1 if respondent saves in a bank 
account, MFI or SACCO, 0 otherwise 
6083 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Save informal Equals to 1 if respondent saves but not in a 
bank account, MFI or SACCO and, 0 
otherwise 
6083 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Save informal  
individually 
Equals to 1 if respondent saves in a secret 
hiding place or piggy bank and does not save 
via other means, 0 otherwise 




Equals to 1 if save informal with household 
members or save informal with people outside 
household equals to 1 and respondent does not 
save formally, 0 otherwise 
6083 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Save informal with 
 household 
 members 
Equals to 1 if respondent save via by giving it 
to a household member to keep it safe and 
does not save formally, 0 otherwise 
6083 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Save informal with  
people  
outside household 
Equals to 1 if respondent save via by giving it 
to a non household member  or merry go-
round and does not save formally, 0 otherwise 
6083 0.05 0.2 0 1 
Borrowed Equals to 1 if respondent has ever taken a loan/ 
borrowed money for business purpose, 0 
otherwise    
6083 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Formal loan Equals to 1 if respondent took a to set up or 
take over the business from a bank or MFI, 0 
otherwise    
6083 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Semi-formal loan Equals to 1 if respondent took a to set up or 
take over the business from an employer, 
SACCO, Village Bank, local government 
schemes or donor/NGO, 0 otherwise    
6083 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Informal loan Equals to 1 if respondent took a to set up or 
take over the business from family, friends, 
savings club, money lender or supplier, 0 
otherwise    
6083 0.06 0.24 0 1 
 
Panel D of Table 6.1, finally, presents our variables and descriptive statistics on the 
financing patterns of enterprises in our sample.  Only 18% of all sample entrepreneurs ever 
borrowed for business purposes; 3% of entrepreneurs in the sample borrowed from a bank 
or MFI, 2% borrowed from a semi-formal financial institution, such as a SACCO or village 
bank and 6% borrowed from an informal source, such as money lenders, savings club or 
family and friends. 
 Saving is a common habit among the entrepreneurs in our sample.  We utilize an 
extensive margin question asking whether the entrepreneur saves for business purposes, and 
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distinguish savers from the rest of the population: 77% of the entrepreneurs in the sample 
save for business purposes.  However there is considerable heterogeneity among saving 
practices of Tanzanian entrepreneurs.  Informal individual saving is the most wide spread 
practice among Tanzanian entrepreneurs.  75% of the savers save informal-individually 
whereas around 13% of them save formally.  Likewise, 13% of the savers do not save at a 
formal financial institution and instead save their funds via people outside the household 
such as members of ROSCAs and moneylenders, or give the savings to household 
members. 
 Table 6.2 presents a correlation matrix concerning the variables of interest for our 
analysis.  The key variables such as “being a saver” and “retaining earnings within the 
business” exhibit a strong correlation.  However, the sign of the relationship seems to be 
dependent on the saving practice of the respondents.  In particular saving via others seems 
to be negatively correlated with firm reinvestment whereas formal and informal individual 
savers have higher reinvestment rates.  We also note a high correlation among other firm 
characteristics, such as borrowing and saving activity. 
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6.5 Saving practices and reinvestment: Baseline results 
Since our dependent variable is binary, we estimate probit models for all different 
specifications of (6.14), and report marginal effects at mean levels for the coefficient 
estimates unless we state otherwise.  Table 6.3 reports those marginal effects for the 
benchmark regression.  We use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and report the 
standard deviations associated with coefficient estimates in parentheses. 
Table 6.3: Estimates for reinvestment and saving/saving practices relationship  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Save formal 0.09***     
 (0.02)     
Save informal 0.06*** -0.04*    
 (0.01) (0.02)    
Save informal 
individually 
  -0.03   
  (0.02)   
Save informal with 
others 
  -0.09***   
  (0.03)   
Save with household 
member 
   -0.12***  
   (0.04)  
Save with people 
outside household 
    -0.04 
    (0.03) 
Borrowed 0.04** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Education 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female -0.03** -0.03** -0.03*** -0.07** -0.04 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Single 0.04** 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
No training -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.07** -0.06** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Income 0.03*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Observations 5,803 4,499 4,499 877 774 

















Notes: Reinvestment is the dependent variable in the estimations. We report estimates marginal effects at 
mean values for all estimations and robust standard errors are in parentheses. We additionally control for 
sector and region dummies in the estimations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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 The results in the first column show that the probability of reinvestment is higher 
for both groups of savers compared to non-savers.  Specifically, ceteris paribus, the 
reinvestment probability of an average Tanzanian MSE who saves informally is around six 
percentage points higher than for an entrepreneur who does not save, while the 
reinvestment probability of an average Tanzanian MSE who saves formally is around nine 
percentage points higher.  We also find that entrepreneurs with access to formal loans are 
more likely to reinvest, while formal business training increases the likelihood of 
reinvestment in business projects.  Female and married entrepreneurs are less likely, while 
richer entrepreneurs are more likely to invest.  Overall, these results are consistent with our 
theoretical predictions as discussed above and the existing literature. 
 Our empirical analysis, so far, stresses the significance of entrepreneurial savings to 
foster entrepreneurial reinvestment in business projects and we confirmed that saving 
related correlations are in line with the findings in the literature.  In the next step, we focus 
on our main research question and we deepen our analysis by studying the implications of 
saving practices on reinvestment.  In order to test the predictions from our theoretical 
model, we rank saving practices based on their vulnerability to consumption temptations - 
as we discussed above - and investigate the implications of the variations in saving methods 
for the probability to reinvest.  Specifically, we rank the “within household savers” as the 
group for whom the vulnerability to consuming savings is the highest.  On the other 
extreme, we expect the most committed savers to be “formal savers” due to the highest 
opportunity cost of consumption - resulting from the foregone interest income.  Finally, 
comparing “informal individual savers” with “informal savers with others”, we conjecture 
that while the redistributive pressure problem might be lower for the former, there would be 
a potential inflexibility to withdrawing savings when needed associated with the latter. 
 Here we also note that we study our main research question by focusing on specific 
sub-samples of savers in order to present the results clearer, and keep the consistency 
between the samples used for main estimations, robustness checks and bivariate probit 
estimates (see below).  To show that our estimates are not biased due to this method, we 
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replicate the analysis by using the entire sample.  We present the results in Table A.6.1 in 
the Appendix, and show that our estimates are robust.
85
 
 The results in column 2 show that “formal savers” are four percentage points more 
likely to retain earnings than the “informal savers”.  To investigate the effects of individual 
saving practices on earnings retention we limit our sample to savers and thus drop 
respondents who do not save.  The results in column 3 show that entrepreneurs that save 
with others are less likely to reinvest than entrepreneurs that save formally.
86
 Also, 
entrepreneurs who save informally but individually are not significantly less likely to 
reinvest when compared to “formal savers”. 
 Finally, we focus on the group of respondents who save with others.  We 
independently study the investment likelihood of household savers and respondents who 
save outside the household compared to the reinvestment probability of formal savers.  The 
regression in column (4) keeps only formal savers and household member savers in our 
sample, while the regression in column (5) keeps only formal savers and outside household 
savers in our sample.  In both cases, we gauge the difference in reinvestment behaviour 
relative to formal savers.  Therefore, the total numbers of observations in these two 
regressions are 877 and 774, respectively.  Confirming our conjecture, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that “with household member savers” reinvest less frequently compared to 
“formal savers”, at the 5% level.  Furthermore, we also show that, although the coefficient 
estimate of Save with people outside household variable in the last regression is not 
significant, the negative coefficient sign is consistent with the argument that the inflexible 
withdrawal opportunity of “informal savings” might be a barrier to earnings retention. 
 In summary, our baseline empirical results are consistent with our theoretical model 
showing that inefficient saving practices lead to a lower likelihood of reinvestment, and 
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 The only difference between the results concerns the estimate for saving with people outside the household. 
It is statistically significant at ten percent level due to lower standard error estimates when we use the full 
sample. 
86
 Here we consider entrepreneurs who have both types of informal saving practices, “saving informal 
individually” and “saving informal with others” inside “save informal with others” group. When we estimate 
specification in column-3 by adding a separate dummy for individuals having both practices and saving only 
informal with others together saving informal individually, estimates for the first two groups including saving 
practices with others are negative and statistically significant showing that our results are robust. 
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hence also a lower likelihood of earnings retention.  It is important to note that this finding 
is mainly driven by the difference in the reinvestment likelihood between within household 
savers and formal savers, for which the difference is most pronounced and statistically 
significant.  The entrepreneurs who save informally with household members are around 12 
percentage points less likely to reinvest than entrepreneurs saving formally in a bank or 
MFI account.  
 In Table 6.4, we test the robustness of our key result concerning the difference in 
reinvestment likelihood between formal and within household savers (see column (4) in 
Table 6.3) with respect to the inclusion of a vector of additional control variables.  First, we 
add specific dummy variables for different sources of external finance at the start-up of the 
enterprise: formal, semi-formal and informal loans.  Our indicator for external finance may 
not capture the potential implications of access to different sources of finance for 
reinvestment decisions.  Getting loans from a formal financial institution might require a 
bank account and facilitate formal entrepreneurial savings.  However, none of the external 
financing variables that we include have significant explanatory power regarding the 
likelihood of reinvestment.  Second, we control for entrepreneurial types by utilizing the 
answers of to the following survey question: “why did you go to business?”
87
 As evidenced 
in the previous literature (Bruhn & Zia 2013), transformational type entrepreneurs are 
expected to have higher rates of investment profitability and earnings retention rate 
compared to survival type entrepreneurs.  While we do not report the individual dummy 
variables, some variables enter significantly at the 5% level.  Third, we add dummy 
variables to control for the type of the activity the business conducts.  The activity of the 
business (e.g. buying and re-selling; buying, adding value and re-selling, providing a 
service etc.) may change the definition of reinvestment for business owners and also the 
timing of the reinvestment.  For instance, they may be different for a restaurant owner than 
for a market vendor.  To control for this factor, we include answers to the question “what 
                                                          
87
 Entrepreneurs selected from a list of statements to indicate why they went into business. Multiple choices 
were available. The answers include: I was fired / lost/retrenched from a previous job; I couldn’t find a job 
elsewhere; To support me / my family; To try out a business idea; I believe I can make more money working 
for myself than for someone else; I had nothing else to do/no other means of survival/no better option; parents 
/ relatives were in business; I saw a good opportunity; I have always wanted my own business; I was 
encouraged by friends and relatives; I needed to supplement my income; Others, please specify. 
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does your business do?” as dummy variables.
88
 The estimates for the variables are jointly 
significant at the 1 percent level.  To economize on space we do not report estimates, and 
they are available upon request.  Fourth, we include the size of the logarithm of the initial 
start-up capital, the logarithm of current sales per employee, the logarithm of duration 
business and the logarithm of number of workers since these size gauges are expected to 
determine the growth potential of a business- and hence the profitability of reinvestment.  
We also control for rural versus. urban location of the enterprise, as the accessibility to 
infrastructure might affect expectations and drive variations in reinvestment rates.  
Including all of these control variables does not affect our key empirical finding. 
Table 6.4: Robustness checks for reinvestment and save with household member 
relationship 
 (1) (2) 
   
Save with household members -0.07** -0.18*** 
 (0.03) (0.05) 
Formal loan 0.02  
 (0.05)  
Semi formal loan -0.11  
(0.09)  
Informal loan -0.12  
 (0.07)  
Initial capital 0.02**  
 (0.01)  
Sales per worker -0.02  
(0.01)  
Rural 0.03  
 (0.03)  
Size 0.04  
 (0.03)  
Duration 0.02  
 (0.01)  
   
Observations 872 650 
Entrepreneurial dummies Yes No 
Activity Dummy Yes No 
Region FE Yes No 
District FE No Yes 
Notes: Reinvestment is the dependent variable in the estimations. We report estimates marginal effects at 
mean values for all estimations and robust standard errors are in parentheses. We use the sample for Formal 
Savers and Household Savers and formal savers as the base category. We additionally control for sector and 
region dummies in the estimations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 We include 4 separate dummy variables for the businesses buying and selling goods; buying, adding value 
and selling goods; making and selling goods; providing service; and other activities including agricultural 
ones. 
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 Finally, in column (2) we replace the region fixed effects with district fixed effects 
to ensure that we are capturing geographical variations well enough that could explain the 
probability of reinvestment.  While our sample becomes smaller, our findings remain.
89
 
6.6 Saving choice, reverse causality and heterogeneity 
While controlling for other enterprise and entrepreneurial characteristics reduces the risk 
that the relationship between savings patterns and the likelihood of reinvestment is a 
spurious one, we cannot exclude the possibility that our relationship is driven by other 
sources of endogeneity, including reverse causation.  As we show in our theoretical model, 
entrepreneurs who are more willing to reinvest might look for saving practices that support 
their investment efforts.  In the following, we focus on the sample of formal and within-
household savers once more since our key result from the empirical analysis of section 6.5 
is that “within household savers” are less likely to re-invest than “formal savers”.  Focusing 
on only one sub-sample also has a methodological advantage as we need fewer exogenous 
determinants to identify the relationship.  For this sample, we investigate the relationship 




 To investigate the determinants of saving choice, we replace the dependent variable 
reinvest with save within household in (14) and regress it on our list of control variables as 
well as on two additional measures denoted by ψ
i
 in our theoretical model: Age of the 
entrepreneur and distance to bank.  Age increases the bargaining power of the entrepreneur 
within the household and this implies a U-shaped relationship between age and the choice 
within household saving.  On the one hand, agents are less likely to be forced to save within 
household as they get older.  On the other hand, when they reach an age giving them 
enough power to protect their savings within the household, they may be more likely to 
                                                          
89
 Note that when we include district fixed effects the total number of observations in the regression decreases 
to 650 because some districts are excluded from the regression in Probit estimations due to perfect prediction. 
Our estimates are robust when we estimate the same model with OLS and do not lose any observations. 
90
 Using age as an instrument may be problematic if age has a direct impact on investment decision (e.g.older 
agents may be less likely to invest their business) However, our test results (see below) show that age does 
not have an impact on reinvestment decision if it is included into the model together with saving choice 
variables..     
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save with household members.  The distance to the nearest bank is expected to increase 
accessibility of “formal savings services”.  We estimate two models with two different 
measures of distance to formal financial institutions.   The first one is a subjective 
distance measure constructed by using the question from the survey: Is there any bank 
branch in one hour walking distance to your house?  However, there might be a concern 
regarding the subjective measure, as entrepreneurs who search for formal savings 
instruments are also those who are more likely to know of the existence of a bank in the 
close proximity.  Therefore, the correlation between the search intensity and some 
unobserved characteristics may bias our results.  For this reason, we estimate a model with 
an additional objective distance measure, the logarithm of ward level minimum distance to 




 Table 6.5 reports the marginal effects from probit estimations for the saving practice 
choice.  In columns (1) and (2) we present the results for models including subjective and 
objective measures respectively.  As we conjecture, the likelihood of saving with household 
members is higher when entrepreneurs are closer to banks.  Moreover, as the age of the 
entrepreneur increases, he or she is less likely to save with household members.  The 
positive coefficient (0.00038) on the square of age indicates that the age saving with 
household members practice relationship is non-linear and U-shaped.  As the age of the 
entrepreneur increases, the impact of the age on the saving practice decreases, and getting 
older increase the probability of saving with household members after the age of 52.  The 
rest of the estimates are also in line with theory.  Entrepreneurs who have access to external 
finance and entrepreneurs with higher education, better training or high income are more 
likely to save formally.  Finally, female entrepreneurs seem more likely to save in formal 
institutions - perhaps to escape from redistributive pressures.  Also, non-married 
entrepreneurs are more likely to save formally. 
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 We use data from the Financial Services Map for Tanzania. This data set gives geographic coordinates of 
bank branches, MFIs and ATMs in 2013 across Tanzania. We match these data with the existing geographic 
coordinates of the wards from which entrepreneurial data are collected. Then we calculate the distance of the 
wards to each financial unit and pick the minimum distance. 
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Table 6.5: The relationship between individual and business characteristics and saving 
choice 
 (1) (2) 
   
Bank branch within one   
hour walking distance 
-0.13***  
(0.04)  
Min. distance to ATM,  
bank branch, or MFI 
 0.04*** 
 (0.01) 
Age -0.04*** -0.04*** 




 (0.00) (0.00) 
Borrowed -0.32*** -0.32*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
Education -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Female -0.10** -0.10** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Single -0.14** -0.14* 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
Notraining 0.02 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Income -0.10*** -0.10*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   
Observations 877 797 
Notes: Save with household member is the dependent variable in the estimations. We report estimates 
marginal effects at mean values for all estimations and robust standard errors are in parentheses. We use the 
sample for Formal Savers and Household Savers and formal savers as the base category. We additionally 
control for region dummies in the estimations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 To circumvent the endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable 
methodology which makes use of the determinants of saving practice choice.  Since our 
dependent and main explanatory variables are binary, we use a system approach, and utilize 
the age of the entrepreneur and her distance to the nearest bank as instruments in a 
nonlinear recursive bivariate probit model.
92
 Specifically the model is formulated as 
follows: 
                                                          
92
 We also estimate the same model by using the 2SLS method. We have the same expected signs for the 
variables of interest but the coefficient estimates are bigger and imprecise as the variance increases. This may 
be because both the dependent and independent variables of interest are binary. Chibus et al. (2012) suggests 
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 (6.15)               ∗                 
             ,  
(6.16)                    
     
             .  
 We assume that error terms    and    are distributed via bivariate normal distribution.  So, 
       ,         and             .  We identify the system by using the vector Z 
which includes the distance to bank measure and age of the entrepreneur as well as its 
square and use a similar set of controls as in the main specifications.
93
 Table 6.6 shows the 
results.  Before presenting the estimates of the bivariate probit model, in columns (1) and 
(2), we test in unreported regressions the exogeneity of our instruments. As standard over 
identification tests for 2SLS are not available for Bivariate Probit estimation, we utilize an 
informal test procedure commonly used in the empirical literature (e.g. Egger et al., 2011; 
Booker et al., 2013): We introduce the instruments into the benchmark model and show that 
none of the instruments has explanatory power for the probability to reinvest.  We also test 
the joint significance of our exogenous variables in the bivariate probit model: they are 
jointly significant at the 1 percent level (Chi-square>20 and p-value<0.001 for both 
specifications).  In columns (3) and (4) we present the recursive bivariate-probit estimates 
by using age in both models, but two different distance measures as our instruments.  Also, 
Table A.6.2 in the Appendix shows detailed estimation results for the model, including the 
control variables. 
 The instrumental variable estimations reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6.6 
confirm our results.  The coefficient estimate of save with household member remains 
negative and significant for both instrument sets.  Different measures of distance produce 
similar results thereby minimizing the concerns regarding the validity of the distance-to-
bank proxies.  We also note that the estimates for the exogenous variables have the 
expected signs.  The probability to save in the household decreases as the proximity to bank 
decreases and entrepreneur gets older.  We have also important evidence minimizing the 
endogeneity concerns: The estimated cross correlation coefficient,  ̂ , is not statistically 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
2SLS may give very different results and imprecise estimates if the number of observations is lower than 
5000 (in our case it is 877). 
93
 We do not use sector dummies in the bivariate probit estimations since our model does not converge. 
However, not using sector dummies does not change our results since our main results shown in Table 6.3 are 
robust when we do not control for them. 
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significant in both estimations, so we do not reject the null hypothesis that    and    are 
uncorrelated and               is exogenous for saving practice choice shown by (6.16). 
Table 6.6: Exogeneity of instruments and estimate for save with household members 
by using bivariate probit 
 Exogeneity checks  Bivariate Probit Estimates 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Save with household member -0.11*** -0.10  -0.20** -0.20** 
(0.04) (0.04)  (0.10) (0.10) 
Bank branch within one hour  
walking distance 
0.00     
(0.03)     
Min. distance to ATM, bank  
branch, or MFI  
 -0.01    
 (0.01)    
Age 0.01 0.01    
 (0.00) (0.01)    
Age
2 
0.00 0.00    
 (0.00) (0.00)    
 ̂    0.23 0.27 
    (0.23) (0.24) 
      
Observations 877 797  877 797 
Distance measure - -  Bank branch 
within one hour 
walking distance  
Min. distance to 
ATM, bank branch, 
or MFI   
Methodology Probit Probit  Bivariate Probit Bivariate Probit 
Notes: We report estimates marginal effects at mean values for all estimations. We report robust standard 
errors for columns 1 and 3 and clustered robust standard errors at ward level in columns 2-4 in parentheses. 
We use the sample for Formal Savers and Household Savers and formal savers as the base category We 
additionally control for variables introduced above and region dummies in the estimations. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 As a final robustness check, we control for Rural dummy (equals to if the 
entrepreneur lives at a rural area), which is correlated with distance to bank measures, in 
our bivariate probit estimations.  We do not report estimation results to economize on space 
and they are available upon request.  The coefficient estimates for “Save with household 
members” are robust, and Rural has no explanatory power for reinvestment in both 
Bivariate Probit models. However distance to bank measures predicting Save informal with 
household members are not statistically significant in the estimation. These findings may 
imply that the entrepreneurs living at rural areas save through household members since 
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they have limited access to banking services. Yet we cannot rule out the possibility that 
distance to bank may be correlated with some unobserved factors that may be correlated 
with reinvestment decision; we therefore should be cautious in interpreting the results.  
 As we discussed in section 6.2.6, we expect heterogeneous reinvestment responses 
with respect to the within-household saving practice.  Therefore, in order to deepen our 
analysis and strengthen our identification, we present a set of impact heterogeneity results 
in Table 6.7.  Specifically, we compare the reinvestment behaviour of entrepreneurs who 
save with household members with the reinvestment behaviour of entrepreneurs that use 
formal savings mechanisms across the following two sample splits.  First, we split the 
sample into female and male entrepreneurs.  Theory and empirical evidence suggests that 
social constraints on accessibility of saved funds are higher for women compared to men.  
Second, we split the sample into entrepreneurs that are household heads and entrepreneurs 
that are spouses, children or siblings.  We expect the social constraints to be less strong for 
household heads. 
Table 6.7: Heterogeneity in the impact of saving in the household on reinvestment   
  Gender  Position in the household  





        
Save with household 
member 
 -0.12** -0.22***  -0.22*** -0.16***  
 (0.05) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.06)  
        
Observations  402 275  213 441  
Notes: We report marginal effects at mean values for all estimations from Probit estimations and robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. We additionally control for control variables listed in Table 6.1 as well 
as sector and region dummies in all estimations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The numbers of 
observations are less than original sample because some control variables perfectly predict outcome 
variables. We estimate all models for comparable subsamples where there is variation in our outcome 
variable with respect to control variables. We use the sample for Formal Savers and Household Savers 
and formal savers as the base category. 
 
 
 The results in Table 6.7 confirm the differential relationships between household 
savings and reinvestment decisions.  The results reveal that the marginal effects of Save 
with household members on reinvestment are larger - and more significant - for female and 
non-head family members.  While the negative relationship between saving within the 
household and reinvestment decisions are significant at least at the 10% level for all groups, 
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the economic significance is large for female, non-household heads - female and non-head 
family members are respectively 10 and 6 percentage points less likely to reinvest than 
male and family head household members when they save informal with household 
members instead of saving at a formal bank account.  Supporting our theoretical 
predictions, this result implies that entrepreneurs who are in disadvantageous positions in 
their households are more negatively affected from inefficient saving practices.  
6.7 Conclusion 
Past research has identified several factors that are important for entrepreneurial investment 
in developing countries.  In this study, we explored how different entrepreneurial saving 
practices - i.e. saving via formal financial institutions, individually (under the mattress), 
within the household or within informal arrangements, such as ROSCAs - are related with 
the likelihood of reinvestment.  To this end, we used a novel survey data set collected from 
MSEs in Tanzania and distinguished multiple saving practices of entrepreneurs as well their 
earnings retention behaviour.  We motivated our empirical research with a simple 
theoretical model that shows how different saving practices can influence investment 
decisions.  We have three key empirical results.  First, we show that saving and the 
probability of reinvestment are significantly correlated.  Second, we provide evidence that 
entrepreneurs who save by giving funds to other household members are less likely to 
reinvest than formal savers.  Third, we document that the difference in the likelihood of 
reinvestment across saving practices is significantly higher for those entrepreneurs who 
potentially have low bargaining power in the household. 
 Our results have important implications for the interactions between enterprise 
performance and access to financial, in particular saving, services.  Enterprises that exploit 
reinvestment opportunities are expected to be more likely to sustain higher productivity 
levels and survive more often.  Access to formal bank account services in this respect could 
be the key to facilitate enterprise performance in financially developing societies and may 
increase the reinvestment likelihood up to 10 percentage points.  Moreover our findings 
suggest that female and younger entrepreneurs are more likely to demand these services 
and may benefit most from the introduction of formal saving instruments in low income 
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areas.  Therefore, from a development policy perspective, targeting those entrepreneurs and 
facilitating their access to formal saving instruments could be thought as a priority.    
 We should mention two caveats.  First, one may be concerned of whether our 
instruments are exogenous or we control for all confounding factors in the estimation.  
Although our main results are robust to various checks, future research using quasi-
experimental variation in saving practice will be a contribution to the literature. Second we 
do not observe variation in intensive margin for neither the savings nor investment levels, 
and this may have implications on results. For instance entrepreneurs who save by 
inefficient means may increase their savings in intensive margin.  That is there is need for 
future data collection concerning savings and investment levels.    
Our research raises also some new issues regarding the implications of savings 
practices of entrepreneurs.  First, why do savers inside households not open a bank account 
to save?  Although we implicitly show proximity to banks as an important factor to save in 
a formal account, identification of all factors is not in the scope of this study.  Second, what 
is the exact role of pressure inside the household that does not allow earnings retention?  
These important questions we leave to future work. 
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6.A Appendix: Additional tables 
Table A.6.1: Estimates for reinvestment and saving/saving practices relationship by 
using full sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES reinvest reinvest reinvest 
        
Save formal 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 















 Save with household members 
  
-0.01 
   
(0.02) 
Save with people outside household 
  
0.04 
   
(0.03) 
Borrowed 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Education 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Single 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
No training -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Observations 5,803 5,803 5,803 
Sample All All All 
Hypothesis: p-values p-values p-values 
Ho: Save formal - Save informal=0 0.072 - - 
Ho: Save formal - Save informal individually=0 - 0.182 0.176 
Ho:  Save formal - Save informal with others=0 - 0.001 - 
Ho:  Save formal - Save with household members=0 - - 0.000 
Ho:  Save formal - Save with people outside household=0 - - 0.066 
Notes: Reinvestment is the dependent variable in the estimations. We report estimates marginal 
effects at mean values for all estimations and robust standard errors are in parentheses. We 
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Table A.6.2: Heterogeneity in the impact of saving in the household on reinvestment   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Save with household 
embers 
-0.81**  -0.86**  
(0.37)  (0.41)  
Bank branch within one 
hour walking distance 
 -0.39***   
 (0.12)   
Min. distance to ATM, 
bank branch, or MFI 
   0.10*** 
   (0.04) 
Age  -0.12***  -0.11*** 
  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Age
2
  0.00***  0.00*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Borrowed 0.07 -0.98*** 0.05 -0.97*** 
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) 
Education -0.07 -0.33*** -0.07 -0.34*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Female -0.24** -0.27** -0.31*** -0.28** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
Single 0.25 -0.47** 0.25 -0.44* 
 (0.18) (0.22) (0.20) (0.24) 
Notraining -0.32*** 0.05 -0.36*** 0.04 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) 
Income 0.08 -0.28*** 0.06 -0.27*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Constant 0.05 8.51*** 0.56 8.08*** 
 (1.07) (0.97) (1.23) (1.08) 
     
Observations 877 877 797 797 
Notes: We report bivariate probit estimates. We report robust standard errors for columns 1 and 3 and 
clustered robust standard errors at ward level in columns 2-4 in parentheses. We use the sample for Formal 
Savers and Household Savers and formal savers as the base category. We additionally control for region 
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Table A.6.3: Bivariate Probit Estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Save with household 
embers 
-0.81**  -0.86**  
(0.37)  (0.41)  
Bank branch within one 
hour walking distance 
 -0.39***   
 (0.12)   
Min. distance to ATM, 
bank branch, or MFI 
   0.10*** 
   (0.04) 
Age  -0.12***  -0.11*** 
  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Age
2
  0.00***  0.00*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Borrowed 0.07 -0.98*** 0.05 -0.97*** 
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) 
Education -0.07 -0.33*** -0.07 -0.34*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Female -0.24** -0.27** -0.31*** -0.28** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
Single 0.25 -0.47** 0.25 -0.44* 
 (0.18) (0.22) (0.20) (0.24) 
Notraining -0.32*** 0.05 -0.36*** 0.04 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) 
Income 0.08 -0.28*** 0.06 -0.27*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Constant 0.05 8.51*** 0.56 8.08*** 
 (1.07) (0.97) (1.23) (1.08) 
     
Observations 877 877 797 797 
Notes: We report bivariate probit estimates. We report robust standard errors for columns 1 and 3 and 
clustered robust standard errors at ward level in columns 2-4 in parentheses. We use the sample for Formal 
Savers and Household Savers and formal savers as the base category. We additionally control for region 
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